The Settlement of Disputes

In 1952 the Brahmans and Non-Brahmans of Kirippūr had had no street headman for the past thirty years. Although I am unsure why, I believe that labor migration, the arrival of newcomers, economic disparities within each street, and the fact that many people earned money outside the village produced disunity. On Lower Street, two Sengunda Mudaliars did collect money for the Draupadi Amman temple, managed its two-thirds acre of land, and leased out fishing in the Ayyaṉar temple tank to Nādārs once a year to obtain more cash for the two Lower Street temples' expenses. They had, however, no authority to settle disputes or witness marriages.

The Toṇḍaimaṇḍalam Mudaliar street also had no regular group of elders to manage its affairs or to govern the lower castes, probably because its members lacked the power of landownership over the village at large. The two wealthiest men in the village – the Padaiyacchi rich peasant owning twenty acres and the Naidu soda factory owner – were too newly rich, uneducated, low in caste, and unassuming in personality to command much authority in the village or even in their streets.

The village headman did have the legal right to settle civil disputes involving not more than Rs. 50, and the obligation to call the police in case of crime. Coming from an old, high-caste family and owning fifteen acres of land in addition to being headman, he was also often called on by disputants to settle general kinds of “trouble” such as theft, adultery, or assault among Non-Brahmans of lower caste.

In describing Kirippūr, my second village, I shall omit much of the detail that was presented for Kumbapeṭṭai. My chief aim is to highlight similarities and differences between the two villages and the relationships among the differences. I shall also give some account of how the Communist movement had taken hold and was operating in this East Thanjāvūr village in 1952.

Kirrippūr lay in Nāgapaṭṭaṇam tālūk, two miles south of the Thanjāvūr Nāgapaṭṭaṇam road and railway and a few miles from both Nāgapaṭṭaṇam and Tiruvārūr towns (see Maps 2 and 6). A cart road led east out of the village to join the main paved road and bus route south to Tirutturaipūṇḍi, and a tiny portion of the main road passed through the village at its southeast corner. Villages to the north and west of Kirippūr were accessible only by narrow raised footpaths across the paddy fields. On the south side, the village was bounded by the River Kaduvaiyār, a branch of the Ōḍumbōkkiyar and ultimately of the Vettār and the Kāvēri. For much of the year the river was too deep and swift for villagers to cross except by the main road bridge (see Map 6).

Kiruppūr was an ūr, or “Non-Brahman village” in contrast to Kumbapeṭṭai, which was a grāmam, or “Brahman village.” Unlike Kumbapeṭṭai, Kirippūr's revenue village and socioeconomic community were coterminous and occupied a continuous area. In 1952, Kirippūr had not yet been organized as a panchāyat and had only the traditional village officers – the village headman, the accountant, and their assistants.

By “economics” I refer to economic relations, especially to socioeconomic classes and their relations of production. In daily life economic relations and activities are interwoven with relations of power and authority and with the prescriptions of religion, especially of caste. I shall separate these themes for convenience, dealing with economic relations in this and the following two chapters.

In these chapters, “Kumbapeṭṭai” refers to the old grāmam plus Akkāchāvady, Vēṭṭāmbadi, and the east side of Barber Street. I have omitted Sheṭṭiyūr and Veḷiyūr because they had little to do with the main village's social life. When I list the land holdings of Kumbapeṭṭai's people I do, however, list their total holdings whether inside or outside the grāmam.

The Landlords

The distribution of the total land holdings by size and caste group among Kumbapeṭṭai's landowners and among those hailing from Kumbapeṭṭai who had left the village is given in Table 12.1. I have omitted owners born outside the village because the total extent of their holdings, in Kumbapeṭṭai and other villages, is not known to me in every case. I will, however, mention some prominent absentee owners in the course of my account.

The Non-Brahmans owned very little land and the Pallars only one acre. Much of the land of these two groups was dry land, less valuable than the wet land, which was monopolized by the Brahmans. Most of the Non-Brahman lots were in Veṭṭambadi and Akkāchāavady.

Eighty-three percent of Kumbapeṭṭai's men gained their livelihood directly from agriculture as rentiers, managers, or workers, whereas 52 percent of the women were actively engaged at least part time in agricultural work or management. The annual cycle of agricultural activities and festivals is therefore essential for an understanding of the villagers' lives and production relations. In this chapter I describe the main events of this cycle. In order to place the yearly round in perspective, I shall also mention major nonagricultural, especially religious, events.

Table 11.1 gives the Tamil months, seasons, and major agricultural events and festivals.

