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The New Geostrategic Situation in Central Africa

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 August 2021

Filip Reyntjens
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Extract

The war that brought Laurent-Désiré Kabila and the AFDL (Alliance of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo/Zaire) into power in Kinshasa must be placed in the broader context of three conflicts—that of the Great Lakes, of course, which is the most immediately obvious, but also those of Sudan and Angola. The proximity of these unstable locations and the game of alliances (every actor uses the “my enemy’s enemy is my friend” logic) brought these conflicts together, creating a potential war zone from Asmara to Luanda. Zaire is the connection among these three wars: Mobutu’s government supported Khartoum’s regime against the South Sudanese guerrillas, in particular the SPLA, who are supported in turn by Asmara, Addis Ababa, and Kampala. Zaire’s territory served as a rear base for attacks by the diverse armed movements against Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi.

Type
Research Article
Information
African Issues , Volume 26 , Issue 1 , 1998 , pp. 10 - 13
Copyright
Copyright © African Studies Association 1998 

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References

Notes

1. I won’t demonstrate here the profound Rwandan engagement in the Congolese/Zairian conflict, especially since General Kagame finally revealed this in his famous interview in the Washington Post on July 9, 1997 (John Pomfret, “Rwandans Led Revolt in Congo, Defense Minister Says; Arms, Troops Supplied for Anti-Mobutu Drive”). He declared that the Rwandan government “planned and directed the rebellion,” that the Rwandan Army “participated in the seizure of at least four cities” (Kinshasa, Lubumbashi, Kenge, and Kisangani), and that, well before the beginning of the rebellion, Rwanda had furnished training and arms. I will come back to the reasons for and the consequences of this acknowledgment.

2. Actually, it seems that Rwanda simply displaced their exterior problems to the interior of the country. Insurrection increased considerably after the return of hundreds of thousands of refugees, particularly in the west and in the northwest, but elsewhere as well. In June 1997 about a third of Rwanda’s communes were “out of bounds.”

3. Promfret, John, “In Congo, Revenge Became Rebellion,” Washington Post, July 6, 1997 Google Scholar.

4. The weekly Angolan publication Espresso of May 3, 1997, affirms that President Dos Santos would have insisted, according to Kabila, that he continue his offensive. Citing military sources, it also wrote that Angolan troops would have assisted the AFDL in the seizure of Tshikapa.

5. Sando, Kabuya-Lumuna, Conflits de l’Est du Zaïre. Repères et Enjeux (Kinshasa: Editions Secco, 1997), 18 Google Scholar.

6. This seems to equally infect Uganda. At the end of July 1997, the rebellious Ugandan ADF movement declared a wish to save Uganda from “Tutsism” (UN DHA, Nairobi, July 31-August 1, 1997).

7. Reproduced based on the narrations of two people present at the meeting.

8. Reuters, Brussels, July 13, 1997.

9. Gemini News Service, Kampala, July 1, 1997.

10. AFP, Kinshasa, July 20, 1997.

11. Gemini News Service, Kampala, July 1, 1997.

12. PANA, Kampala, April 24, 1997.

13. Reuters, Kigali, March 3, 1997.

14. Kabuya-Lumuna Sando, op. cit. There is a question of the creation of “a Tutsi State” (p. 21) and of “a Republic of the Voléanos dominated by the nationals of the Tutsi race” (p. 22).

15. We showed to what point this presentation is ahistoric elsewhere in: Reyntjens, F. and Marysse, S., eds., Con-flits au Kivu (Anvers: University of Anvers, 1996), 17-18Google Scholar.

16. For instance, the former Sudanese minister, Professor Francis Deng, published an article entitled “These Borders Are Not Sacred” in the Washington Post on December 20, 1996.