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Rawlings, Populism, and the Civil Liberties Tradition in Ghana

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 August 2021

E. Gyimah-Boadi  and
Donald Rothchild
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Extract

On returning to power following the coup d’etat of December 31, 1981, Flight-Lt. Jerry John Rawlings set two major goals: the restoration of power to the people and the waging of a “holy war” against corruption. In line with these objectives, he suspended the constitution, banned political parties, detained party leaders, and took a number of extra-legal actions. Almost immediately questions began to surface about the prospects of the regime’s impact on Ghana’s long civil liberties tradition. This essay will examine the basis for these fears and assess whether or not they might be justified. An attempt is made to do this by placing the Ghanaian civil liberties situation in a broader comparative context, seeking in this way to give a balanced perspective on this subject.

Type
Insight
Information
African Issues , Volume 12 , Issue 3-4 , Fall/Winter 1982 , pp. 64 - 69
Copyright
Copyright © African Studies Association 1982 

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References

Notes

1. West Africa, January 18, 1982, p. 197. On the Rawlings regime’s commitment to “ensur[e] that power is exercised by the people organised from the grassroots,” see Policy Guidelines of the Provisional National Defence Council (Accra: PNDC, May 1982), p. 7.

2. Ghana News (Washington, D.C.) 11, 8 (August 1982): 5.

3. On this, see Busia’s, K. A. discussion of the recognized rights of citizens in The Position of the Chief in the Modern Political System of Ashanti (London: Oxford University Press, 1951), chapter 3Google Scholar.

4. See Asante, S. K. B., “The Politics of Confrontation: The Case of Kobina Sekyi and the Colonial System in Ghana,” Universitas 6, 2 (1977)Google Scholar.

5. Kimble, David, A Political History of Ghana, 1850-1928 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), p. 550 Google Scholar.

6. Nkrumah, Kwame, Ghana: The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah (Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1957), p. xvi Google Scholar.

7. Quoted in Rothchild, Donald, “On the Application of the Westminster Model to Ghana,” Centennial Review 6, 4 (Fall 1960): 469 Google Scholar.

8. Ibid., pp. 469-70.

9. In particular, see Ocran, A. K., Politics of the Sword (London: Rex Collings, 1977), pp. 1 Google Scholar, 47; and Africa, A. A., The Ghana Coup (London: Frank Cass, 1966), pp. 75 Google Scholar, 119. For an interesting discussion of this point, see Price, Robert M., “A Theoretical Approach to Military Rule in New States: Reference Group Theory and the Ghanaian Case,” World Politics 23 (April 1971): 399–430 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

10. Dowse, Robert, “Military and Police Rule,” in Austin, Dennis and Luckham, Robin (eds.), Politicians and Soldiers in Ghana (London: Frank Cass, 1975)., pp. 16, 17, 25Google Scholar.

11. Austin, “Introduction,” in Austin and Luckham, Politicians and Soldiers, pp. 12-13.

12. West Africa, January 18, 1982, p. 197.

13. West Africa, March 29, 1982, p. 186.

14. West Africa, October 11, 1982, p. 267; and Ghana News 11, 10 (October 1982): 5.

15. West Africa, October 4, 1982, p. 2551.

16. Certainly, a tendency toward lawlessness preceded the December 1981 coup in Ghana. In June 1980 Maxwell Owusu wrote of the PNP government under President H. Limann as follows: “The nation has clearly lost her capacity for self-regulation. Social control at all institutional levels is for all intents and purposes non-existent. There is a virtual breakdown of law and order, as nearly everyone does what she or he likes without let or hindrance” (Maxwell Owusu,”Current Socio-Economie Situation . . . What’s To Be Done,” Daily Graphic [Accra], June 13, 1980, p. 4).

17. Ghanaian Times (Accra), January 6, 1983, p. 1.

18. West Africa, February 21, 1983, p. 487.

19. For a discussion of the Union Government proposals and the debate that followed, see Rothchild, Donald, “Military Regime Performance: An Appraisal of the Ghana Experience, 1972-78,” Comparative Politics 12, 4 (July 1980): 462-66CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Also see Owusu, Maxwell, “Politics without Parties: Reflections on the Union Government Proposal in Ghana,” African Studies Review 22, 1 (April 1979): 89–108 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

20. On the Union Government referendum campaign and voting results, see Chazan, Naomi and Vine, Victor T. Le, “Politics in a ‘Non-Political’ System: The March 30, 1978, Referendum in Ghana,” African Studies Review 22, 1 (April 1979): 177–207 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

21. Statement of the Catholic Bishops Conference, November 11, 1982 (Accra), p. 1 (mimeo). Also see Christian Council of Ghana, “Memorandum to the PNDC,” in their publication The Christian Council Churches and the Revolution (Accra: Christian Council, 1983), pp. 3–5 Google Scholar.

22. Statement of the Catholic Bishops Conference, pp. 3-4 (italics added).

23. On the economic difficulties inherited by the Rawlings regime, see Rothchild, Donald, “Ghana’s Economy: An African Test Case for Political Democracy,” in Legum, Colin (ed.), Africa Contemporary Record, 1979-1980, 12 (New York: Africana Publishing Co., 1981): A137-45Google Scholar.

24. Policy Guidelines, p. 8.

25. Ibid., p. 5.

26. See Jeffries, Richard, “Rawlings and the Political Economy of Underdevelopment in Ghana,” African Affairs 81, 324 (July 1982): 307-17CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

27. For a discussion of the PNDC’s four-year economic recovery program as outlined by Dr.Botchwey, Kwesi, see the Secretary for Finance and Economic Planning, The PNDC’s Programme for Reconstruction and Development (Accra: Information Services Department, December 30, 1982)Google Scholar. Among other things, the program calls for a government monopoly of the import-export trade, increases in the state’s holding of stock in the banking and insurance businesses, and a crash program to increase agricultural output. Significantly, the World Bank has indicated support for the new government in these endeavors, agreeing to provide Ghana with $30 million to rehabilitate the transportation system and improve agriculture and $80 million to reappraise programs in the timber, cocoa, and mining sectors.

28. Chazan, Naomi, “Ethnicity and Politics in Ghana,” Political Science Quarterly 97, 3 (Fall 1982): 483 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

29. Hansen, Emmanuel and Collins, Paul, “The Army, the State, and the Rawlings Revolution in Ghana,” African Affairs 79, 314 (January 1980): 5 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

30. Rothchild, Donald and Gyimah-Boadi, E., “Ghana’s Return to Civilian Rule,” Africa Today 28, 1 (June 1981): 9–10 Google Scholar.