New Year

The agricultural year began on New Year's Day (Varusha Pirappu)on Chittrai 1. On that date mirāsdārs finally selected their kuthakai tenants and pannaiyals for the coming year and made them loans of about Rs. 50 per pannaiyāl and Rs. 100 per tenant This sum tided the servant over the lean months of Chittrai, Vaigāsi, and Ani when rivers and channels were dry and there was little agricultural work. It allowed the tenant to begin ploughing and to buy cow dung and pay for sheep from Rāmanāthapuram to fertilize his fields. On New Year's morning, the mirāsdār received a promissory note from the tenant or the pannaiyāl for the amount forwarded. He reclaimed it from the man's wages or harvest shares in the course of the year, sometimes at 6 percent interest and sometimes interest free.

This book is about changes in the political and economic structures of two villages in Thanjāvūr district of Tamiḷ Nāḍu State in southeast India. It is an attempt to view the villagers' changing internal class relations in the context of change in the larger structures of the district, state, and nation, in which some members of each village participate and which affect all of them.

I use the term “class” in this book in the Marxian sense. Thus, to quote Lenin's formulation, “classes are large groups of people distinguished by the place they occupy in an historically defined system of production, by their relations … vis à vis the means of production, by their role in the social organization of labour, and by the modes of obtaining and the importance of the share of the social wealth of which they dispose.”

The present volume concerns the two villages as they were when I first studied them in 1951–3. At that time, shortly after the independence of India, the villagers' lives were much affected by the impact of one-and-a-half centuries of British rule. In Part I, I deal with this heritage as it affected Thanjāvūr district as a whole, especially with reference to the economic impact of colonial rule and the resultant changes in the class structure. This involves examining Thanjāvūr's transition from a relatively self-contained and prosperous small kingdom to an agrarian hinterland that exported rice and labor to British plantations in southwest India, Ceylon, and Malaya and to the modern cities in the southern part of the Madras Presidency, which now forms the state of Tamiḷ Nāḍu.

In the preceding chapters, I have explored the contributions to the philosophy of social science which may be found in the writings of authors belonging to different intellectual traditions. This comparative analysis is invited and facilitated by a remarkable feature of twentieth-century thought: its convergence on the phenomenon of language. Like philosophers in the Anglo-Saxon world, both Ricoeur and Habermas emphasise the centrality and importance of language. Yet unlike many of their Anglo-Saxon counterparts, neither Ricoeur nor Habermas regards the analysis of this phenomenon as an activity divorced from broader philosophical and theoretical concerns. Thus Ricoeur views language as a medium of objectification and assigns hermeneutics the task of unfolding the dimensions of being which are expressed in, and disclosed by, the semantic structure of symbols and texts. Habermas conceives of language as the locus of ideology, suggesting that the distortions effected by the exercise of power can be criticised through a reconstruction of the presuppositions of speech. So for authors within widely differing traditions, language has become a common field of analysis, a common intersection for divergent aims. However, whereas ordinary language philosophers tend to treat this field as the ultimate ground of inquiry, both Ricoeur and Habermas view it as a region through which interpretation must proceed, but which in the end it must surpass.

The conceptions of language espoused by Ricoeur and Habermas are interwoven with their approach to the social sciences.

The following study is concerned with the philosophy of social science. This sphere of philosophical inquiry remains an arena of deep-rooted dispute. Since the middle of the nineteenth century, many authors have argued that the methods of the social sciences are identical in essential respects with those of the natural sciences. The latter disciplines provide, by virtue of their very success, an exemplar of what all knowledge should be: empirically grounded, universally binding, value-free. However, during the same period, many writers have rejected this view, maintaining that there is a radical discontinuity between the natural and the social domain. For the social world consists of speaking and acting subjects who constantly make sense of themselves and others, and whose meaningful and wilful activities cannot be comprehended by the methods of the natural sciences. The study of the social world requires, these writers contend, a fundamentally different approach.

The two opposing positions are reflected in the recent philosophical literature of the Anglo-Saxon world. In the 1940s and 50s, authors such as Hempel and Nagel sought to analyse the methods of the humanistic disciplines in a manner which concurred with the positivistic programme of a unified science. There has since been a strong reaction to this earlier aim, a reaction propelled by the work of the later Wittgenstein, Austin and other ‘ordinary language philosophers’. Writers such as Peters, Winch and Louch have called for an account of social science which is no longer constrained by the positivistic model, and which recognises the unique and ineradicable meaningfulness of human phenomena.

The methodology of social science is a topic which attracts the attention of writers within the traditions of ordinary language philosophy, hermeneutic phenomenology and critical social theory. As an exponent of ordinary language philosophy, Winch offers an analysis of the idea of understanding which effectively eliminates explanation from the sphere of social science. The hermeneutic phenomenology of Ricoeur adopts a more complementary approach, seeking to integrate understanding and explanation into a systematic theory of interpretation. The latter approach is shared by Habermas, who employs depth hermeneutics as a framework for critical social theory. In the present chapter, I continue my critical discussion of the three traditions by evaluating these various contributions to the methodology of social science. I maintain, first, that Winch's characterisation of the concept of understanding is untenable, and that his treatment of the problems of adequacy and critique is unsound. Second, I suggest that Ricoeur's recent views on the relation between motive and cause are in need of development; that his theory of interpretation faces a number of difficulties; and that his mediation in the debate between hermeneutics and critical theory raises problems which he has yet to resolve. In the third part of the chapter, I try to show that Habermas's proposals for the programme of depth hermeneutics and the conduct of critique are unsatisfactory in certain respects, and that his desire to forge a unity of theory and practice remains unfulfilled.

