INTRODUCTION

Social activity involves human interactions on two levels. The first level concerns the development, modification, and specifications of institutions. Institutions define the basic framework within which people interact with one another; we can refer to them as the rules of the game. The second level of social activity concerns human interactions within the prevailing institutional arrangements; we can refer to this level of activity as the game itself. The two levels of social activity are interrelated. By constraining the scope and contents of human interactions, the rules help interacting individuals to predict each other's behavior, or, to put it another way, the rules lower the transaction costs of playing the game. Of course, lower transaction costs mean a higher level of economic activity. By implication, a change in the rules changes both the way the game is played and the level of economic activity.

The institutional framework consists of formal and informal rules, all of which create their own behavioral incentives. Formal rules are constitutions, statutes, common law, and other governmental regulations. They are enacted, enforced, and changed by governmental authorities. Informal rules include traditions, customs, religious beliefs, and all other norms of behavior that have passed the test of time and that bind the generations. The enforcement of informal rules takes place by means of sanctions such as ostracism by friends and neighbors, loss of reputation, or alienation (expulsion) from the community.

INTRODUCTION

In any ordered society, two contrasting attitudes may describe the positions that persons take, one toward another, in evaluating and organizing their relationships, whether these be personal, social, or political. A person may consider and treat others as “natural equals,” as potential players in the cooperative-competitive game who are capable of reciprocating behavior and hence deserving of respect. Or, by contrast, a person may consider and treat others as determined by classification of their positions in a “natural hierarchy,” as superiors or inferiors and hence deserving of either deference or domination—a stance that may or may not be informed by ethical standards. The attitude toward others taken by any individual will embody some mix of these two contrasting positions, and, by extension, so will the social interaction structure for any particular society.

My thesis is that differences along this attitudional dimension may make it difficult to extend precepts of justice across political boundaries because the basic meaning of justice becomes different in the two positions. A society that is primarily described by institutional structures derived from precepts for “justice among natural equals” may seem to fail when measured against criteria that apply to treatment among classified unequals. My subordinate thesis is that the societies of the United States, on the one hand, and Western European welfare states, on the other, are sufficiently distinct along the dimension emphasized to offer at least a partial explanation for differing public support for particular institutional practices, for example, the practice of capital punishment.

INTRODUCTION

My aim in this essay is to discuss, and defend against some frequent objections, John Rawls's rejection of a global principle of distributive justice. As is well known, Rawls's A Theory of Justice argues for a principle of distributive justice, the difference principle, that is to be applied within different societies but not among them. According to A Theory of Justice, each society has the duty to set up its economic and legal institutions in such a way that they make the least advantaged among its own members better off than the least advantaged would be if that society were structured according to any other distribution principle. But each society does not have a duty to structure its system so as to maximize the position of the least advantaged in the world at large. Though it is a universal principle that is to apply severally, or within every society, the difference principle is not global in reach, applying jointly to all societies simultaneously. To critics of many political persuasions, this seems a peculiar position. Why should principles of justice be domestically rather than globally applied?

Rawls's position in A Theory of Justice becomes even more complicated in Political Liberalism and The Law of Peoples, where he is guided by questions of political legitimacy, and feasibility (or “stability”) of liberal regimes. In Political Liberalism and later works, Rawls appears to give up on the idea that a well-ordered society of justice as fairness is feasible (such a well-ordered society is one where every rational and reasonable citizen affirms, for moral reasons, justice as fairness, including the difference principle).

INTRODUCTION

No sooner has the issue of globalism been elevated into a general proposition of paradigmatic dimensions, than its death has been declared. In Harper's, the journalist John Ralston Saul states simply enough that not only is there a “collapse of globalism,” but also a “rebirth of nationalism.” He is only the most recent to post an obituary. My own sense of the situation is that the language of “tendencies,” “strains,” and “forces” better represents reality than the heated rhetoric of “birth” and “death.” The international economy is not reduced to rubble by ideological missives, nor has the national state been dissolved by the recognition that the world is whole, round, and virtually boundless.

