Element contents
Commitment and Resoluteness in Rational Choice
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 03 February 2022
Summary
Drawing and building on the existing literature, this Element explores the interesting and challenging philosophical terrain where issues regarding cooperation, commitment, and control intersect. Section 1 discusses interpersonal and intrapersonal Prisoner's Dilemma situations, and the possibility of a set of unrestrained choices adding up in a way that is problematic relative to the concerns of the choosers involved. Section 2 focuses on the role of precommitment devices in rational choice. Section 3 considers the role of resoluteness in rational choice and action. And Section 4 delves into some related complications concerning the nature of actions and the nature of intentions.
- Type
- Element
- Information
- Online ISBN: 9781009211536Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication: 03 March 2022
References
Andreou, C. (2006a). Environmental damage and the puzzle of the self-torturer. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 34(1), 95–108.Google Scholar
Andreou, C. (2006b). Might intentions be the only source of practical imperatives. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 9(3), 311–325.Google Scholar
Andreou, C. (2007a). Environmental preservation and second-order procrastination. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 35(3), 233–248.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Andreou, C. (2007b). Understanding procrastination. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 37(2), 183–193.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Andreou, C. (2008). Making a clean break: Addiction and Ulysses contracts. Bioethics, 22(1), 25–31.Google Scholar
Andreou, C. (2010). Coping with procrastination. In The Thief of Time, ed. Andreou, C. and White, M. D.. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 206–215.Google Scholar
Andreou, C. (2014a). The good, the bad, and the trivial. Philosophical Studies, 169(2), 209–225.Google Scholar
Andreou, C. (2016). Figuring out how to proceed with evaluation after figuring out what matters. Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review, 55, 621–637.Google Scholar
Andreou, C. (2018a). Self-paternalism. In The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Paternalism, eds. Grill, K. and Hanna, J.. New York: Routledge, pp. 59–65.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Andreou, C. (2018b). Newcomb’s problem, rationality, and restraint. In Newcomb’s Problem, ed. Ahmed, A.. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 167–178.Google Scholar
Andreou, C. (2021). General assessments and attractive exceptions. Inquiry, 64(9), 892–900.Google Scholar
Bratman, M. (1987). Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Bratman, M. (2018). Planning, Time, and Self-Governance. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Broome, J. (2001). Are intentions reasons? And how should we cope with incommensurable values? In Practical Rationality and Preference, eds. Morris, C. W. and Ripstein, A.. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 98–120.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Davidson, D., McKinsey, J. C. C., and Suppes, P. (1955). Outlines of a formal theory of value, I. Philosophy of Science, 22(2), 140–160.Google Scholar
De Condorcet, N. (1785). Essay on the Application of Analysis to the Probability of Majority Decisions. Paris, De l’Imprimerie Royale.Google Scholar
Dresser, R. S. (1982). Ulysses and the psychiatrists. Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review, 16(3), 777–854.Google Scholar
Elster, J. (1984). Ulysses and the Sirens: Studies in Rationality and Irrationality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Ferrero, L. (2017). Intending, acting, and doing. Philosophical Explorations, 20(S2), S13–S39.Google Scholar
Gauthier, D. (1991). Why contractarianism? In Contractarianism and Rational Choice, ed. Vallentyne, P.. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 15–30.Google Scholar
Glover, J. (1975). It makes no difference whether or not I do it (I). Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, 49(1), 171–190.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gollwitzer, P. M. and Schaal, B. (1998). Metacognition in action: The importance of implementation intentions. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 2(2), 124–136.Google Scholar
Hansson, S. O. and Grüne-Yanoff, T. (2017). Preferences. In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. E. N. Zalta. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/preferences/Google Scholar
Hume, D. (1951/1998). An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. Beauchamp, T. L.. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Kagan, S. (2011). Do I make a difference? Philosophy & Public Affairs, 39(2), 105–141.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McClennen, E. (1990). Rationality and Dynamic Choice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
McClennen, E. (1998). Rationality and rules. In Modeling Rationality, Morality, and Evolution, ed. Danielson, P.. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 13–40.Google Scholar
Olson, M. Jr. (1965). The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Peterson, M. (2015). The Prisoner’s Dilemma. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Quante, M. (1999). Precedent autonomy and personal identity. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, 9(4), 365–381.Google Scholar
Quinn, W. (1993). The puzzle of the self-torturer. In Morality and Action, ed. Foot, Philippa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 198–209.Google Scholar
Savulescu, J. and Dickenson, D. (1998). The time frame of preferences, dispositions, and the validity of advance directives for the mentally ill. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology, 5(3), 225–246.Google Scholar
Schelling, T. C. (1984). Ethics, law, and the exercise of self-command. In Choice and Consequence. London: Harvard University Press, pp. 83–112.Google Scholar
Spellecy, R. (2003). Reviving Ulysses contracts. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, 13(4), 373–392.Google Scholar
Steele, K. and Stefánsson, H. O. (2020). Decision theory. In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. E. N. Zalta. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2020/entries/decision-theory/Google Scholar
Tenenbaum, S. and Raffman, D. (2012). Vague projects and the puzzle of the self-torturer. Ethics, 123(1), 86–112.Google Scholar
Thoma, J. (2018). Temptation and preference-based instrumental rationality. In Self-Control, Rationality, and Decision Theory, ed. Bermúdez, J. L.. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 27–47.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Thompson, M. (2008). Life and Action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Vanderschraaf, P. (2006). The circumstances of justice. Politics, Philosophy & Economics, 5(3), 321–351.Google Scholar
Velleman, J. D. (2000). Deciding how to decide. In The Possibility of Practical Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 221–243.Google Scholar
- 10
- Cited by