3.1 Why Describe Disciplinary Approaches?

A common feature of many of the projects describing individual disciplinary approaches is an effort to direct attention away from the specifics of a discipline’s practice and toward its intellectual or practical essence. In contrast, the disciplinary specifics – such as subject matter, tools and techniques – are described as a distraction that misleads people as to what really characterises or constitutes that discipline, especially the thinking involved. For example, Reference BrownBrown (2008) famously contrasted the integrative and innovative role of designers with the public’s perceptions of design as a merely stylistic activity:

What’s especially interesting is that it seems many disciplines feel misunderstood in the way Brown describes. This is stated particularly clearly in discussions of geographical and historical thinking, approaches that many people might imagine they already understand from their schooling:

Similar points have been made across a wide range of projects describing disciplinary approaches. For example, systems thinking should not be mistaken for computer modelling (Reference MeadowsMeadows, 2008, p. 6), computational thinking should not be mistaken for computer programming (Reference WingWing, 2006, p. 34) and scientific thinking should not be mistaken for scientific knowledge (Reference Gauld and HukinsGauld & Hukins, 1980, p. 109). Clearly, in describing disciplinary approaches, many people have been concerned that their own disciplines have previously been confused for the specifics of their subject matter or their techniques, rather than the underlying essence of their practice, whatever that might be. Abstraction is seemingly the preferred way to move beyond such distracting details, revealing what lies beneath.

A consequence of abstracting from the specifics of disciplinary practices is that the resulting descriptions are no longer tied so closely to those disciplines’ traditional domains of application. As such, it is a feature of many projects that they advocate for the wide-ranging applicability of the disciplinary approaches that they are describing. These are approaches that can ostensibly be learnt by many people outside the originating discipline and implemented by them in many contexts or domains. For example, in promoting design thinking, Reference PressmanPressman (2018) insists that it is ‘[n]ot just for architects or product developers, [but] can be applied across many disciplines to solve real world problems and reconcile dilemmas [, … in] politics and society, business, health and science, law, and writing’ (pp. xvii–xviii). Similarly, but now considering systems thinking, and especially the capacity to distinguish multiple system levels, Reference Wilensky and ResnickWilensky and Resnick (1999) say that the need for this ‘arises in many different domains, among many different types of learners’ (p. 3). To give just one more example, Reference WingWing (2006) claims that, ‘[c]omputational thinking is a fundamental skill for everyone, not just for computer scientists [and therefore … ] we should add computational thinking to every child’s analytical ability’ (p. 33). In response to this last proposal, Reference Barr and StephensonBarr and Stephenson (2011) report on work that formalises the components of computational thinking, with suggestions for how those can be introduced across a range of school subjects, including maths, science, social studies and language arts. So, once abstracted from their specific application domains, and framed in general terms, many forms of disciplinary approach are celebrated for their wide-ranging applicability: if only everyone would pay attention, not get distracted by the details, and think like a practitioner of … [insert your favourite discipline here].

Although it is not the main focus of this present work, it is important to acknowledge that the codification and application of disciplinary approaches is seemingly successful. Representations of things like design thinking are typically driven by practical goals rather than deep conceptual commitments or theoretical agendas. The challenge is capturing enough about the disciplinary approach so that it can be understood and applied by others, often influencing their own training and practice in a relatively short period. To this end, there are, just as examples, accounts of the successful application of design thinking in business contexts (Reference Liedtka, King and BennettLiedtka et al., 2013), of systems thinking in healthcare development (Reference Bashford, Myint and WinBashford et al., 2018) and of entrepreneurial thinking in institutional restructuring (Reference Jacob, Lundqvist and HellsmarkJacob et al., 2003). Other disciplinary approaches are often more oriented toward educational outcomes in school settings, but there too we find reports of how training in specific disciplinary approaches positively influences outcomes in the associated disciplines and sometimes also in others. For examples, see studies of the effectiveness of training in computational thinking (Reference Scherer, Siddiq and Sánchez ViverosScherer et al., 2019), mathematical thinking (Reference Algani and JmalAlgani & Jmal, 2020), evolutionary thinking (Reference Novick and CatleyNovick & Catley, 2016), geographical thinking (Reference Karkdijk, van der Schee and AdmiraalKarkdijk et al., 2013) and historical thinking (Reference Keleşzade, Güneyli and ÖzkulKeleşzade et al., 2018).

3.2 Are the Descriptions Agreed Upon?

Despite the apparent success of promoting and applying disciplinary approaches, there can be some inconsistency in the claims made about just what kind of thing they actually are. This has led to complaints, in many of the projects, that the central concepts under consideration are not well understood. For example, discussions of design thinking often engage with the problem of how poorly defined the concept is, and how the term is used in overlapping and conflicting ways. To illustrate, here are just three examples: Reference KimbellKimbell (2011) says that ‘those who support [design thinking’s] application to business or more broadly to public services or social problems, have trouble articulating what it is’ (pp. 288–289); Reference Johansson-Sköldberg, Woodilla and ÇetinkayaJohansson-Sköldberg et al. (2013) say that ‘the design thinking discourse … has different meanings depending on its context’ (p. 121) and Reference Patel and MehtaPatel and Mehta (2017) say that ‘[t]here is a lack of consensus amongst prominent champions of design thinking about its precise definition’ (p. 516). The result of all this is that there are many attempts to explicitly make sense of design thinking, either in general, or for specific communities (e.g. see Reference AntleAntle, 2017; Reference Inns and MountainInns & Mountain, 2020; Reference MadsonMadson, 2021).

Although complaints about the diffuse meaning of design thinking point exclusively at that term or concept, this really isn’t a problem that is unique to just one disciplinary approach. The literatures on many other approaches have also complained about the vague and inconsistent meanings of their terms. For example, in describing systems thinking, Reference Stave and HopperStave and Hopper (2007) explain that ‘although the goal of getting people to think more systemically is broadly shared in the system dynamics community, the term “systems thinking” is used in a variety of sometimes conflicting ways’ (p. 1). Or, writing of computational thinking (CT), Reference Shute, Sun and Asbell-ClarkeShute et al. (2017) complain that ‘CT definitions vary in their operationalization … The definition of CT is evolving as researchers begin to aggregate knowledge about CT’ (p. 144). Or, writing of scientific thinking, Reference Gauld and HukinsGauld and Hukins (1980) say ‘[o]ne of the problems which faces a reviewer in such an area as this is the lack of agreement about the meanings to be attributed to various terms that are used’ (p. 131). To give just one more example, in concluding an edited book focussed exclusively on mathematical thinking, Reference Sternberg, Sternberg and Ben-ZeevSternberg (1996) writes that

Seemingly, all significant projects to define and codify disciplinary approaches have encountered the same problem of vague and varying meanings of their central concepts. Each project discusses this problem as though it is a characteristic feature of the specific disciplinary approach being considered – and an individual failing of that project – but really it is just a feature of all such projects. Although only writing about scientific thinking, Reference Gauld and HukinsGauld and Hukins (1980, quoted above) offer a multi-point explanation for why this imprecision prevails in that long-running project, an explanation that I here generalise to the wider set of projects trying to describe any disciplinary approach:Footnote ¹⁰

1. 1. few projects to define a specific disciplinary approach engage with the relevant research on more general forms of thinking, or habits of mind;

2. 2. few projects connect with the philosophical study of the relevant discipline (e.g. philosophy of design, philosophy of science), even though different conceptions of the discipline would lead to different conceptions of that discipline’s approach;

3. 3. sometimes a specific disciplinary approach is defined as a single holistic thing, and sometimes as being made up of a set of components;

4. 4. where components are defined, this is often done without any indication of the relationships between them; sometimes two or more components might appear to be the same as each other, or they might overlap, or one might subsume the other, or one might entail the other, and so on;

5. 5. it is seldom acknowledged that some components might conflict with each other, for example when those components describe practitioners as being persistent yet flexible, or critical yet open-minded;

6. 6. the lists of components that define any specific disciplinary approach have typically been developed through consultation with subject matter experts or practitioners, not psychologists, so the use of words like ‘thinking’, ‘attitudes’ or ‘habits of mind’ need not conform to accepted technical understandings of those words (see Reference Gauld and HukinsGauld & Hukins, 1980, pp. 130–134).

Perhaps sitting above the six points provided by Gauld and Hukins is a more general point: projects to define different forms of disciplinary approach struggle with imprecision because those projects are very ambitious. Disciplines can be large and complex things, with considerable variation in how individuals and groups draw the boundaries around those disciplines, and also within them. The practitioners and practices that make up those disciplines are also varied, and so arriving at a simple yet comprehensive distillation of those practitioners’ disciplinary approaches is unlikely to be a simple process that yields consistent results. Rather than complaining, we could recognise that a multitude of definitions for each disciplinary approach is a meaningful characteristic of the projects, rather than a sign of their failure; we could embrace pluralism.Footnote ¹¹ For example, focussing on design thinking, Reference Carlgren, Rauth and ElmquistCarlgren et al. (2016) tell us that ‘[t]here is a need for a description … that is less normative and static and that is specific enough to be able to frame it as a concept, yet flexible enough to allow for variety in its local use’ (p. 49). Looking to other disciplines, we see that Reference Sternberg, Sternberg and Ben-ZeevSternberg (1996) does not just observe the inconsistent definition of mathematical thinking (as quoted above), but also notes that it could be an error to try to identify any particular features that are common to all the various kinds of mathematical thinking that are discussed (p. 303). Instead, Sternberg suggests that what connects different conceptions of mathematical thinking is more a matter of ‘family resemblances’ (after Reference WittgensteinWittgenstein, 1968, p. 32) or ‘prototypes’ (after Reference RoschRosch, 1973). In describing mathematical thinking – or any other disciplinary approach – there might be some features that are characteristic, but perhaps none of those features are necessary or definitive.

Reference to the concepts of family resemblances or prototypical class members might help us to understand the relations not just between different descriptions of a single disciplinary approach (such as two variants of design thinking), but also between different disciplinary approaches (such as a variant of design thinking and a variant of systems thinking). The outputs from a project to define a particular disciplinary approach might all bear some resemblance to each other or be related to some typical description, but there is not necessarily any feature (or component) that they all share. Similarly, the various outputs from projects to define different disciplinary approaches might also resemble each other or some prototype, but they also need not necessarily have any single common feature.Footnote ¹² For example, not every variant of design thinking contains a component related to ‘empathy’. More generally, not every description of a disciplinary approach needs to highlight the same perspective on that discipline, such as a practitioner’s mindsets or the focus of their attention. That might cause some confusion – and seemingly frustration – but it is probably representative of what is happening. Those people describing disciplinary approaches are looking at subtle, complex and shifting things (i.e. the actual disciplines) and working to provide definite, simple and static descriptions of them (i.e. the specified approaches). This is always done from those people’s own perspectives, even if such perspectives are often left unstated. The resulting descriptions of the disciplines are seldom offensive – and are often very useful – to people from outside the disciplines. However, the same descriptions can seem overly reductive to people inside the disciplines, people who adopt a more critical orientation to the representation of something they already understand well.