Globalization has been perceived either as the latest and most pernicious form of imperialism or as the latest form of modernization. Whatever position one takes on globalization—whether one is in mute support or unabated opposition—it is clear that globalization has become not just a thing unto itself, but a metaphor of fundamental values of peoples and systems alike. My purpose here is to examine how this term has become part of the polarization of the American culture. The controversy over globalization has become a struggle over the shaping of the world's economy, but it is also a political and cultural struggle. In this process, old battles between political systems and economic structures have acquired new dimensions.

ENLIGHTENMENT AND ROMANTICISM

In moving on to assess the hermeneutic contribution of the dawning modern era, we are entering the realm of German philosophical hermeneutics. In spite of making a strong claim throughout our discussion thus far for the significance of earlier Ancient and Judeo-Christian interpretative practices, this is not in any sense meant to diminish the value of the German contribution. As Warnke, Mueller-Vollmer and Palmer have all so well told, this is undoubtedly a mighty tradition. My point is that this later tradition builds upon earlier humanist strands of thought. Ironically, a further point is that those humanist scholars with their distinguished accounts of Ancient Greco-Roman and Judeo-Christian hermeneutics, for instance, Copeland, Eden and so on, can in turn underplay the significance of the later German contribution.

Philosophical hermeneutics grew on the continent. It can be conceptualised as beginning roughly around Enlightenment and then developing through Romanticism to the twentieth century and beyond. Its main protagonists during the era of Enlightenment were Wolff and Chladenius. Throughout the Romantic period, Schleiermacher, von Humboldt, Droysen and Dilthey all carried the flame. Later, phenomenology and existentialism, with figures like Husserl and Heidegger, and the theologian Bultmann became key. Post-war hermeneutics of the twentieth century, meanwhile, has been dominated by Gadamer, with later thinkers like Ricoeur and Derrida initiating important developments and, of course, Habermas intercepting with influential debates.

Hermeneutics is one of the oldest traditions in the humanities. It pre-dates modern scientific forms of enquiry and can be traced back to ancient beginnings; it was pivotal to Greek education. As a practice, it was highly influential throughout both Ancient and Christian times, and because of these historical roots the term hermeneutics can, on occasion, be used specifically to refer to the study of ancient texts and the Scriptures. Today, however, hermeneutics, although still predominant in the old humanities disciplines of theology, classics, history, philosophy, law and much of literature, has spread into modern disciplines like politics, anthropology, sociology and even cultural studies where its techniques are of vital use.

The term ‘hermeneutics’ is derived from the Greek ‘hermeneutikos’ which means ‘to interpret’, and it retains the same meaning today. Interpretation is a commonplace phenomenon and we could not with any truthfulness depict an origin to this practice, be that historical, cultural or geographical. Interpretation is something human beings throughout time and history have undertaken. We have needed to interpret our world in order to survive and also have wanted to understand its deeper meaning. In social and cultural interaction we interpret each other, often tacitly, on a day-to-day basis. When we talk of hermeneutics, however, we mean something rather more specific. We are usually referring to a disciplined approach to interpretation often aimed at understanding texts of special, cultural significance.

Our final tradition is the very broad and highly acclaimed one of Critical Theory. This term is often used very loosely to include thinkers like Foucault, the post-structuralists or those influenced by Nietzsche, Marx and Freud, and indeed some even go so far as to apply the term to almost any critical approach to the humanities at all. It should be kept in mind however that in correct usage Critical Theory denotes a very specific tradition.

Critical Theory, properly conceived, is the brainchild of the Early Frankfurt School. It is worth noting the enormous impact of the Early Frankfurt School and critical theory in post war liberal Europe and indeed throughout the world. Held explains that: ‘The writings of what one may loosely refer to as a “school” of western Marxism – critical theory – caught the imagination of students and intellectuals in the 1960's and early 1970's. In Germany thousands of copies of the “school”s’ work were sold, frequently in cheap pirate editions. Members of the New Left in other European countries as well as in North America were often inspired by the same sources. In other parts of the world, for example in Allende's Chile, the influence of these texts could also be detected. In the streets of Santiago Marcuse's name often took a place alongside Marx and Mao in the political slogans of the day. Critical theory became a key element in the formation and self-understanding of the New Left'.

