Contradictions in intellectual history are presented in this chapter regarding: scientific discoveries in physics and biology, Montaigne’s prolific self-investigation, and research on self-complexity. There are also cultural differences: East Asians view the world as being involved in constant flux and are tolerant of contradictions. This tolerance is more problematic for Western individuals, who tend to experience contradiction as a threat to their self-esteem. The Japanese folkloristic figure of yokai is presented as an example representing a coalition of good and bad. Furthermore, utopian ideals are critically discussed as embracing one ultimate end position, with the denial of the fundamentally contradictive nature of human beings. The work of Carl Jung on "shadows" is introduced and compared to the moral middle ground. The process of generative dialogue is proposed as a way to deal with contradictions. Finally, some practical implications are presented: the fostering of self-empathy, stimulating tolerance of uncertainty, and the influence of high-quality listening on the softening of the boundaries of the self.

To demonstrate the flexibility of moral positioning and the associated transference of energies, the concept of dominance reversal is introduced, illustrated by James’s description of “falling out of love” and Bakhtin’s exposé of carnival. The carnival ritual provides a basis for the conceptualization of a moral middle ground or grey area beween moral good and bad. The main practical implication of this chapter is the significance of recognizing that, via this middle ground, sharp distinctions between good and bad can be transcended as a buffer to toxic polarization.

Two shocking examples of projecting the moral bad are presented in this chapter: Hitler’s and Putin’s worldviews. The deeper commonalities in the social identities they propagated are analyzed: dehumanization, purification, internal unity/external division, and enemy image construction. This leads to some practical implications: recognizing the existence of moral multiplicity instead of moral dualism, avoiding the identification of people on the basis of one category only, replacing social categories by personalized I-positions, broadening one’s moral circle beyond one’s favorite ingroup, intergroup contact, promoting a superordinate identity, developing an overarching meta-position, and creating access to the moral middle ground.

The worldviews of Jean Genet, Marquis de Sade, and Anton LaVey are presented in this chapter. All of them accuse society of being morally hypocritical. Empirical research vis-à-vis hypocrisy in the psychology of morality is discussed. A moral-pluralistic approach is proposed in which different moral positions are prominent and can come into conflict with each other. In this context, Max Weber’s “ethic of responsibility” is discussed as relevant to political leadership. Then, the monopositionality of utopian visions, such as fascism, communism, religions, and neoliberalism, are criticized as being focused on one ideal end-position that does not allow counter-positions or alternative points of view As practical implications of this chapter, I offer three guidelines for dealing with hypocrisy: the role of self-awareness, perspective-taking, and the stimulation of moral multiplicity.

In this Introduction, a summary of the whole book is provided. The main concepts are defined and the main historical figures, such as Adolf Hitler, Vladimir Putin, Marquis de Sade, Jane Addams, Andrew Carnegie, and Oscar Schindler, are mentioned.

Some phenomena demonstrating that moral good and bad can form productive coalitions on a moral middle ground are presented in this chapter: healthy selfishness, Machiavellianism, the case of Oskar Schindler, black humor, grey hat hackers, transgressive art, the combination of the pure and impure in the tradition of Émile Durkheim, and the repositioning of the “wrong” other-in-the-self. Three practical implications are outlined: a guideline to evaluating transgressive art beyond one’s first emotional response and the existence of grey areas in the abortion discussion and in the #MeToo debate.

A multilevel conception of identity is proposed in this chapter, with individual, social, human, and ecological levels. Emphasis is placed on the nature of the relationships among the different identity positions, with a focus on dialogical flexibility and the distinction between consonant and dissonant dialogues. The risk of over-positioning is analyzed, indicating the one-sided exaggeration of one of the identities, and attention is devoted to the “level confusion” resulting from a lack of distinction between the different levels. An elaborate discussion of the concept of conscience is presented. From a neurological perspective, evidence shows that the natural inclination of bonding and caring puts limitations on our circle of moral regard. Finally, the worldviews of two historical icons, Jane Addams and Andrew Carnegie, are compared in order to demonstrate the value of promoter positions.