Despite confusion over definitions, one thing that is very consistent across the different literatures that describe specific disciplinary approaches is that they are each promoted, at least implicitly, as the good and proper way to think and act, either within that discipline or more widely. For example, Reference KimbellKimbell (2011) observes that ‘design thinking is meant to encompass everything good about designerly practices’ (p. 289). Similarly, Reference Daspit, Fox and FindleyDaspit et al. (2023) recognise that the study of entrepreneurial thinking has focussed exclusively on ‘the positive aspect of the mindset’, and they note that researchers have not studied any ‘potentially deleterious effects’ (p. 24). Perhaps this positivity is not surprising, as these projects to define disciplinary approaches typically aim to capture and codify something like the behaviour of disciplinary experts, and both the disciplines and the experts are viewed as valuable.Footnote ¹³ However, an alternative focus for projects looking to describe disciplinary approaches would be to capture the weaknesses or biases of each discipline, including those exhibited by its expert practitioners. For a rare example of such an analysis, see Reference Blackwell, Church and GreenBlackwell et al.’s (2008) critique of how descriptions of computational thinking have unreflectively promoted abstraction. In contrast, these authors illustrate the negative consequences of the overapplication of abstraction in computer science, to the detriment of the products produced, the users’ experiences of those products and society more generally. In a similar vein, design discourse has seen criticisms of the indiscriminate promotion of empathy (Reference Heylighen and DongHeylighen & Dong, 2019) and ambiguity (Reference Stacey and EckertStacey & Eckert, 2003). Although these two criticisms don’t focus on design thinking, per se, they address concepts that are often central to that disciplinary approach (e.g. see Reference Micheli, Wilner, Bhatti, Mura and BeverlandMicheli et al., 2019; Reference Schweitzer, Groeger and SobelSchweitzer et al., 2016).

3.3 What Kind of Thing Is a Disciplinary Approach?

Some of the confusion and disagreement over disciplinary approaches might stem from a lack of consistency over how disciplinary approaches are described or categorised. If we ask what kind of thing design thinking is (or systems thinking, etc.), it is often hard to find a complete or consistent answer in the relevant literatures. To be clear, it is not hard to find arguments that a certain discipline’s approach is important, should be widely understood, and is made up of certain components. It’s that these such arguments are often made without any clear discussion of just what kind of thing is important, and so on. Is that disciplinary approach a set of skills, habits, inclinations or something else? We generally can’t be sure.

Staying with design thinking as the example of central interest, it has seemingly been considered as many different kinds of thing. Reviewing the published work, Reference KimbellKimbell (2011) describes design thinking under three categories: ‘as a cognitive style, as a general theory of design, and as a resource for organizations’ (p. 285). Similarly, Reference Hassi and LaaksoHassi and Laakso (2011) describe design thinking as including ‘practices, thinking styles, and mentality’, each of which includes ‘methods, values, and concepts’ (p. 1). In a later review, Reference Schweitzer, Groeger and SobelSchweitzer et al. (2016) indicate that design thinking has variously been described in terms of ‘design principles, thinking modes, creative behaviours and postures’ (p. 72). Finally, in yet another review, Reference Micheli, Wilner, Bhatti, Mura and BeverlandMicheli et al. (2019) report that ‘some authors have considered design thinking to be an organizational attribute, whereas others conceive of it at the individual level, highlighting the traits of “design thinkers”’ (p. 125). So, even within the project to describe just one disciplinary approach, we can see considerable variety in the types of things that approach is taken to be or taken to include.

Looking beyond design thinking, Reference Kaur, Craven, Maier, Oehmen and VermaasKaur and Craven (2020) say of systems thinking that the ‘[d]efinitions put forward emphasise different foci, ranging from systems thinking as a set of characteristics, systems thinking as comprised of a purpose and what it does, or systems thinking as a system itself’ (p. 193).Footnote ¹⁴ Similarly, Reference Stave and HopperStave and Hopper (2007) acknowledge that ‘some system dynamicists see it [systems thinking] as the foundation of system dynamics as well as a number of other systems analysis approaches; others see systems thinking as a subset of system dynamics’ (p. 1). Turning to entrepreneurial thinking, Reference Daspit, Fox and FindleyDaspit et al. (2023) review existing definitions of that approach and find it to be an ‘ability’, ‘rules of thumb’, ‘individual beliefs’, a ‘perspective’, personal ‘qualities’, ‘motives, skills, and thought processes’ and a form of ‘thinking and decision-making’ (p. 7). Clearly, it is not just design thinking that is thought to be more than one kind of thing.

Descriptions of computational thinking might at first seem simpler because Wing describes it as ‘a fundamental skill’ (Reference Wing2006, p. 33) and ‘a kind of analytical thinking’ (Reference Wing2008, p. 3717), which would straightforwardly make computational thinking an analytical thinking skill (for a review of computational thinking as way of thinking, see Reference Selby and WoollardSelby & Woollard, 2014). However, in summarising the educational movement around computational thinking, Reference Denning and TedreDenning and Tedre (2021) describe that movement as having settled on the following definition: ‘Designing computations that get computers to do jobs for us’ (p. 30). This seemingly renders computational thinking as a design activity rather than a thinking skill, although perhaps it’s the thinking skill required to undertake such an activity. Looking elsewhere, Reference JacksonJackson (2006) describes ‘geographical thinking’ as ‘a unique way of seeing the world’ (p. 199), and other disciplines have offered similarly varied, and often similarly brief descriptions of the kind of thing their approach is.

If we change focus, then we find that when the motivations behind descriptions of disciplinary approaches are made explicit, this tends to be very revealing about the kind of thing that is actually being described. For example, consider Reference Andrews and BurkeAndrews and Burke’s (2007), reflections on what they are trying to achieve in defining historical thinking:

Note the similarities with Reference MeadowsMeadows’ (2008) description of her motivation for writing a book about systems thinking:

So, we could perhaps add craft knowledge to our list of things that disciplinary approaches are. We could also add something that captures how you come at the world, while recognising that disciplinary approaches might be characterised by the tacit knowledge that is accumulated through training, work and social interactions.

In surveying just some of the projects that have tried to define their own disciplinary approaches, we might learn that these approaches are described as ways of thinking, habits of mind, perspectives, attitudes, cognitive styles, thinking skills, craft skills, mindsets, logics, personal traits, perspectives, and so on. However, if someone were to suggest that a particular way of thinking (or habit of mind, or perspective, etc.) should be listed as a component of a discipline’s approach, what criteria should be used to assess such a claim? How do we establish what is to be included in – and excluded from – any particular discipline’s approach? We seemingly will not find guidance on this in any of the projects we have been examining, but some hints can be found elsewhere, in fact in a completely different body of work.

In discussing the context-bound nature of cognitive skills, Reference Perkins and SalomonPerkins and Salomon (1989) offer four requirements for what they call ‘general cognitive skills’. We can use these four requirements to limit what’s included in disciplinary approaches, because these requirements seem to be already implicit in the various projects that discuss those approaches:

1. 1. it must be something that practitioners actually use (‘seeming use’);

2. 2. it must play an important role in their practice;

3. 3. it must be transferrable by those practitioners to other domains;

4. 4. it must be commonly absent from other disciplines (Reference Perkins and SalomonPerkins & Salomon, 1989, pp. 19–20).

Some projects would also – often implicitly – add an additional requirement:

1. 5. it must be learnable by non-practitioners for application to their own domain.Footnote ¹⁵

These requirements are useful to keep in mind because anyone in any discipline might exhibit a great many different ways of thinking (or habits of mind, or perspectives, etc.). However, not all of these will play an important role in their practice, or perhaps cannot be transferred to other domains (or other people), or might be commonly present in other disciplines. To give a simple example, designers might think numerically when estimating a production run or dimensioning a product, but quantitative analysis is not typically included in descriptions of design thinking because it is not especially associated with the discipline of design. As Reference DorstDorst (2011) tells us, ‘many of the activities that designers do are quite universal, and thus it would be inappropriate to claim these as exclusive to design or “Design Thinking”’ (pp. 525–526). The same is true for all disciplinary approaches, because in the complex realities of any practice, many different kinds of things are done, not all of which are said to be characteristic. Rules for deciding on what gets admitted to a description of a disciplinary approach (like the five outlined above) are seldom stated, perhaps because that would require comparison to other disciplines, a cross-disciplinary perspective that is generally not adopted in the projects we are discussing here.

Considering all of the above, I propose the following working definition of ‘disciplinary approach’, one that seems to be consistent with a range of meanings already apparent – even if implicit – in various literatures:

Referring back to our consideration of family resemblances and prototypical class memberships, this definition needn’t be read as a statement of all the characteristics that any disciplinary approach will have, but as a list of the many features that they draw from; a prototypical disciplinary approach might exhibit many or all of them. I’ll revisit and expand this definition later, once we have reviewed the components that various disciplinary approaches are made up of, but for now, it will help to clarify the kind of thing these approaches are. Here and later, even though a desire for clarity and consistency imposes some restrictions on the definitions I propose, they are intended to describe current usage rather than stipulating correct meanings.

4.1 What Is Design Thinking?

The term ‘design thinking’ means many different overlapping things. In scientific studies of design cognition, it is sometimes used to describe the mental processes and representations of designers (e.g. trained professionals) when they are undertaking general or specialised design tasks (for a collection of works, see Reference Hay, Cash and McKilliganHay et al., 2020). However, this use of the term is largely (but not entirely) disconnected from more popular uses that emphasise how adopting a design-like approach can benefit a wide range of practices, professions and sectors (for a recent commentary on the distinction, see Reference CrossCross, 2023). This more popular interpretation of design thinking is sometimes considered controversial for not representing the practices of expert designers or for not acknowledging the skills required to apply design processes (for an example critique, see Reference KolkoKolko, 2018). Nevertheless, the popular use of the term prevails, typically emphasising empathy, visualisation, iteration and creativity. For example, these components can be seen in the variant of design thinking summarised in Table 1, which is itself derived from other variants.

4.2 What Is Systems Thinking?

Just as with ‘design thinking’, the term ‘systems thinking’ means many different overlapping things. In some instances, it describes a form of thinking that is taken to be central to disciplines like ecology (Reference StilingStiling, 1994), or to systems-focussed sub-disciplines, such as systems engineering and systems biology (Reference Camelia and FerrisCamelia & Ferris, 2016; Reference Momsen, Speth, Wyse and LongMomsen et al., 2022). In other instances, it is taken to be the kind of thinking that is exhibited by (or required by) those who construct specific systems representations, such as models of systems dynamics (Reference RichmondRichmond, 1993, Reference Richmond2016). However, ‘systems thinking’ is perhaps most commonly interpreted as a generally applicable thinking skill, or set of skills, that can be applied across many practices, professions and sectors (e.g. Reference JacksonM. C. Jackson, 2003). These descriptions of systems thinking typically emphasise a focus on holism, relationships and interactions, as compared to analytic reductionism. The variant summarised in Table 2, emphasises the biological and ecological origins of some systems perspectives.