Astonishingly there exists no single English language book dedicated to the continental tradition in the philosophy of social science. Juxtapose this surprising position with the abundance of continental works on all other aspects of European thought from the vast array of tracts on political philosophy, aesthetics and the history of European ideas to the plethora of studies of individual thinkers and schools of thought. Contrast, too, this lack of a treatment of continental philosophy of social science with the abundance of expositions of the same subject matter in the Anglo-American tradition.

In fact, the entire mainstream corpus of philosophy of social science is dominated by Anglo-American literature. Consequently these transatlantic schools set the agenda for pretty much all philosophy of social science with their own particular approach to the subject matter – a distinct canon of thinkers, set of questions and debates. The continental domain is simply marginalized by this rubric: either through sheer exclusion or, indeed, by a reductive mode of inclusion.

On the one hand, in so far as continental issues veer from the Anglo-American agenda, the continental tradition is simply ostracised. On the other hand, in so far as continental questions address this ‘mainstream’ rubric the tradition is included. However this means that in so far as the continental philosophy of social science exists at all, it is merely treated as a strand of influence in the supposedly much larger world of Anglo-American approaches.

Views about the importance of the Judeo-Christian tradition per se and its significance to modern hermeneutics differ no less than opinion about the relevance and nature of the Ancient legacy. As with the Greek and Roman heritage, however, many contemporary philosophical hermeneutists are guilty of relegating the biblical tradition to a minor role. This oversight is accentuated by disciplinary boundaries and the fact that this strand of intellectual history is confined mainly to specialist theologians. Indeed, those from more contemporary disciplines like politics, sociology, anthropology, human geography, cultural studies and even law, often ignore the importance of two thousand years of Christianity altogether. Having said this, all philosophers at least would stand by the impact of the reformation upon hermeneutics. The remainder of the Judeo-Christian heritage, however, is fairly disregarded; indeed, certain philosophical hermeneutic accounts overlook the important developments that occurred in this tradition altogether. Warnke, for instance, hardly mentions the Jewish tradition or the many distinct Catholic practices of hermeneutics. She collapses the whole biblical tradition prior to the reformation into a single notion. Her assumption is that biblical interpretation prior to the arrival of Protestantism was a uniform practice. This argument is worth depicting because unfortunately it represents a commonplace among many contemporary hermeneuticists. Her thesis is roughly as follows.

During the Medieval Christian era, Warnke's argument goes, hermeneutics was the common practice of scholars who were concerned with interpreting the most important text known to human beings at this time, namely, the Bible.

We have studied Foucault's philosophical perspectives on the human sciences. His approach centres around concepts of Power/Knowledge and the theory of genealogy. Our final purpose is to look at how he deploys these philosophical approaches to practical, dare I say, ‘empirical’ instances in the human sciences. Here we can do no better than continue with Foucault's own work and examples of genealogy. First, we conduct a detailed study of his genealogy of the penal system. Secondly, we examine his work on the history of sexuality.

PENAL INSTITUTIONS

For our example of the application of Foucault's approach of genealogy we look first to the particular institutions and practices of criminal reform. Foucault studies these in his seminal Discipline and Punish. Foucault analyses our modern disciplinary regime by doing a genealogy. He looks to the heterogeneous past of the penal regime – its transitions through the historical power struggles by which it is constituted. There are three main stages of historical change and rupture that result in the constitution of the contemporary penal system, according to Foucault. These are firstly, torture, secondly, punishment and finally, modern discipline.

TORTURE

Let us look first at the practice of torture. Foucault begins his genealogy of the penal system in true characteristic style, with a flamboyant attempt to shock. It is not for the faint-hearted.

In the final section of our portrayal of hermeneutics we shift our scrutiny to a thorough inspection of the trends of the latter half of the twentieth century. Many of the thinkers addressed here are prominent across all the multifarious disciplines that comprise the contemporary humanities. They exert an almost palpable influence upon philosophical, epistemological and exegetical debates throughout the social and political sciences, literature, history, law and theology. Moreover, their works are influential through being seized upon (rather inappropriately) as methodologies, no more so than in the social sciences. However, we shall continue to see the distinctively humanistic influences of an almost overriding concern with matters of language, tradition and history which distinguish contemporary hermeneutics from the sciences and methodological approaches of the social sciences.

