Skip to main content Accessibility help

We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.

Close cookie message
×
Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-xfwgj Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-03T23:47:28.087Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
Series:   Elements in Epistemology

The Nature and Normativity of Defeat

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 September 2023

Christoph Kelp
Christoph Kelp
Affiliation:
University of Glasgow

Summary

Defeat is the loss of justification for believing something in light of new information. This Element mainly aims to work towards developing a novel account of defeat. It distinguishes among three broad views in the epistemology of defeat: scepticism, internalism, and externalism and argues that that sceptical and internalist accounts of defeat are bound to remain unsatisfactory. As a result, any viable account of defeat must be externalist. While there is no shortage of externalist accounts, the Element provides reason to think that extant accounts remain unsatisfactory. The Element also explains the constructive tasks of developing an alternative account of defeat and showing that it improves on the competition.
Get access

Keywords

epistemologydefeatjustificationknowledgevirtue epistemology
Type
Element
Information
Series: Elements in Epistemology
Online ISBN: 9781009161022
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication: 07 September 2023

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Alston, W. 2002. ‘Plantinga, Naturalism, and Defeat’. In Naturalism Defeated? Essays on Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism, edited by Beilby, J. Ithaca: Cornell University Press 176–203.Google Scholar
Baker-Hytch, M., and Benton, M. A.. 2015. ‘Defeatism Defeated’. Philosophical Perspectives 29: 40–66.Google Scholar
Beddor, B. 2015. ‘Process Reliabilism’s Troubles with Defeat’. Philosophical Quarterly 65: 145–59.Google Scholar
Beddor, B. 2021. ‘Reasons for Reliabilism.’ In Reasons, Justification, and Defeat, edited by Brown, Jessica and Simion, Mona, 146–76. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Bergmann, M. 2006. Justification Without Awareness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
BonJour, L. 1980. ‘Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge’. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5: 53–73.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
BonJour, L. 1985. The Structure of Empirical Justification. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Chisholm, R. 1977. Theory of Knowledge. 2nd ed. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.Google Scholar
Christensen, D., and Bickhard, M. H.. 2002. ‘The Process Dynamics of Normative Function.’ The Monist 85: 3–28.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Coates, A. 2012. ‘Rational Epistemic Akrasia’. American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (2): 113–24.Google Scholar
Comesaña, J. 2005. ‘Unsafe Knowledge’. Synthese 146: 395–404.Google Scholar
Conee, E., and Feldman, R.. 2004. Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Firth, R. 1978. ‘Are Epistemic Concepts Reducible to Ethical Concepts?’ In Values and Morals: Essays in Honor of William Frankena, Charles Stevenson, and Richard Brandt, edited by Goldman, A. and Kim, J., 215–29. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.Google Scholar
Fernández Vargas, M. A. ed. 2016. Performance Epistemology: Foundations and Applications. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Frances, B. 2005. Scepticism Comes Alive. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fricker, M. 2007. Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Gettier, E. 1963. ‘Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?’ Analysis 23: 121–3.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Godfrey-Smith, P. 1994. ‘A Modern History Theory of Functions’. Noûs 28: 344–62.Google Scholar
Goldberg, S. C. 2018. To the Best of Our Knowledge: Social Expectations and Epistemic Normativity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Goldman, A. 1979. ‘What Is Justified Belief?’ In Justification and Knowledge, edited by Pappas, G., 1–25. Dordrecht: Reidel.Google Scholar
Goldman, A. 2012. Reliabilism and Contemporary Epistemology. New York/NY: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Graham, P. 2012. ‘Epistemic Entitlement’. Noûs 46: 449–82.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Graham, P. and Lyons, J. 2021. ‘The Structure of Defeat: Pollock’s Evidentialism, Lackey’s Framework, and Prospects for Reliabilism’. In Reasons, Justification, and Defeat, edited by Brown, J. and Simion, M. Oxford: Oxford University Press 39–68.Google Scholar
Greco, J. 2010. Achieving Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Greco, J. 2012. ‘A (Different) Virtue Epistemology’. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85: 1–26.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Greco, J., and Turri, J.. 2013. ‘Virtue Epistemology.’ In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Zalta, E.N., Winter 2013. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/epistemology-virtue/.Google Scholar
Harman, G. 1980. ‘Reasoning and Evidence One Does Not Possess’. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5: 163–82.Google Scholar
Hetherington, Stephen Cade 2001. Good Knowledge, Bad Knowledge: On Two Dogmas of Epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Kelp, C. 2009. ‘Knowledge and Safety’. Journal of Philosophical Research 34: 21–31.Google Scholar
Kelp, C. 2016. ‘Justified Belief: Knowledge First-Style’. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93: 79–100. https://doi.org/10/grpk2f.Google Scholar