4.3 What Is Entrepreneurial Thinking?

Just as with ‘design thinking’ and ‘systems thinking’, the term ‘entrepreneurial thinking’ also means many different overlapping things. In some instances, there is a focus on the cognitive aspects of entrepreneurial behaviour (Reference Grégoire, Corbett and McMullenGrégoire et al., 2011), while in others there is a focus on something more like the inclinations or ‘logics’ employed by entrepreneurs (Reference SarasvathySarasvathy, 2001). Descriptions of entrepreneurial thinking typically emphasise many components that overlap with design thinking, including an orientation toward customers and iterative problem solving based on experimentation (Reference Frederiksen and BremFrederiksen & Brem, 2017). In contrast, the variant of entrepreneurial thinking summarised in Table 3 focusses on five key ‘principles’ that entrepreneurs employ.

4.4 What Is Computational Thinking?

Just like the three disciplinary approaches already discussed, and those that are discussed in the following sections, the term ‘computational thinking’ means many different and overlapping things. (Terms like these are debated and contested in similar ways across disciplines, and so I won’t now emphasise that further.) Common to many descriptions of computational thinking is a focus on the modes of thought that computer scientists exhibit, in comparison to the skills required when using computers (e.g. Reference WingWing, 2006). Computational thinking is sometimes distinguished from writing computer code, with emphasis instead placed on how more general ‘practices’ like abstraction, incrementalism, iteration and reuse can be applied in non-computational contexts (Reference Barr and StephensonBarr & Stephenson, 2011). These components can be seen in the variant of computational thinking summarised in Table 4, which is itself derived from other variants.

4.5 What Is Engineering Thinking?

Engineering thinking is normally distinguished from engineering domain knowledge. Different engineering disciplines draw from specific bodies of scientific knowledge, such as mechanics, structures, electronics and materials. In contrast, descriptions of engineering thinking emphasise how engineers approach the problems they are addressing and the solutions they are developing (Reference Lucas, Hanson and ClaxtonLucas et al., 2014). Alternatively, because engineers draw on scientific knowledge derived from disciplines such as physics and chemistry, engineering thinking is sometimes distinguished from the scientific thinking that produced such knowledge. In these instances, the focus is often placed on the engineer’s drive to change situations rather than just understand them. This perspective is emphasised in the variant summarised in Table 5, which has some similarities with design thinking and entrepreneurial thinking, and includes systems thinking.

4.6 What Is Scientific Thinking?

Like engineering thinking, scientific thinking is often described in contrast to (scientific) domain knowledge, and like design thinking it is often described in contrast to the specific methods applied (here, the scientific method). Rather than emphasising knowledge and method, descriptions of scientific thinking instead emphasise the ‘attitude’ of scientists or their ‘habits of mind’. Decades of work have been done on this, often focussing on how scientists are inclined toward accurate and critical thinking, valuing evidence over argumentation (see reviews in Reference Dunbar, Fugelsang, Holyoak and MorrisonDunbar & Fugelsang, 2005; Reference GormanGorman, 2006). The variant of scientific thinking summarised in Table 6 is noteworthy for being formalised so much earlier than many of the other disciplinary approaches reported here.

4.7 What Is Evolutionary Thinking?

Evolutionary thinking describes the ways of thinking that are useful for understanding processes of biological evolution, including variation, selection and inheritance (Reference StearnsStearns, 2006; Reference SuzukiSuzuki, 2021). However, the widespread application of evolutionary thinking to non-biological entities means that this disciplinary approach can be seen in some accounts of how technologies, societies, ideas and organisations change over time (e.g. Reference BreslinBreslin, 2016). One of the features of evolutionary thinking is flexibility in considering similarities between the members of a group, considering the variation between those members, and considering previous generations from which those members descended. This is illustrated in the variant summarised in Table 7.

4.8 What Is Mathematical Thinking?

As with scientific thinking, the long history and high status of mathematical practice have led scholars and researchers to devote considerable attention to mathematical thinking (for a collection of views, see Reference Sternberg and Ben-ZeevSternberg & Ben-Zeev, 1996). Descriptions of mathematical thinking often emphasise aspects of thought that are independent of specific mathematical operations (e.g. addition, multiplication) and also independent of what those operations are applied to (e.g. numbers, algebraic variables). Instead, the focus is on more abstract mental activities that are characteristic of mathematical work, especially the more creative aspects of that work, such as making conjectures and drawing inferences. This perspective on mathematical thinking is emphasised in the variant summarised in Table 8.

4.9 What Is Statistical Thinking?

Statistical thinking might be considered as a sub-type of mathematical thinking, focussed on a subset of operations and a subset of applications. As with mathematical thinking, the focus is typically not on specific knowledge or techniques, but on the more general way in which statisticians learn about the problem, recognise opportunities for variation and quantify that variation with data (Reference ChanceChance, 2002). Different dimensions of statistical thinking can be identified that are widespread in other disciplinary approaches, including problem-solving processes, general modes of thought and dispositions such as scepticism, imagination, curiosity and perseverance (Reference Wild and PfannkuchWild & Pfannkuch, 1999). Some types of thinking that are more specific to statistics are summarised in the variant presented in Table 9.

4.10 What Is Geographical Thinking?

The term ‘geographical thinking’ is used to describe the perspectives and approaches that expert geographers exhibit and that geography educators want to encourage in their students. As with the other disciplinary approaches described here, there are debates over which definitions to use, which components to include and whether or not there is value in the overall concept (for a collection of views, see Reference Brooks, Butt and FargherBrooks et al., 2017). Again, the focus is not typically on geographers’ domain knowledge (e.g. national import data) or practices (e.g. cartography), but on the more abstract and generally applicable matters that they devote their attention to, such as analysis at different levels of abstraction, and the relationships between things at those different levels. This can sound like a form of systems thinking, as exemplified by the variant summarised in Table 10.

4.11 What Is Historical Thinking?

The term ‘historical thinking’ is generally used to describe how historians think and what they think about, in contrast to the sequences of events that are sometimes taken to be matters of historical record. For example, some accounts of historical thinking state that when seeking to understand people in the past, historians are required to navigate the tension between the ways in which those people are familiar to us due to our common humanity and yet strange due to differing contexts and values (Reference WineburgWineburg, 2010). There is a clear connection here to accounts of anthropological thinking (see next section), and thus design thinking. Other accounts of historical thinking focus on more general concepts, such as significance, evidence, continuity, change, cause and consequence (Reference SeixasSeixas, 2017). This links historical thinking to systems thinking, which is especially evident in the variant summarised in Table 11.

4.12 What Is Anthropological Thinking?

The term ‘anthropological thinking’ (and similar terms) refers to the general approaches that anthropologists take to the world. These can be conceptual approaches, such as attending to culture, values, identity and authority (Reference EngelkeEngelke, 2019), or methodological approaches, such as comparison (Reference Binah-Pollak, Hazzan, Mike and HacohenBinah-Pollak et al., 2024). Interestingly, Binah-Pollak et al., emphasise the adoption of a holistic perspective when considering cultural context, so that the entire system of relevance is attended to, linking to systems thinking. Much of anthropological thinking is focused on understanding groups of people and the contexts they operate in. As such it can be seen as an elaboration of the empathy component often emphasised in descriptions of design thinking. For example, empathy makes up the first component of anthropological thinking in the variant summarised in Table 12, with the other two components developing that further.

4.13 What about Other Approaches and Other Variants?

The twelve disciplinary approaches tabulated above are clearly just a subset of those that have been described in the various relevant literatures. This limitation is partly imposed by space constraints, but I have also restricted the tables to those approaches for which I found neatly delineated sets of components. I have omitted other approaches that have been described but seemingly not decomposed in this way, even if I discuss them in other sections.Footnote ¹⁶ These approaches include artistic thinking (e.g. Reference SullivanSullivan, 2001), craft thinking (e.g. Reference GrothGroth, 2016; Reference IngsIngs, 2015), technological thinking (e.g. Reference GormanGorman, 2006), architectural thinking (e.g. Reference FrascariFrascari, 2009), systems-architectural thinking (e.g. Reference Aier, Labusch, Pähler, Persson and StirnaAier et al., 2015), economic thinking (e.g. Reference Heyne, Boettke and PrychitkoHeyne et al., 2013) and data-scientific thinking (e.g. Reference CaoCao, 2018; Reference GouldGould, 2021). Even for those approaches that are tabulated in this section, only one example variant is offered for each. For some or all of these approaches, there are other variants available in the literature, which can be tabulated in a similar way. Again, due to space constraints, these cannot all be summarised here for comparison, but online Appendix C (available at www.cambridge.org/Crilly) does tabulate other variants of design, systems, entrepreneurial and computational thinking (to illustrate differences between variants, and to support interpretation of a later figure).

5.1 Are They Really about Thinking?

At the most general level, the various projects to define the disciplinary approaches are referred to in terms of ‘thinking’, such as ‘design thinking’, ‘thinking geographically’ and ‘thinking like an economist’. It is certainly true that many of the components that each disciplinary approach is divided into appear to describe something to do with thinking. Taking design thinking as an example, one of the components that is often proposed is a specific mode of logical reasoning called ‘abduction’ (e.g. Reference DorstDorst, 2011; Reference KimbellKimbell, 2011, p. 297; Reference Micheli, Wilner, Bhatti, Mura and BeverlandMicheli et al., 2019, p. 132). This can be distinguished from other modes of reasoning that are emphasised in other disciplinary approaches, such as deduction and induction in the natural sciences (e.g. Reference Dunbar, Fugelsang, Holyoak and MorrisonDunbar & Fugelsang, 2005, p. 712) and related components in mathematical thinking (Reference BurtonBurton, 1984, p. 38). However, while these modes of logical reasoning might be considered as ways of thinking, other components might be more accurately regarded as objects of thought. For example, in whatever way people are thinking, they might think about ‘non-linearity’ (listed in Reference Arnold and WadeArnold and Wade’s (2015) description of systems thinking) or about ‘scale and connection’ (listed in Reference JacksonJackson’s (2006) description of geographical thinking).