The most influential figure of this twentieth-century interpretative theory is Hans-Georg Gadamer. His ideas inform a score of other thinkers and schools, most notable of whom are Ricoeur and Derrida from structuralist and deconstructionist schools. Furthermore, Gadamer provokes fairly impassioned debate especially from critical theorists like Habermas. We begin with a thorough-going account of Gadamer's own ideas before moving on to assess his successors.

HANS-GEORG GADAMER

Gadamer, in contrast to the other figures discussed, intersects with our own life and times. He was born in 1900 and lived to see the beginning of the twenty-first century. He was a student of Heidegger and he worked in the universities of Marburg and Heidelberg.

Nietzsche himself is often neglected by continental philosophers of social science who all too frequently overlook the historical underpinnings of the modern discipline. However, the complexity and importance of the work of Nietzsche's disciple Michel Foucault cannot be fully appreciated without a familiarity with his German predecessor.

Michel Foucault has proved a pivotal figure for almost all branches of the twentieth and twenty-first century humanities. Sadly, his work, too, is often poorly depicted in sociology, human geography and cultural studies where Foucault is portrayed in scant theoretical style leading those from traditional disciplines to regard him as little more than a flippant peddler of some perfidious version of post-modernism. This would be a grave injustice as Foucault is perhaps the best-ever student of Nietzsche, appropriating a visionary analysis and applying it to his own society, with dramatic effect. Foucault was, in fact, the first person to correctly understand Nietzsche's genealogy and to apply it with new potency. If Nietzsche's genealogy was directed towards an understanding of nineteenth-century morals, Foucault appropriated this same nominalist, historical approach and deployed it in understanding the features of twentieth-century European society.

Michel Foucault, the flamboyant French philosopher with characteristic shaven head is familiar to us all. Born in Poitiers in 1926, he died in 1984. The Ecole Normale Superieure was where he studied from 1946 and he held various posts thereafter throughout France, most notably in the College de France from 1969.

We begin with an introduction to the history of the ‘tradition’ of genealogy and discuss this approach as first articulated by Friedrich Nietzsche. We introduce the life and works of this infamous German philosopher and take a brief look at his early works and his views about knowledge. We then depict genealogy as an approach to the humanities used to critically analyse Christianity. We see how it was developed by the influential post-structuralist thinkers in the social sciences, in particular Foucault, whom we focus upon in the later chapters of this section.

NIETZSCHE

Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche was born in Germany in 1844. He lived until 1900, although he spent his latter years in a condition of complete insanity. He was a highly successful classicist, awarded a Chair in Classics at the University of Basle in 1869 at the startlingly young age of twenty-five. He then proceeded to write a succession of immensely influential books from the 1870s onwards. The style of all these works is similar, namely, poetic, aphoristic, highly expressive and emotionally charged. It was in 1889 that Nietzsche became plagued by insanity which lasted for eleven years until his death at the turn of the century. Tragically, he was not recognised during his sane life and then was only later perceived to be one of the most important European thinkers ever. Infamously, the Nazis made fallacious use of his philosophy decades after his death.

Horkheimer built his notion of critical theory upon an idea of theory that differed from the ordinary use of the term. He argued that ‘theory’ was not about developing a string of connected statements that represented the nature of the world around us. He did not believe that the word ‘theory’ should simply refer to a static set of propositions. In contrast, he thought that theory referred to a kind of activity generated within a particular social context. For him theory means in essence what you and I would normally take theorising to mean.

Human societies are constantly acting upon nature in order to maintain their existence and in order to reproduce themselves. We burn fuel, build houses, plough land, all to perpetuate our human lives. In the course of doing these things, we need to understand the nature of our world so we gain knowledge in order to enable us to produce and reproduce more efficiently. The kinds of knowledge that we develop whilst undergoing these activities of human social and economic survival are processed together as kinds of theories. For example, theories about diseases, about animal migration, geological strata or indeed Newtonian science. All these theories that are part of the activity of human survival are called ‘traditional’ theories, according to Horkheimer.

Horkheimer believed that there was a very different kind of theorising to the traditional variant. This different type of theorising had quite distinct goals from the former.