Kelp, C. 2017. ‘Knowledge First Virtue Epistemology.’ In Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind, edited by Carter, A., Gordon, E., and Jarvis, B.. Oxford: Oxford University Press 223–245.Google Scholar
Kelp, C. 2018. Good Thinking: A Knowledge First Virtue Epistemology. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
Kelp, C. 2019. ‘How to Be a Reliabilist’. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98: 346–74. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12438.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kelp, C. 2021a. Inquiry, Knowledge, and Understanding. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kelp, C. 2021b. ‘Theory of Inquiry’. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103: 359–84. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12719.Google Scholar
Kelp, C. 2023. ‘Agent Functionalism’. In The Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, edited by Sylvan, K.. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.Google Scholar
Kelp, C., and Greco, J.. 2020. Virtue Theoretic Epistemology: New Methods and Approaches. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Kelp, C., and Simion, M.. 2021. Sharing Knowledge: A Functionalist Account of Assertion. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Kelp, C., and Simion, M. 2023. ‘What Is Normative Defeat?’ Manuscript.Google Scholar
Kornblith, H. ed. 2001. Epistemology: Internalism and Externalism. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Lackey, J. 1999. ‘Testimonial Knowledge and Transmission’. Philosophical Quarterly 49: 471–90.Google Scholar
Lackey, J. 2003. ‘A Minimal Expression of Non-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony’. Noûs 37: 706–23.Google Scholar
Lackey, J. 2008. Learning from Words: Testimony as a Source of Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Lackey, J. 2018. ‘Credibility and the Distribution of Epistemic Goods.’ In Believing in Accordance with the Evidence, edited by McCain, K.. Dordrecht: Springer 145–168.Google Scholar
Lasonen-Aarnio, M. 2010. ‘Unreasonable Knowledge’. Philosophical Perspectives 24: 1–21.Google Scholar
Lasonen-Aarnio, M. 2014. ‘Higher-Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat’. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88: 314–45.Google Scholar
Lehrer, K. 1990. Theory of Knowledge. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
Lehrer, K., and Paxson, T. D.. 1969. ‘Knowledge: Undefeated Justified True Belief’. Journal of Philosophy 66: 225–37.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lyons, J. 2009. Perception and Basic Beliefs: Zombies, Modules, and the Problem of the External World. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McLaughlin, P. 2000. What Functions Explain: Functional Explanation and Self-Reproducing Systems. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Millikan, R. 1984. Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Millikan, R. 2004. Varieties of Meaning. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Neander, K. 1991. ‘Functions as Selected Effects: The Conceptual Analyst’s Defence’. Philosophy of Science 58: 168–84.Google Scholar
Neta, R., and Rohrbaugh, G.. 2004. ‘Luminosity and the Safety of Knowledge’. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85: 396–406.Google Scholar
Nottelmann, N. 2021. ‘Against Normative Defeat’. Mind 130: 1183–1204.Google Scholar
Plantinga, A. 1993. Warrant and Proper Function. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Plantinga, A. 2000. Warranted Christian Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Pollock, J. L. 1986. Contemporary Theories of Knowledge. London: Hutchinson.Google Scholar
Pritchard, D. 2005. Epistemic Luck. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Shah, N. 2006. ‘A New Argument for Evidentialism’. The Philosophical Quarterly 56: 481–98.Google Scholar
Silva, P., and Oliveira, L.. eds. 2022. Propositional and Doxastic Justification: New Essays on Their Nature and Significance. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
Simion, M. 2019. ‘Knowledge-First Functionalism’. Philosophical Issues 29: 254–67.Google Scholar
Simion, M. 2023. ‘Resistance to Evidence and the Duty to Believe’. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12964Google Scholar
Sosa, E. 1999. ‘How to Defeat Opposition to Moore’. In Philosophical Perspectives, edited by Tomberlin, J., 137–49. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Sosa, E. 2015. Judgment and Agency. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Sosa, E. 2021. Epistemic Explanations. A Theory of Telic Normativity, and What It Explains. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Sartwell, Crispin 1992. ‘Why Knowledge Is Merely True Belief’. Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):167–80.Google Scholar
Swain, M. 1974. ‘Epistemic Defeasibility’. American Philosophical Quarterly 11: 15–25.Google Scholar
Turri, John 2012. ‘Is Knowledge Justified True Belief?’ Synthese 184 (3): 247–59.Google Scholar
Wedgwood, R. 2012. ‘Justified Inference’. Synthese 189 (2): 273–95.Google Scholar
Williamson, T. 2000. Knowledge and Its Limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Williamson, T. 2009. ‘Replies to Critics.’ In Williamson on Knowledge, edited by Pritchard, D. and Greenough, P., 279–384. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Zagzebski, L. 1996. Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Zimmermann, M. 1997. ‘Moral Responsibility and Ignorance’. Ethics 107: 410–26.Google Scholar

Save element to Kindle

To save this element to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

The Nature and Normativity of Defeat
Available formats
×

Save element to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

The Nature and Normativity of Defeat
Available formats
×

Save element to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

The Nature and Normativity of Defeat
Available formats
×