Although various components of various disciplinary approaches are related to modes or objects of thought, this is just a subset of the types of components that are described. Examining each approach in detail reveals considerable variation in what the components describe, and this variation is visible not just between disciplinary approaches, but also within them, and within individual variants. For example, some components are seemingly a reference to

1. ▪ modes of thought, such as those described above, but also ‘abstraction’ (listed in Reference Barr and StephensonBarr and Stephenson’s (2011) description of computational thinking);

2. ▪ objects of thought, such as those described above, but also ‘contingency’ (listed in Reference Andrews and BurkeAndrews and Burke’s (2007) description of historical thinking);

3. ▪ objects of attention, such as the ‘blind spots’ that others overlook (listed in Reference TettTett’s (2021) description of anthropological thinking);

4. ▪ capacities or abilities, such as ‘empathy’ (listed in Reference Schweitzer, Groeger and SobelSchweitzer et al.’s (2016) description of design thinking);

5. ▪ actions that are taken, such as ‘the crazy quilt principle’ of collaboration (listed in Reference SarasvathySarasvathy’s (2009) description of entrepreneurial thinking);

6. ▪ processes that are followed, such as ‘iteration and experimentation’ (listed in Reference Micheli, Wilner, Bhatti, Mura and BeverlandMicheli et al.’s (2019) description of design thinking);

7. ▪ artefacts that are constructed, such as visualisations and models, but also ‘the minimum viable product’ (listed in Reference Frederiksen and BremFrederiksen and Brem’s (2017) description of entrepreneurial thinking)

8. ▪ things that are accepted, tolerated or embraced, such as ‘ambiguity and failure’ (listed in Reference Micheli, Wilner, Bhatti, Mura and BeverlandMicheli et al.’s (2019) description of design thinking).

Given the various types of components that make up disciplinary approaches, one interpretation is that these approaches aren’t necessarily about thinking after all. Perhaps projects describing disciplinary approaches have just used the word ‘thinking’ loosely, to indicate that we are now focussing more on how practitioners generally go about their work rather than the specific subject matter that they work with or the tools they use. Perhaps descriptions of disciplinary approaches are intended to include not just attitudes and inclinations, but also things like physical actions, processes and outputs. This inclusive meaning of thinking might fit better with the comparatively neutral term I have been using throughout: ‘disciplinary approach’. Disciplinary approaches, on this account, needn’t describe ways of thinking, as such, but could still describe aspects of practice that are at once characteristic of a particular discipline, while also being abstracted or generalised so that they can be understood as more widely applicable beyond that discipline.

Another interpretation is that these projects to define disciplinary approaches are indeed focussed on thinking, but that the various components they list have not always been clearly described that way. For example, perhaps those components that are seemingly describing actions, processes and outputs, should in fact be read as descriptions of the way practitioners in the relevant disciplines think about those things. For example, designers and engineers are known for constructing and testing provisional representations through ‘prototyping’ (e.g. Reference Lucas, Hanson and ClaxtonLucas et al., 2014; Reference Micheli, Wilner, Bhatti, Mura and BeverlandMicheli et al., 2019; Reference Schweitzer, Groeger and SobelSchweitzer et al., 2016), which is seemingly an action or activity involving an artefact. However, what if referring to prototyping as a component of a disciplinary approach might really mean something a bit different? What if it means the inclination to prototype, the motivation to do so, the value assigned to the resulting learnings, the willingness to respond to those learnings, the habit of engaging in it repeatedly and the overall attitude taken toward it? By framing ‘prototyping’ in this way it becomes more like a way of thinking than an activity. We might apply the same broad interpretation to other components that are seemingly framed as actions, processes or representations, but could instead be reframed to seem more like thinking.

5.2 Can Taxonomies of Thinking Help?

Given the common use of the term ‘thinking’ in describing disciplinary approaches and their components, it is perhaps surprising that general taxonomies of thinking have seemingly not been widely consulted. For example, the Cattell–Horn–Carroll theory of cognitive abilities provides structured representations of the varieties of human intelligence and achievement. The current and expanded version has six high-level categories, including ‘memory and efficiency’, ‘acquired knowledge’ and ‘reasoning’, and over eighty low-level items, including ‘induction’, ‘general sequential reasoning’ and ‘ideational fluency’ (Reference Flanagan, Dixon, Reynolds, Vannest and Fletcher-JanzenFlanagan & Dixon, 2014). Many other such classifications of cognitive abilities can be identified (for a collection, see Reference Newton, Moseley, Newton and MillerNewton, 2005), and there are related models showing how such abilities are connected to learning (e.g. Reference Shute, Husén and PostlethwaiteShute, 1994).

Focussing less on abilities, is Reference Costa and KallickCosta and Kallick’s (2008) set of sixteen ‘habits of mind’, a list of attributes that characterise the approaches taken by people from all disciplines, including their many skills, attitudes, experiences and inclinations. This list was derived from studies of what successful people do ‘when they are confronted with problems to solve, decisions to make, creative ideas to generate, and ambiguities to clarify’ (p. 1). On the face of it, this is exactly what the projects to define disciplinary approaches are trying to identify and include. In fact, Reference Costa and KallickCosta and Kallick’s (2008) sixteen habits of mind include some that can be mapped directly to particular components of the disciplinary approaches we have been considering so far, including

1. ▪ ‘listening with understanding and empathy’ (e.g. see design thinking’s characteristic of being ‘empathetic’, as reported by Reference Schweitzer, Groeger and SobelSchweitzer et al., 2016);

2. ▪ ‘taking responsible risks’ (e.g. see entrepreneurial thinking’s principle of ‘affordable loss’, as reported by Reference SarasvathySarasvathy, 2009);

3. ▪ ‘striving for accuracy’ (e.g. see scientific thinking’s ‘habit of accuracy’, as reported by Reference NollNoll, 1935).

Taxonomies that provide a structured understanding of thinking, learning and habits of mind are clearly relevant to how we might consider disciplinary approaches. As such, perhaps we might expect that the projects to define those approaches would start with the identification or development of a discipline-neutral taxonomy that could be drawn on for this purpose. However, such taxonomies are seldom mentioned. Instead, when individual projects develop descriptions of disciplinary approaches that are divided into components, these components are seemingly developed in an ad hoc fashion. They are generally not drawn from existing lists or hierarchies (for an exception, see Reference Lucas, Hanson and ClaxtonLucas et al.’s (2014) description of engineering thinking, which is connected to Claxton’s notion of ‘learning power’ (Reference Gornall, Chambers and ClaxtonGornall et al., 2005, p. 6)).

As we saw earlier, the various projects that have focussed on defining disciplinary approaches have typically not been particularly precise in defining what kinds of things their approaches are (i.e. whether they are a way of thinking or something else). It is now apparent that those projects also haven’t been very precise about what kinds of things the components of their approaches are either. To put it another way, more effort has seemingly gone into identifying and naming the various components that make up each discipline’s approach than has gone into establishing what kinds of things those components are, and how those relate to the kind of thing that the disciplinary approach is. However, I’ll here lean toward ‘thinking’ being the emphasis that is sought in these projects, rather than something more activity-oriented, such as doing or making. This is consistent with the titles these projects have generally given themselves (design thinking, etc.), and the way the projects are introduced (understanding how designers think, etc.). As such, I’ll expand my earlier working definition with this in mind, now focussing on the components from which the approaches are made up, with revised content italicised:

From now on, I’ll use this definition, without implying that it captures all the meanings out there, or even that all those meanings can be captured by a single definition.

6.1 What Are Disciplinary Approaches Defined Relative to?

One thing that we might wonder about when considering different disciplinary approaches, is what each particular approach is being contrasted with. For example, are the characteristics of design thinking somehow distinctive in themselves? Or, is it that they are distinctive in comparison to the approaches taken in some alternative disciplines such as science or art? Or is it that they are distinctive in comparison to some ‘normal’ or ‘conventional’ way of approaching things? The same questions could be asked across the range of disciplines that have undertaken projects to define their specific – yet generalisable – approaches. However, perhaps because each discipline has undertaken its own project in isolation from the others, there are only a few cases where the components of a disciplinary approach are defined in contrast to anything else. Here are two examples though: Reference RichmondRichmond’s (2016) definition of the components of systems thinking are compared with their opposites, which are associated with ‘traditional business thinking’, and Reference Grimes and VogusGrimes and Vogus’ (2021) definition of the components of entrepreneurial thinking are compared with alternatives from ‘conventional thinking’. Perhaps a more definite and elaborated contrast is drawn by Reference Waks, Trotskovsky, Sabag and HazzamWaks et al. (2011) in their description of engineering thinking in comparison to the thinking required in ‘scientific research’ (see Table 5).

Pairings such as those described above do a lot to clarify what is meant by each component of a disciplinary approach because those components are then defined relative to some explicitly specified alternative. However, these pairings also generally take the form of making contrasts between the comparatively well-defined components under consideration and alternatives that are only loosely defined. What I mean by this is that while authors interested in their own disciplinary approach will cite other work on that approach and describe the components from which it is made up, any reference they make to some other discipline’s approach will typically not draw from any relevant literature, and might assume it has not been decomposed. It’s as though these authors are implicitly saying that ‘our disciplinary approach is complex, nuanced and debated, whereas theirs is simple, well understood and agreed upon’ (for an example of this being recognised, see Reference Coelen, Smulders, Block, Halberstadt, Högsdal, Kuckertz and NeergaardCoelen & Smulders, 2023, p. 403).

Although the individual components of one disciplinary approach are seldom actually defined in relation to (or in contrast to) the components of another established disciplinary approach, the overall approaches are sometimes compared. Given the rarity of such comparisons, spread across numerous literatures, it is valuable to explicitly acknowledge those that exist. For example, there are well-founded comparisons between design thinking and several other disciplinary approaches, including systems thinking (e.g. Reference BuchananBuchanan, 2019; Reference Litster, Hurst, Cardoso and GeroLitster et al., 2023; Reference Pourdehnad, Wilson and WexlerPourdehnad et al., 2011), entrepreneurial thinking (e.g. Reference Christensen, Arendt, McElheron and BallChristensen et al., 2023; Reference Garbuio, Dong, Lin, Tschang and LovalloGarbuio et al., 2018; Reference Klenner, Gemser and KarpenKlenner et al., 2022; Reference VaradarajanVaradarajan, 2019) and computational thinking (e.g. Reference DenningDenning, 2013; Reference Kelly and GeroKelly & Gero, 2021). Going beyond such pair-wise comparisons, Reference Patel and MehtaPatel and Mehta (2017) consider frameworks of design thinking, systems thinking and entrepreneurial thinking through a detailed review of the three relevant literatures and case studies of their integrated application in practice. Very unusually, Reference Lewrick, Link and LeiferLewrick et al. (2018) actually describe such integration as characteristic of a design thinking mindset, saying that ‘[a]s the situation requires, we combine different approaches with design thinking, data analytics, systems thinking, and [entrepreneurial thinking]’ (p. 9; also see §3.1 and §3.3).