Hermeneutic phenomenology may be regarded as a philosophical tradition created by the synthesis of two Continental orientations. One of these orientations, that of hermeneutics, has a long and distinguished history which includes the work of authors such as Schleiermacher and Dilthey. The other orientation, that of phenomenology, stems largely from the investigations of Husserl, who clothed its contents in a transcendental guise. The key figures in the synthesis of these orientations are Martin Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer. In recent years, an outstanding contribution to this tradition has been made by Paul Ricoeur. However, the nature of Ricoeur's contribution can be fully appreciated only if it is placed within the wider context of his voluminous work. My aim in this chapter, therefore, is to present some key ideas of hermeneutic phenomenology by tracing the evolution of the philosophy of Ricoeur. This approach necessarily underplays the contributions of other authors within this tradition, as well as those writings of Ricoeur which are not immediately relevant to the topic concerned. Nevertheless, and in spite of these limitations, I assume that a short and selective exposition of Ricoeur's philosophy will provide a clear and coherent image of hermeneutic phenomenology.

Philosophical background

Hermeneutics

Hermeneutics is a discipline that has been primarily concerned with the elucidation of rules for the interpretation of texts. The development of this discipline may be traced from the Homeric disputes of the Greek Enlightenment, through the struggle between rival theological schools in the first century A.D., to the biblical controversies of the Reformation.

The problems of reference and truth form a common focal point in the traditions of ordinary language philosophy, hermeneutic phenomenology and critical social theory. Wittgenstein, Strawson and others explicate the referential relation by means of the applicability of identifying descriptions and criticise the conception of truth which posits a correspondence between language and the world. The recent work of Ricoeur proffers the intriguing idea of split reference, coupling this idea with a notion of truth which terminates the dialectic of interpretation. One of Habermas's most original proposals is the formulation of a consensus theory of truth, which specifies the conditions for the rational redemption of truth claims in terms of the necessary presuppositions of speech. In the present chapter, I conclude my critical discussion of the three traditions by undertaking an assessment of these contributions. Among other things I attempt to show, first, that the link between reference and description is less secure than ordinary language philosophers suggest, and that these philosophers fail to furnish a theory of truth; second, that Ricoeur's remarks on the problems of reference and truth are incomplete, often relying upon authors whose views are at variance with his own; and third, that Habermas's argument for the necessary presupposition of an ideal speech situation is problematic, so that his conjunction of rational consensus and truth must be held in doubt.

Ordinary language philosophy may be regarded as the second stage in the development of the contemporary analytical school. The first stage in this development is represented by logical atomism and its positivistic offspring within the Vienna Circle; and it was through the critique of these early positions that the second stage emerged. The writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein figure prominently in both of these stages, as well as in the transitional phase between. Consequently, in the present chapter, I attempt to unfold the evolution of analytical philosophy by following the development of Wittgenstein's ideas. In adopting this approach, I seek neither to underrate the contributions of other analytical philosophers, nor to overrate the extent to which these philosophers agree among themselves. Rather, my aim is to facilitate the exposition of ordinary language philosophy by focusing the discussion around the writings of a single author. One consequence of this approach is that recent developments in analytical philosophy, such as those associated with the names of Quine and Davidson, will not be presented here; and although I shall refer to some of these developments in subsequent chapters, they will not form a focal point of this study.

Philosophical background

Logical atomism

The first stage of contemporary analytical philosophy comprises logical atomism and its audacious heir, logical positivism. The principal proponents of the former doctrine were Russell and the early Wittgenstein, who were among a handful of philosophers responsible for the downfall of British idealism.

In this work ideas of human freedom and equality are understood to be integral expressions of the dominant modern conception of the basis of moral and political life. The aim of the work is in the first place to show that the notions of freedom and equality must be taken together in the idea of the equal value of individuals as free or self-determining beings, and yet that this necessary combination of equality and freedom cannot be elaborated into a coherent system of ethical thought. The principles of freedom and equality are as much opposed to each other as they require each other. From this I conclude that they cannot be the fundamental principles in terms of which we can account adequately for our ethical experience. Part I is thus a critical and negative argument.

