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Series:   Elements in Ethics

Subjective versus Objective Moral Wrongness

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 March 2021

Peter A. Graham
Affiliation:
University of Massachusetts, Amherst

Summary

There is presently a debate between Subjectivists and Objectivists about moral wrongness. Subjectivism is the view that the moral status of our actions, whether they are morally wrong or not, is grounded in our subjective circumstances – either our beliefs about, or our evidence concerning, the world around us. Objectivism, on the other hand, is the view that the moral status of our actions is grounded in our objective circumstances – all those facts other than those which comprise our subjective circumstances. A third view, Ecumenism, has it that the moral status of our actions is grounded both in our subjective and our objective circumstances. After outlining and evaluating the various arguments both against Subjectivism and against Objectivism, this Element offers a tentative defense of Objectivism about moral wrongness.
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Online ISBN: 9781108588249
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication: 15 April 2021
Copyright
© Peter A. Graham 2021

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Subjective versus Objective Moral Wrongness
  • Peter A. Graham, University of Massachusetts, Amherst
  • Online ISBN: 9781108588249
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Subjective versus Objective Moral Wrongness
  • Peter A. Graham, University of Massachusetts, Amherst
  • Online ISBN: 9781108588249
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Subjective versus Objective Moral Wrongness
  • Peter A. Graham, University of Massachusetts, Amherst
  • Online ISBN: 9781108588249
Available formats
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