That’s all focussed on design thinking, but if we consider other disciplinary approaches, then there are similarly well-founded comparisons between computational thinking and mathematical thinking (e.g. Reference Rycroft-Smith and ConnollyRycroft-Smith & Connolly, 2019; Reference Sneider, Stephenson, Schafer and FlickSneider et al., 2014), and between computational thinking and systems thinking (Reference EasterbrookEasterbrook, 2014; Reference Shin, Bowers and RoderickShin et al., 2022). Again, going beyond pair-wise comparisons, Reference Lucas, Hanson and ClaxtonLucas et al. (2014) discuss engineering habits of mind in contrast to those found in mathematics and science (with reference to similar projects in those disciplines). Similarly, Reference GouldGould (2021) describes data-scientific thinking as including decreasing proportions of statistical thinking, computational thinking and mathematical thinking. Even more wide-ranging is Reference Shute, Sun and Asbell-ClarkeShute et al.’s (2017) discussion of computational thinking in comparison to mathematical thinking, engineering thinking, design thinking and systems thinking (again with reference to projects in those disciplines).

Some authors have clearly recognised that the forms of disciplinary approach they are interested in (whether that is just one or a few) can be related to others, each of which has its own literature. However, note that although these various works compare different disciplinary approaches, they typically describe whatever collection of approaches they are engaging with as though they form some naturally occurring set, or the only set available. They don’t indicate that they are looking at just one of many possible subsets. For example, Reference Kelly and GeroKelly and Gero (2021) describe design thinking and computational thinking as ‘the only two forms of thinking to gain prominence since the turn of the 21st century’ (p. 2), and Reference Shin, Bowers and RoderickShin et al. (2022) say that to ‘fully explain complex phenomena or solve problems using models requires both systems thinking (ST) and computational thinking (CT)’ (p. 933). There are seemingly very few examples where disciplinary approaches are described not as a small, bounded set, but as a general class that is (or can be) populated with contributions from almost any discipline. Perhaps the clearest exception to this is found in the epilogue of Reference Denning and TedreDenning and Tedre’s (2019) book on computational thinking, where they point out that

Denning and Tedre do not then analyse or compare these various disciplinary approaches or the projects they originate from, but they do acknowledge that variety, which is seemingly very rare.Footnote ¹⁸ In fact, just conducting simple literature searches for works on disciplinary approaches reveals the very small number of those works that focus on two or more approaches in comparison to those that focus on just one approach (see Figure 3). Similarly, it can be observed that even the most cited works describing one disciplinary approach (e.g. Wing’s description of computational thinking) are seldom cited in works describing other disciplinary approaches (e.g. various descriptions of design thinking) (see online Appendix B, available at www.cambridge.org/Crilly).

Figure 3 Illustration of the relative prominence of four forms of disciplinary approach in the scientific literature, both in terms of when they are referred to in isolation and when they are referred to in combination. The numbers represent the count of documents returned when searching the Scopus database for each term using Boolean operators (title, abstract and keywords from 1954 until the search date of February 2023). See online Appendix B for the underlying data.

6.2 Are These Approaches Really Discipline-Specific?

There is a duality at the centre of discussions about disciplinary approaches. On the one hand, these are approaches that are claimed to be discipline-specific: they characterise the particular disciplines that give them their names (e.g. design thinking). On the other hand, these are approaches that are claimed to be discipline-neutral: they have potentially wide-ranging application elsewhere (e.g. design thinking in business, or in healthcare or in education). One way to understand this duality is to view each approach as originating from a particular discipline, capturing its distinctive features, while also recognising that many other disciplines will also require or exhibit some or all of those features.Footnote ¹⁹ Using design as an example again, we could say that central to design is the practice of conceiving plans for enabling goal-directed change. When described at this level of abstraction, aspects of design thinking will clearly be employed in other disciplines, such as when scientists plan experiments to test hypotheses (‘experiment design’). On the other hand, central to science is the practice of undertaking investigative activities that provide new insights about the world. When described at this level of abstraction, scientific thinking will clearly be employed in other disciplines, such as when designers conduct research to better understand potential users (‘user research’). However, although scientists engage in design activities and designers engage in research activities, it needn’t be that design approaches are thought to be characteristic of science, or that scientific approaches are thought to be characteristic of design (for design-science comparisons, see Reference CrillyCrilly, 2010; Reference Farrell and HookerFarrell & Hooker, 2013; Reference Galle and KroesGalle & Kroes, 2014).

Recognising that disciplinary approaches can be applied beyond their disciplinary origins raises an important question: once a disciplinary approach has been abstracted from its discipline-specific practices, transferred to another domain and then adapted to suit that domain, does it still carry the distinctive signature of the original discipline? For example, note that many discussions of design thinking look like earlier and ongoing discussions of a more discipline-neutral approach to creative problem solving (e.g. see Reference Treffinger, Isaksen and Stead-DorvalTreffinger et al., 2006).Footnote ²⁰ More generally, if disciplinary approaches are abstracted from disciplinary specifics, what exactly is it that makes the approach still disciplinary? Another way of thinking about this is to ask what characterises disciplines, what distinguishes them from each other, and how the described disciplinary approaches reflect those characteristics and distinctions.

Although I do not intend to get into a detailed discussion of disciplines here, it is worth noting that they are seemingly difficult to define (see Reference KrishnanKrishnan, 2009; Reference Shumway and Messer-DavidowShumway & Messer-Davidow, 1991), perhaps as difficult as the associated approaches have proven to be! However, at a very general level, Reference ChandlerChandler (2009) tells us that most meanings of discipline ‘involve some notion of submission to a regularized set of practices, a sense of an imposed ordering of life and thought, body and mind’ (p. 732). This meaning of disciplines is clearly connected to the kind of thing that we are considering disciplinary approaches to be, and reflects why they are each thought to be distinctive. A common way to consider such distinctions between disciplines is to classify them into a hierarchy, dividing them according to their subject matter, origins, objectives or something else. For example, notwithstanding the overlaps between academic and professional disciplines,Footnote ²¹ the former are often classified according to the structure of university departments (Reference ChandlerChandler, 2009), while the latter are often classified according to the structure of professional associations (Reference Greenwood, Suddaby and HiningsGreenwood et al., 2002). Despite this apparent order, disciplines are fragmented, heterogeneous and dynamic and interact with other disciplines in many complex ways (for discussions of the fluidity of disciplinary boundaries, see Reference GierynGieryn, 1983). As a result, an overly strict conception of disciplinary boundaries sometimes prevents people from seeing the close connections that might be made across disciplines (Reference KrishnanKrishnan, 2009). This is something that a well-coordinated cross-discipline project to understand disciplinary approaches could address.

Looking at the various projects to define different disciplinary approaches, it is clear that in some cases particular components appear to be characteristic of many different disciplines. For example, ‘problem solving’ is listed as a component of design thinking (Reference Micheli, Wilner, Bhatti, Mura and BeverlandMicheli et al., 2019), computational thinking (Reference Weintrop, Beheshti and HornWeintrop et al., 2016) and scientific thinking (Reference Dunbar, Fugelsang, Holyoak and MorrisonDunbar & Fugelsang, 2005). Similarly, ‘empathy’ appears as a component of both design thinking (Reference Schweitzer, Groeger and SobelSchweitzer et al., 2016) and anthropological thinking (Reference TettTett, 2021), while ‘experimentation’ appears as a component of both design thinking (Reference Micheli, Wilner, Bhatti, Mura and BeverlandMicheli et al., 2019) and entrepreneurial thinking (Reference Frederiksen and BremFrederiksen & Brem, 2017). Such overlaps between disciplinary approaches are easy to identify when the components are conveniently named and defined in near-identical ways. However, many more overlaps can be identified when we include the components that are named differently but where their definitions refer to very similar concepts. For example, the ‘experimentation’ component referred to above might also be closely related to ‘being iterative and incremental’ in computational thinking (Reference Kong, Kong and AbelsonKong, 2019) or to ‘hypothesis testing’ in scientific thinking (Reference Dunbar, Fugelsang, Holyoak and MorrisonDunbar & Fugelsang, 2005).Footnote ²²

Even the components of disciplinary approaches that we might expect to be quite domain-specific can be found in other disciplines. For example, in evolutionary thinking, one of the three main components is ‘tree thinking’ which involves recognising that the shared characteristics of members of a group are determined by their descent from common ancestors. In studies of biological evolution, this involves thinking of species within the context of a phylogenetic tree, where branching occurs at distinct evolutionary events. However, as Reference O’HaraO’Hara (1997) notes in his description of one component of evolutionary thinking

Indeed, Reference Milani and FarinellaMilani and Farinella (1994) are describing work on ‘asteroid families’, a group of asteroids that share similar motion characteristics (for billions of years) because they are descended from a single ‘parent body’ that was broken up in a past collision. This group of fragments are said to have ‘inherited’ the motion characteristics of that parent in a process of ‘collisional evolution’ (see Reference Nesvorný, Bottke, Vokrouhlický, Morbidelli and JedickeNesvorný et al., 2005). Of course, viewing diverse systems through the lens of biological evolution is widespread, including in discussions of cultural evolution (Reference LewensLewens, 2015), technical evolution (Reference ArthurArthur, 2009), ideational evolution (Reference CrillyCrilly, 2021b) and organisational evolution (Reference BreslinBreslin, 2016). However, that is not necessarily the same as adopting and applying the thinking exhibited by evolutionary biologists. For example, one might observe certain similarities between how biological species and commercial organisations change over time – and draw analogies on that basis – without necessarily thinking about those organisations in the way that an evolutionary biologist would.

As we have seen, the components of one disciplinary approach can map to identical or similar components of other disciplinary approaches. That’s quite straightforward, but things are more complicated when a component of one disciplinary approach seems to map to a whole other disciplinary approach, rather than just to a component of that other approach. For example, ‘systems thinking’ appears as just one component of entrepreneurial thinking (e.g. Reference Grimes and VogusGrimes & Vogus, 2021), computational thinking (e.g. Reference Weintrop, Beheshti and HornWeintrop et al., 2016) and engineering thinking (e.g. Reference Lucas, Hanson and ClaxtonLucas et al., 2014; Reference Waks, Trotskovsky, Sabag and HazzamWaks et al., 2011). However, systems thinking is itself broken down into many different components by the various authors who describe that as a disciplinary approach in its own right (e.g. see Reference Arnold and WadeArnold & Wade, 2015; Reference Capra and LuisiCapra & Luisi, 2014; Reference RichmondRichmond, 1993). Conversely, on at least one account, systems thinking includes a component called ‘scientific thinking’ (Reference RichmondRichmond, 2016), which, again, others describe as an entire disciplinary approach that can be divided into several components (e.g. see Reference Dunbar, Fugelsang, Holyoak and MorrisonDunbar & Fugelsang, 2005; Reference NollNoll, 1935).

