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Series:   Elements in the Philosophy of Science

Causation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 June 2021

Luke Fenton-Glynn
Luke Fenton-Glynn
Affiliation:
University College London

Summary

This Element provides an accessible introduction to the contemporary philosophy of causation. It introduces the reader to central concepts and distinctions (type vs token causation, probabilistic vs deterministic causation, difference-making, interventions, overdetermination, pre-emption) and to key tools (structural equations, graphs, probabilistic causal models) drawn upon in the contemporary debate. The aim is to fuel the reader's interest in causation, and to equip them with the resources to contribute to the debate themselves. The discussion is historically informed and outward-looking. 'Historically informed' in that concise accounts of key historical contributions to the understanding of causation set the stage for an examination of the latest research. 'Outward looking' in that illustrations are provided of how the philosophy of causation relates to issues in the sciences, law, and elsewhere. The aim is to show why the study of causation is of critical importance, besides being fascinating in its own right.
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Keywords

causationcounterfactual theories of causationprobabilistic causationregularity theories of causationcausal modelling
Type
Element
Information
Series: Elements in the Philosophy of Science
Online ISBN: 9781108588300
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication: 15 July 2021

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