In Part II I consider the views of two major theorists who also reject individualist conceptions of freedom and equality, Hegel and Marx. My concern is to show how their accounts of the basis of moral experience, while doing justice to its communal nature, fail to leave an adequate place for the particular individual. In Part III I offer my own account of how the basis of our ethical experience is to be construed. This account, while rejecting the individualist position, will be seen both to owe much to it and to give a more determinate and coherent explanation for many of the moral and political practices associated with that position. Crudely, not individuals but men's associated wills in community constitute the basis of our ethical experience.

In recent years, there have been major changes in social theory in the English-speaking world. What could be called the old ‘orthodox consensus’ in the social sciences was dominated by the pre-eminence of functionalism on the level of methodology, and positivism on the level of epistemology. These ideas never went unquestioned, of course, but in past years they have come under increasing attack – so much so that they certainly no longer reign as an orthodoxy, but have become substantially discredited. One of the results of these events has been a new convergence between the social sciences and philosophy. Indeed, as John Thompson points out, some of those authors who have written under the influence of recent trends in ordinary language philosophy have advanced the view that social science can be regarded as ‘a conceptual extension of philosophy’. This is not a position which Thompson accepts, but he does acknowledge the significance of the contributions that such authors have made to pressing issues in social theory at the current juncture.

In the first part of his book, Thompson analyses these contributions in a concise and elegant way. He concentrates his attention upon three main areas of analysis: problems of action, interpretation and truth. In each of these areas, ordinary language philosophy is shown to have encountered a cluster of unresolved difficulties.

Critical social theory marks a distinctive standpoint in the contemporary philosophical field. This standpoint is part of a tradition of thought which stems from the writings of Kant, Hegel and Marx, and which includes the contributions of the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research. The work of Jurgen Habermas represents an original development of several themes which preoccupied the critical theorists of the Frankfurt School. The specific nature of this development has appeared in the course of a brief but prolific career, during which Habermas has written on topics ranging from classical philosophy and student politics to the theory of social evolution. Accordingly, in the pages that follow, I attempt to sketch some of the themes of critical social theory through a selective exegesis of the work of Habermas. One consequence of this approach is that the writings of other authors who are commonly associated with the standpoint of critical theory are only cursorily discussed. Moreover, since Habermas has expressed his views on an astonishing variety of issues, and since with each new publication these views continue to be elaborated and reformed, no claim can be made to provide a comprehensive and conclusive account of his work. Nevertheless, and despite these limitations, this chapter is animated by the belief that a selective exegesis of the writings of Habermas will provide a suitable basis for the analysis of certain themes in critical social theory.

The previous chapters have shown that the analysis of human action is a theme which is common to the traditions of ordinary language philosophy, hermeneutic phenomenology and critical social theory. Ordinary language philosophers focus on the everyday usage of the words with which actions are described, and Winch in particular elaborates an account of meaningful action which is based on Wittgenstein's later theory. As an exponent of hermeneutic phenomenology, Ricoeur develops a mode of discourse in which action may be treated as a text, so that it may be subsumed under the auspices of a general theory of interpretation. Habermas approaches the problem from the standpoint of critical social theory, proposing an analysis of action which may serve as a basis for the critique of ideology. In this chapter, I should like to begin the critical discussion of these three traditions by assessing the strengths and weaknesses of their contributions to the analysis of action. I shall try to show, first, that ordinary language philosophers do not provide an adequate account of the connection between language and experience, of history and social change, and of meaningful action and social relations. These shortcomings are avoided to some extent by Ricoeur and Habermas, but the writings of the latter authors contain difficulties of their own. Thus, in the second part of the chapter, I argue that Ricoeur does not present a compelling case for his distinction between modes of discourse, nor does he offer a satisfactory defence for his conception of action as a text; and I further maintain that the work of Ricoeur does not yield a coherent account of the relation between action and structure.

THE RELATIVITY OF VALUE

A major element in the individualist theory which must be abandoned if a more satisfactory and coherent understanding of moral value is to be obtained is the requirement of authenticity. This is the requirement that the individual have only himself as his end in his particular life, the requirement of self-determination and the exclusion of other-determination in respect of particular life. One way of allowing another to enter into the determination of one's particular life is by choosing one's life having regard, not simply to oneself, but to another person as a valuer of that life. The value one's life has for him enters into the formation of one's choices, and he becomes co-determiner with oneself of it. The requirement of authenticity, then, would be dropped, and one would accept that the value of one's particular life is as much determined by the value it has for another as by its value for self.

Authenticity itself is a corollary of the more fundamental axiom that individuals have value in themselves. For this is the claim that individuals have value in an unmediated relation to themselves, and that the value they have for others is a consequence of the value they have in themselves. This claim must be denied, and it must be affirmed that the value of the individual for another arises in, or is the creation of, the relation that comes into existence between those particular persons. This rejection of the absolute value of the individual, and the affirmation of his value in relation to other individuals is a necessary condition of a coherent account of the possibility of morality.