Because one disciplinary approach might seemingly appear as a component of another disciplinary approach, these approaches might be considered at different levels of granularity. For example, entrepreneurial thinking can be divided into many components, one of which is, say, ‘systems thinking’ (Reference Grimes and VogusGrimes & Vogus, 2021), and systems thinking can itself be divided into many components, one of which is, say, ‘recognizing interconnections’ (Reference Arnold and WadeArnold & Wade, 2015). We might then ask what a component like ‘recognizing interconnections’ can be further divided into (at a finer level of granularity), and also what ‘entrepreneurial thinking’ might be a component of (at a courser level). Such an investigation might aim at generating a large hierarchical structure where something like ‘thinking’ is at the coarsest level of granularity, and this is progressively broken down further and further. An alternative to this hierarchical view of disciplinary approaches is a network view (for a discussion of hierarchical and networked organisational structures, see Reference FischerFischer, 2016). In this conception, the various ways of thinking constitute a space of possibilities, and disciplinary approaches are defined by how they connect through that space, linking different components into a coherent and descriptive set. One discipline’s approach might be just a component of another discipline’s approach, but disciplinary approaches in general would be defined by their full set of components and how those components are related. Including or overlapping with other disciplines would be permitted or encouraged, but perhaps most importantly, it would be acknowledged (we’ll return to that later).

Attention to commonalities between the disciplinary approaches should not mask the fact that many of these approaches seemingly have components that are quite distinctive, common to only small sets of disciplines or perhaps even unique to one of them. For example, design thinking’s reference to ‘abductive reasoning’ is quite unusual (e.g. Reference KimbellKimbell, 2011; Reference Micheli, Wilner, Bhatti, Mura and BeverlandMicheli et al., 2019), as is the principle of ‘affordable loss’ in entrepreneurial thinking (Reference SarasvathySarasvathy, 2009), and also the focus on ‘understanding feedback’ in systems thinking (Reference Arnold and WadeArnold & Wade, 2015). These are unlike the components in any of the other disciplinary approaches reviewed here, but it is not clear whether this reveals genuinely unique features of these approaches, accidental omissions in the projects describing other disciplinary approaches or attention to different levels of description in those other projects. For example, although the design thinking project is perhaps the only such project to claim a special place for abduction, that mode of thought has been described as central to medical reasoning (Reference Patel, Arocha, Zhang, Holyoak and MorrisonV. L. Patel et al., 2005, p. 730) and legal practice (Reference AskelandAskeland, 2020).Footnote ²³ However, it is still the case that when each discipline’s components are taken as a set, they are collectively distinctive and characteristic, despite some partial overlap with individual components of other disciplines.

6.3 Are These Approaches Really Transferrable?

In the previous section, I began by outlining the dual claims that are apparent or implicit in many accounts of disciplinary approaches: each one is both discipline-specific (in its origins) and yet discipline-neutral (in its potential application). Having now considered the issue of discipline-specificity, I turn to the issue of discipline-neutrality.

As we have seen, the various projects to define disciplinary approaches typically abstract away those aspects of the discipline that are thought to be overly specific. This is done with the goal of representing the transferrable essence of those disciplines’ approaches, approaches that seemingly might be applied by almost anyone to almost anything. This is a tempting proposition because it suggests that a wide range of people can then learn to think like, say, a designer, an entrepreneur or an ecologist by learning just about each discipline’s ‘thinking’ rather than undertaking training in the discipline itself.Footnote ²⁴ Given that the learners’ domains of application are likely to be very different to the domains traditionally associated with the approach they are training in, this might seem to provide a shortcut that is not just convenient but also justified. However, just how is it that practitioners acquire and develop the approaches that are taken to characterise their discipline? What is lost when discipline-specific factors such as subject matter are stripped away from descriptions of a discipline’s practices? Such questions are seldom addressed by the projects that promote each disciplinary approach, and we would have to look elsewhere for clues.

Disciplinary styles are reported to be ‘imprinted’ on people by the ‘signature pedagogies’ of their academic and professional training, and by their early professional experiences (Reference ShulmanShulman, 2005; Reference Blackwell, Wilson, Boulton and KnellBlackwell et al., 2010). As such, the approaches that are practiced and promoted by each discipline might be thought to originate in those disciplines’ distinctive histories, goals, values, materials, subjects, techniques, cultures, achievements and failures. This would suggest that attempts to extract disciplinary approaches from the originating disciplines could rob those approaches of the very characteristics that make them coherent and valuable. We might reasonably ask to what extent the various disciplinary approaches can be understood, acquired and developed without learners’ involvement in the actual disciplines themselves. Is each discipline, in fact, the best place to learn the disciplinary approaches that they promote? Specifically, are those approaches best acquired and practised by working with each discipline’s motivations, problems, materials, processes, constraints and specific forms of feedback? For example, are the components of design thinking best learnt by practicing architecture, product design or service design (for a discussion of such issues, see Reference KolkoKolko, 2018)? Or, is systems thinking best learnt by modelling the behaviour of natural ecosystems (for a related experiment, see Reference Riess and MischoRiess & Mischo, 2010)? We could go on through any list of disciplines that interest us asking similar questions about which experiences really shape the way practitioners develop and refine their disciplinary approaches. Those people who have been immersed in the specifics of a discipline’s practices might be able to abstract from those specifics to recognise their own disciplinary approach and apply it elsewhere. However, we might wonder whether people from outside the discipline can be effectively trained just in the approaches and then meaningfully progress from such abstractions to new specifics that are relevant to them in their own domain (for a discussion of how teachers aim to encourage ‘disciplinary patterns of language and thought’, see Reference Langer, Confer and SawyerLanger et al., 1993).

The various projects to define disciplinary approaches don’t offer much guidance on the issues raised above, but another set of projects has: those defining higher-order thinking skills. Perhaps the most prominent of these skills is ‘critical thinking’, with associated work investigating how such thinking can be effectively taught, both within disciplines and independent of them (e.g. Reference Halpern, Sternberg, Sternberg and HalpernHalpern & Sternberg, 2020). However, there are also similar discussions of other forms of thinking that aren’t tied to any specific discipline. A list of these higher-order thinking skills might include

1. ▪ ‘critical thinking’ (cited above);

2. ▪ ‘creative thinking’ (e.g. Reference WebsterWebster, 1990);

3. ▪ ‘inventive thinking’ (e.g. Reference Sokol, Oget, Sonntag and KhomenkoSokol et al., 2008);

4. ▪ ‘visual thinking’ (e.g. Reference McKimMcKim, 1980);

5. ▪ ‘analogical thinking’ (e.g. Reference Gentner, Maravilla, Ball and ThompsonGentner & Maravilla, 2018);

6. ▪ ‘possibilistic thinking’ (e.g. Reference ClarkeClarke, 2008);

7. ▪ ‘possibility thinking’ (e.g. Reference Craft, Wegerif, Li and KaufmanCraft, 2015);

8. ▪ ‘futures thinking’ (e.g. A. Reference Jones, Buntting and HipkinsJones et al., 2012);

9. ▪ ‘flexible thinking’ (e.g. Reference Barak and LevenbergBarak & Levenberg, 2016);

10. ▪ ‘reflective thinking’ (e.g. Reference RodgersRodgers, 2002);

11. ▪ ‘open-minded thinking’ (e.g. Reference Stanovich and WestStanovich & West, 1997);

12. ▪ ‘model-based thinking’ (e.g. Reference Warton, Foster, De’ath, Stoklosa and DunstanWarton et al., 2015);

13. ▪ ‘causal thinking’ (e.g. Reference Illari, Russo, Williamson, Lagnado, Illari, Russo and WilliamsonIllari et al., 2011).

Many of these general thinking skills are themselves subdivided into components (e.g. see Reference EnnisEnnis, 1964), and they are also sometimes compared to each other (e.g. see Reference DonaldDonald, 2002; Reference Hitchcock and ZaltaHitchcock, 2020).Footnote ²⁵ In educational contexts, these skills are usually described in terms of ‘teaching thinking’, as opposed to teaching subject matter content (Reference WegerifWegerif, 2007, chs. 6–7; Reference Wegerif, Li and KaufmanWegerif et al., 2015), and so also share that feature with the disciplinary approaches we have been considering here.

Even a brief survey of the higher-order thinking skills shows that they overlap with the components of the disciplinary approaches. However, I’ll focus here on critical thinking because it has one of the most well-established literatures (developed over several decades) and because that literature has explicitly addressed the issue of discipline-neutrality and the challenge of transfer. Although definitions vary, critical thinking is often associated with evaluating claims, assessing evidence, considering alternatives, employing logic and remaining sceptical.Footnote ²⁶ However, just as we have seen that disciplinary approaches include not just thinking skills, but also knowledge, attitudes, habits and dispositions, the same is true for critical thinking. To quote Reference Halpern, Sternberg, Sternberg and HalpernHalpern and Sternberg (2020), critical thinking is ‘the willingness to engage in and persist at a complex task, demonstrate flexible and openminded thinking, and the readiness to abandon non-productive strategies and self-correct when needed’ (p. 3).

In whatever ways it might be defined, critical thinking is widely regarded as an essential approach across a wide range of disciplines and is the stated objective of education at many levels (e.g. see Reference WillinghamWillingham, 2007). Because so many different disciplines value and promote critical thinking, it has often been described as though it is a single set of skills and inclinations that can be applied in different contexts. This has led to the creation of general critical thinking courses, which aim to teach critical thinking separately from disciplinary subject matter. The idea is that these courses develop widely applicable critical thinking skills that can later be demonstrated in any number of subjects, ranging from philosophy and literature to mathematics and the natural sciences. However, analysis of these courses and their performance has led other people to argue that critical thinking is really just an umbrella term for sets of skills and inclinations that vary greatly according to the specific contexts of application (for summaries of the debates, see Reference EnnisEnnis, 1964, Reference Ennis1989; Reference McPeckMcPeck, 1981, Reference McPeck1990; Reference MooreMoore, 2011). As Reference Sternberg, Sternberg and HalpernSternberg (2020) points out

Observations like Sternberg’s have led to proposals that critical thinking is not a separate, widely applicable skill, but is something that should be taught within disciplines, applied to the subject matter that is most relevant. One consequence of the apparent discipline-specificity of critical thinking is the difficulties that people experience when they are required to take critical thinking concepts or skills from one domain and apply them to another. There then seems to be a tendency for critical thinking learnt in one domain to become ‘attached’ to the problems that are seen in that domain, rather than being freely and effectively transferred to other kinds of problems (for an analysis of this with respect to professional practice, see Reference Lilienfeld, Basterfield, Bowes, Costello, Halpern and SternbergLilienfeld et al., 2020; for an analysis of this with respect to education, see Reference WillinghamWillingham, 2007, Reference Willingham2019). The relevant literature does not conclude that training in critical thinking is impossible, but certainly challenging. The notion of transfer is key, and it is advised that educational courses are explicitly designed to encourage transfer, including demonstrations of discipline specificity and neutrality (e.g. see Reference Halpern, Sternberg, Sternberg and HalpernHalpern & Sternberg, 2020; Reference Perkins and SalomonPerkins & Salomon, 1989; Reference WillinghamWillingham, 2007).

Critical thinking is directly relevant to many disciplinary approaches, either because critical thinking is a component of those approaches, or because those approaches are a specialised application of critical thinking. For example, Reference Schweitzer, Groeger and SobelSchweitzer et al. (2016) include critical thinking as a component of design thinking, Reference NollNoll (1935) includes it as a component of scientific thinking and Reference RuggieroRuggiero (1996) includes it as a component of sociological thinking. Conversely, Reference WillinghamWillingham (2007) regards such disciplinary approaches as different forms of critical thinking, saying ‘there are specific types of critical thinking that are characteristic of different subject matter: That’s what we mean when we refer to “thinking like a scientist” or “thinking like a historian”’ (p. 8; also see Reference Sternberg, Sternberg and HalpernSternberg, 2020). So, some people regard critical thinking as a part of certain disciplinary approaches, whereas others regard disciplinary approaches as specific forms of critical thinking. Either way, critical thinking is intertwined with many of the disciplinary approaches, and the same could be said of the other higher-order thinking skills, each of which also has a body of literature associated with it. These literatures have typically been overlooked in discussions of disciplinary approaches, even though they address many overlapping themes, including education and transfer. A closer integration of research on disciplinary approaches and the higher-order thinking skills would be beneficial, especially for our understanding of how to educate for transfer between domains. For a rare example of this, see Reference EnglishEnglish’s (2023) work on different ways of thinking in problem solving, which includes a focus on critical thinking, systems thinking and design thinking.

Many of the projects to define particular disciplinary approaches make claims for their general applicability: apparently, everyone can benefit from thinking like a designer, or like an ecologist, entrepreneur, computer scientist, and so on. However, for this to be true requires effective transfer from the originating discipline to the domain of application. A relevant consideration here is how far something is being transferred, either in terms of the distance between disciplines or application domains (for a taxonomy of transfer distances, see Reference Barnett and CeciBarnett & Ceci, 2002). For example, a recent meta-analysis of transfer effects from teaching computer programming found positive effects for activities close to computing (near transfer: creative thinking, mathematical skills and metacognition), whereas activities further from computing benefitted the least (far transfer: school achievement and literacy) (Reference Scherer, Siddiq and Sánchez ViverosScherer et al., 2019). Clearly, if the claims about the wide applicability of disciplinary approaches are to be supported, then courses (or other interventions) will need to be developed with this in mind, and studies will need to be conducted to assess their effectiveness in this regard (e.g. see Reference Carlgren, Rauth and ElmquistCarlgren et al., 2016; Reference Kurtmollaiev, Pedersen, Fjuk and KvaleKurtmollaiev et al., 2018). Adopting such a focus on transfer has implications not just for how the interventions should be evaluated, but also how they should be designed so that such assessment is possible (e.g. for this argument applied to systems thinking training, see Reference Cavaleri and StermanCavaleri & Sterman, 1997).

It should be acknowledged here that considering higher-order thinking skills (e.g. critical thinking) might make us question the distinction between these skills and the many disciplinary approaches that we have been focussed on (e.g. design thinking). On the one hand, each disciplinary approach might originate from specific professional practices or academic traditions. On the other hand, higher-order thinking skills might be more general and remain independent of any such practices or traditions. This sort of distinction might be easiest to defend when the disciplinary approaches under consideration are like design thinking, entrepreneurial thinking and computational thinking. These approaches are derived from the work of designers, entrepreneurs and computer scientists, each of whom is associated with specific professional practices and academic traditions. However, what about something like systems thinking, which I have so far treated as a disciplinary approach? If the term ‘systems thinking’ describes how systems biologists or systems engineers think, then perhaps it is indeed disciplinary. However, if systems thinking is instead described as a discipline-neutral approach then it might just as well be treated as a higher-order thinking skill rather than anything disciplinary. In fact, instead of being a special case, systems thinking is just a clear illustration of the problem of trying to classify any of these ways of thinking. If a disciplinary approach originates in a discipline but is then abstracted for wide-ranging application elsewhere then perhaps it has become a general higher-order thinking skill (or a set of such skills). Perhaps all disciplinary approaches are actually just higher-order thinking skills, rather than being disciplinary after all. These two overarching categories might really just be two ends of a continuum, with some ways of thinking seeming to be more attached to disciplines and others seeming to be more detached from them.

6.4 What about Sub-disciplines and Inter-disciplines?

With all this talk of discipline specificity and neutrality, it makes sense to consider exactly what is included and excluded within the bounds of any particular discipline. However, the various projects to define disciplinary approaches have typically been phrased in very general terms that cover large disciplines, and therefore – implicitly – many sub-disciplines. For example, discussions of design thinking generally do not distinguish the approaches used in product design from those used in engineering design or software design, and yet also do not explicitly claim that these sub-disciplines are all united by the same overall approach. We might ask whether components such as ‘developing empathy’ or ‘iterative prototyping’ are equally important in each sub-discipline of design. Similar questions could be asked about many other disciplinary approaches:

1. ▪ ‘Systems thinking’ – is this describing the approach taken by those working in ecology, systems biology or systems engineering?

2. ▪ ‘Entrepreneurial thinking’ – is this describing the approach taken by those working on technology-related or service-related ventures?

3. ▪ ‘Computational thinking’ – is this describing the approach taken by those working in information systems, software engineering or computer networks?

Distinctions like these could be identified within all the other disciplines for which disciplinary approaches have been defined: ‘geographical thinking’ (human or physical?), ‘scientific thinking’ (natural or social?), ‘economic thinking’ (model-based or heterodox?), and so on. Whatever discipline we consider, it can be divided further and further into sub-disciplines and sub-sub-disciplines. Those divisions might be made on the basis of subject matter knowledge, applied techniques, or just, well, … on the basis of some general approach. As such, interpreting claims made about a single overarching disciplinary approach, such as design thinking, requires some caution. This is because we don’t know if those claims apply to any or all of the sub-disciplines we might be interested in.

An alternative interpretation of the projects to define disciplinary approaches is that they are not really identifying the overarching approaches that are common to all their many sub-disciplines. Instead, perhaps they are – again implicitly – prioritising just one or some of the sub-disciplines but giving the approach a much more general name. For example, is design thinking really more like product design thinking or service design thinking? The examples that are often used to illustrate the sources of design thinking might suggest that it is one of these that is dominant (but also see Reference PressmanPressman, 2018; Reference Wrigley, Mosely and MoselyWrigley et al., 2021). Additionally, is it Western perspectives and practices that are taken to be central to design thinking, or are those from other regions equally represented (for discussions of African design thinking, see Reference AmboleAmbole, 2020)? More generally, just whose design are we talking about when we talk about design thinking, who decides that, how is that decision made and how do we know? Similar questions can be asked for systems thinking, entrepreneurial thinking and for all the other disciplinary approaches considered here (e.g. for discussions of indigenous worldviews relevant to systems thinking, see Reference GoodchildGoodchild, 2021; Reference Spiller, Wolfgramm, Henry and PouwhareSpiller et al., 2020).

A more transparent way of describing each discipline’s approach might be to start by identifying the various sub-disciplines (and other variants) of relevance: what distinguishes them and how are they related? We could then identify the distinct approaches that characterise each sub-discipline and the common approaches that characterise the discipline as a whole. Some of these common approaches might be shared by many or all sub-disciplines; some might be shared by only a few; some sub-disciplines might have specialised approaches that are not shared with the overall discipline, or with many or any of the other sub-disciplines. In considering things in this way, we should note that parts of two completely different disciplines might actually be more similar to each other than two very different parts of the same discipline (Reference BecherBecher, 2017, ch. 2). For example, consider the broad discipline of engineering, which might include sub-disciplines of engineering science and engineering design.Footnote ²⁷ The approach taken in engineering science might be closer to scientific thinking than it is to design thinking. In contrast, the approach taken in engineering design might be closer to design thinking than scientific thinking (for related discussions, see Reference Dzombak and BeckmanDzombak & Beckman, 2020; Reference Waks, Trotskovsky, Sabag and HazzamWaks et al., 2011). See Figure 4 for an illustration of these issues, and as a possible partial expansion of Figure 1. Perhaps more accurate – but also more complex – is the idea that disciplinary relations should be considered as a network rather than a hierarchy, where all disciplines and sub-disciplines are related to each other in some way (see Figure 3 in Reference Rosvall and BergstromRosvall & Bergstrom, 2011).

Figure 4 Diagram showing (i) how sub-disciplinary approaches of different disciplines (in this case engineering and science) might be more similar than sub-disciplinary approaches of the same discipline (engineering), and (ii) how inter-disciplines (like engineering design) might exhibit characteristics of two or more disciplines (like engineering and design).

As indicated in Figure 4, some sub-disciplines, such as engineering design, lie at the intersection of two or more disciplines, and thus might ‘inherit’ common approaches from two or more ‘parents’. Another example is synthetic biology, which is a hybrid of biological science and engineering, and draws from both disciplines. Practitioners of synthetic biology might thus be expected to employ forms of biological thinking and engineering thinking, while possibly also exhibiting approaches that are not found in either (see discussions in Reference EndyEndy, 2005; Reference KnightKnight, 2005). For our purposes here, perhaps the most prominent discussion of such inter-disciplines is ‘systemic design’, which is described as a disciplinary approach in its own right, one which is divided into several components (for a review, see Reference Kaur, Craven, Maier, Oehmen and VermaasKaur & Craven, 2020, pp. 202–205). However, there are many of these inter-disciplines, the practices of which might be expected to combine characteristics of two or more of the approaches that we have been considering, and others too (for a framework of options, see Reference McComb and JablokowMcComb & Jablokow, 2022).

In addition to considering disciplines, sub-disciplines and inter-disciplines, there are other ways in which disciplinary approaches might be divided. For example, Reference Denning and TedreDenning and Tedre (2021; also see Reference Tedre, Denning, Yadav and BerthelsenTedre & Denning, 2022) distinguish between computational thinking for beginners and computational thinking for professionals, arguing that the approaches of each group are different, or at least that the challenges they engage with are.Footnote ²⁸ This is unusual, and just as projects to define disciplinary approaches generally do not engage with sub-disciplines, they also generally do not engage with levels of expertise or other such forms of distinction. However, whether divided by sub-disciplinary specialisation, expertise level or something else, considering discipline decomposition and comparison might not conform to the overall goal of representing disciplinary approaches in a way that is accessible to outsiders. Still, it might provide a more nuanced basis from which such accessible representations can be constructed, and it might also permit more transparency for those seeking to understand the foundations of claims that are seemingly made about entire disciplines.

Considering the different ways in which disciplines can be decomposed and combined might prompt us to reconsider the utility of categorising approaches according to disciplines after all. On the one hand, categorisation according to traditional disciplinary categories can seem inevitable because those disciplines have long been reified as a way to divide up knowledge, learning and practice (Reference Greenwood, Suddaby and HiningsGreenwood et al., 2002; Reference ChandlerChandler, 2009). It is also within those disciplines that the projects to define disciplinary approaches have taken place, and it is after those disciplines that the approaches are named. On the other hand, we have seen that definitions of disciplinary approaches are typically presented at a level of abstraction that strips away many of the discipline’s details to emphasise their transferrable essence. For people outside the discipline seeking to apply that approach to their own work, we might question whether it should really interest them which discipline the approach originated from. For example, if someone in an organisation wants to implement some innovative change to how a business process is managed, does it matter whether an iterative low-fidelity build-and-test technique is imported from design, engineering, computer science, entrepreneurship or somewhere else? Does it matter where they think that approach has come from, or even if they think it has come from anywhere other than the domain they are from, such as management?

If we answer the questions with a ‘yes’, then we assert that disciplinary identity is an important part of disciplinary approaches, even though that is not what the projects to define such approaches have emphasised. With their focus on abstraction, each project instead emphasises the components that make up their own particular disciplinary approach, but not on what associations people make with that discipline, or what the naming of the approach means to those people. However, although something like design thinking might be usefully decomposed into a set of components that can be individually learnt, developed and applied, perhaps what is more important is that learners recognise that the problem they are addressing is a design problem, that they are engaged in design activities and that they are acting as designers. Similarly, the components of entrepreneurial thinking might mean less to learners than the idea that they should be entrepreneurial or act like an entrepreneur, even if they are not launching a new business venture, but perhaps just operating within an established organisation (for a discussion of intrapreneurial thinking, see Reference Sayeed and GazdarSayeed & Gazdar, 2003). The same might be said of many other disciplinary approaches, where emphasis could be placed on thinking and acting like a forest ecologist (systems thinking), a software engineer (computational thinking), and so on. To be clear, the distinction here is between emphasising the particularities of the disciplinary practice (or part of it) rather than eradicating such details in the interests of codification and generalisation.

If instead we think that disciplinary origins are not important to the promotion of disciplinary approaches (answering those earlier questions with a ‘no’), then we might look for alternative categorisations of the approaches that have previously been associated with specific disciplines. These new categories of practice would either be independent of traditional disciplines or would place them in higher-level categories. For example, individual disciplines might be grouped according to whether they are investigative, artistic, social or enterprising (Reference Smart, Ethington, Umbach and RocconiSmart et al., 2009, p. 489), or according to any of the many other schemes of discipline grouping (for a review, see Reference JonesW. A. Jones, 2011, p. 11). Such moves might then emphasise things like ‘investigative thinking’, which could include many components that are currently distributed across a wide range of disciplinary approaches from the natural and social sciences. Alternatively, we could focus not on the disciplines (whether traditional or newly defined) but instead on the finer-grained components of practice from which they are made up. This might, for example, shift the emphasis to approaches like ‘prototype thinking’ or ‘pivot thinking’, rather than the disciplines that exhibit those practices (perhaps design and entrepreneurship). However, we might question whether prototype thinking or pivot thinking would each be just one type of thing, or whether they would vary substantially across disciplines and sub-disciplines, as has been found for critical thinking (for related work on visualisation, see Reference Eckert, Blackwell, Stacey, Earl and ChurchEckert et al., 2012). Another example might be ‘complexity thinking’ (e.g. see Reference McCool, Freimund, Breen, Worboys, Lockwood, Kothari, Feary and PulsfordMcCool et al., 2015; Reference RichardsonRichardson, 2008), which can be divided into different components, and where the weighting of those components can be seen to vary between sub- or inter-disciplines, such as swarm robotics and synthetic biology (Reference Chen and CrillyChen & Crilly, 2016).

As we can see, diverging from disciplinary classifications is not straightforward, and might involve giving up some clarity in a discussion that generally needs more of just that, not less. However, we should acknowledge that the existing focus on broad disciplinary approaches can mask important differences within disciplinary boundaries, and important commonalities across them.

7.1 Will the Existing Literatures Suffice?

In considering various disciplinary approaches, I’ve here attempted to read across disciplinary boundaries and draw material together for comparison and synthesis. However, the many problems encountered in trying to do this constitute the bulk of what I have been describing. Such problems make the process of cross-disciplinary literature review very challenging, perhaps even more challenging than such reviews normally are (for methodological guidance see Reference Cronin and GeorgeCronin & George, 2023). To be clear, there are cross-disciplinary integrative reviews on relevant topics, including creativity and innovation (Reference Acar, Tarakci and van KnippenbergAcar et al., 2019), idea generation and selection (Reference Hua, Harvey and RietzschelHua et al., 2022), design and problem solving (Reference CrillyCrilly, 2021a), and entrepreneurship (Reference Ireland and WebbIreland & Webb, 2007). It’s just that these reviews have not focussed on disciplinary approaches, but rather on other factors relevant to the practices that take place within and across disciplines.

A different orientation to the published literatures would be a content analysis study, counting and examining references to different components of each approach across different disciplines. For example, if ‘problem solving’ is identified as a component of a specific disciplinary approach then that could provide the stimulus for searching other disciplines’ literatures for that and related terms. The relevant bodies of work might include both the research literature and practitioner literature across a number of disciplines. This process could then be repeated for a range of different components, such as problem finding, problem framing, and so on. Such searches would permit analysis of the relevant weighting for each component in each discipline. Augmenting such a study with semantic analysis of the keyword occurrences would provide further context, either for sense checking a proportion of the data or for a more qualitative analysis (for an illustration of such an approach, see Reference Roehling, Cavanaugh, Moynihan and BoswellRoehling et al., 2000).

Although there are options for conducting a cross-disciplinary review of the existing literature, that will always involve working with what we’ve got, which in this case, might not be what we need. I think other methods will be required, methods that generate new data.

7.2 Can Experts Provide the Required Insights?

An alternative to seeking clarity in the published literatures on disciplinary approaches would be to survey the opinions of experts, explicitly seeking cross-disciplinary comparisons. Two categories of expert are easily identifiable, categories which might sometimes overlap.

First, there are researchers of disciplinary approaches, such as those who have published many of the works cited here: experts in the study of design thinking, systems thinking, entrepreneurial thinking, and so on. Although these researchers have seemingly mostly thought about their own disciplinary approaches in isolation, there are opportunities to address this: these researchers could be invited to define their disciplinary approach in relation to something else; they could be invited to reflect on the connections to closely allied disciplines; they could be asked to respond to the accounts of other disciplinary approaches. The application of such elicitation techniques could yield better definitions of the approach taken in each expert’s own discipline and also new information about the relationships between disciplines. This might be even more effective where experts can be identified who have detailed knowledge of more than one disciplinary approach. Interactions between experts could be facilitated by reference to many of the lists, tables and diagrams that illustrate the description of individual disciplinary approaches or to comparative diagrams, such as the sketches in Figures 5, 6 and 7 (for descriptions of visual and verbal elicitation techniques, see Reference Crilly, Blackwell and ClarksonCrilly et al., 2006; Reference Ford and StermanFord & Sterman, 1998).

Second, in addition to researchers, the practitioners of each discipline could be surveyed for their opinions of the characteristics of their own approaches. This could involve assembling groups of practitioners from across a range of disciplines to discuss similarities and differences in their approaches. Alternatively, researchers could identify practitioners who have two or more disciplinary associations, either having moved between disciplines or combining two or more in their current practice. This would provide an opportunity for abstracting from the specifics of disciplinary practices in a comparative way. For an example of such an approach at the level of sub-disciplines, see Reference Eckert, Blackwell, Stacey, Earl and ChurchEckert et al.’s (2012) study of sketching in various branches of design, which identifies both common and distinct experiences with this form of visualisation. Although conducted with different objectives, it is also useful here to consider Reference StroberStrober’s (2006, Reference Strober2011) reports on a series of workshops with specialists in different academic disciplines. She describes participants learning to better understand their own disciplinary approaches when they saw those approaches contrasted with those of other participants. However, Strober’s work also warns that such interactions might be challenging because of the very thing that is of interest: the differing approaches of the participants make communication and coordination difficult, resulting in conflict (for advice on explicitly addressing this, see Reference StroberStrober, 2006, pp. 229–230).

7.3 How Can Cross-Discipline Practice be Observed?

As informative as published literature and expert opinion might be, the claims made about disciplinary approaches are generally about practices (not people’s descriptions of those practices or their reflections on them) and about how those practices transfer to other domains (not what people claim about such transfer). Because of this, some more direct comparative study of disciplinary approaches in action would be valuable. To illustrate the potential for this, I outline just two possible kinds of study here.

First, researchers could define a set of discipline-neutral tasks to which various disciplinary approaches could be applied. Practitioners from those various disciplines are then set those tasks, with their approaches recorded for analysis. Researchers could subsequently work to identify any differences and commonalities in the approaches taken across disciplines. Whether practitioners were working individually or collaboratively, studies such as this would present opportunities to compare disciplinary approaches on the same terms, with the same tasks, same data and even with opportunities for analysis from different perspectives (e.g. psychological, sociological and educational). I don’t find studies like this in the published literature, with most comparative studies of disciplines being based on comparisons of how each goes about its work within its normal context (e.g. see Reference BecherBecher, 2017). However, it should be noted that the kind of comparative studies I am suggesting might involve considerable methodological challenges, especially if the disciplinary differences do not just characterise the individuals and groups to be compared, but also influence the tasks that are relevant to those comparisons (for a general discussion of the challenges surrounding comparative studies of thinking, see Reference Cole and MeansCole & Means, 1981, pp. 2, 11).

Second, and more naturalistically, researchers could identify practitioners who have two or more disciplinary associations, either having moved between disciplines, or combining two or more in their current practice. This would provide an opportunity for observing how those practitioners approach their work and distinguishing how those approaches compare with those of their more monodisciplinary colleagues. For example, if some practitioners had moved from the design domain to the policy domain, then researchers could study how those designers’ approaches to policy work differed from the approaches demonstrated by their colleagues (for related case studies of the temporary transfer of designers into other sectors, see Reference Wrigley, Nusem and StrakerWrigley et al., 2020). Alternatively, in sectors that draw from a wide range of disciplines (e.g. education, management consultancy), comparative studies could be conducted, investigating how those from different backgrounds approach the same kind of task. Again, I don’t find comparative studies like this in the published literature, but the concepts of ‘epistemic games’ (Reference PerkinsPerkins, 1997) and ‘epistemic fluency’ (Reference Goodyear and MarkauskaiteGoodyear & Markauskaite, 2017) might help with analysis of the data.