Planned actions, as prescribed in protocols and trained in exercises, help frontline responders take action under enormous pressure. Yet, these same actions are often hard, if not impossible, to implement during crises, either because the specific situation was not anticipated and there are no plans in place or because prepared plans do not produce the desired results. As a consequence, frontline responders will need to improvise and adapt their activities to crisis situations. Yet, improvisation under extreme stress is very difficult and may be inefficient or even dangerous to responders. The resulting dilemma for responders is how to choose the right course of action. This requires a view of both action patterns as complementary and even mutually conducive, as most crises will demand a combination of plans and improvisation. Reflective acting helps frontline responders to find the right balance and define adequate response activities.

Sensemaking is widely seen as one of the most crucial processes in crisis response operations. Frontline responders need an adequate understanding of a crisis situation to implement the appropriate actions. Gaining a better grasp of the situation requires acquiring more cues and avoiding premature commitment to a particular frame of reference. Ideally, operational members need to engage in adaptive sensemaking to achieve a perfect understanding of the crisis. Yet, crises are defined by uncertainty, which hinders a full understanding of the situation. The pursuit of a perfect understanding may also impede a rich awareness of the context and create blind spots. Thus, responders need to embrace some degree of uncertainty in their sensemaking as well, even though this is counterintuitive and demanding. The dilemma for responders is that they need to balance gaining a better understanding with embracing uncertainty. Frontline responders may deal with this sensemaking dilemma by pursuing a plausible understanding. A plausible understanding matches the demands of the situation and helps responders take bold action, but is also treated with an attitude of ambivalence, doubt, and modesty.

Ordinary civilians are assumed to panic or freeze in crises, but research has shown that this is a myth. In many crises, civilians provide life-saving help to those in need. They may even form emergent groups, which are temporary organizations that are involved in crisis response activities. Their actions can be of major importance to the crisis response efforts, but professionals are often reluctant to include volunteers in formal crisis structures out of distrust and because it requires considerable adaptation. By excluding volunteers, responders are sure that trained professionals provide high-quality support to affected communities. The attitude of frontline responders to volunteers poses a dilemma. It is important to anticipate the presence of well-intentioned volunteers and build relations with them, so that their skills and intentions can be rapidly identified and potential coordination can be established early on. Civilians can be given a variety of tasks, depending on the crisis, but it should not foreclose the recognition of their possible victimhood. Open engagement enables the adaptive incorporation of civilians in frontline crisis response efforts.

The moral foundations of crisis response seem simple: responders save lives, reduce human suffering, and pursue a lofty societal goal. Yet, crises often produce morally complicated situations as well. Crisis organizations have adopted norms, which help responders to work in complex moral contexts, but these norms cause moral distress when responders do not fully agree with them. Responders can choose to deviate from the norms and follow their inner moral convictions instead. This will not remove the moral complexities of their work though. Rather, it means that crisis professionals have to resolve moral dilemmas on their own and bear the full weight of moral responsibility. The moral dilemma for responders concerns this tension between following organizational norms and their own convictions. In response, crisis organizations could pursue an ethical culture by promoting organizational deliberation on moral questions in crisis operations. Creating an ethical culture allows for an open, flexible attitude by enabling active dialogue and collective reflection on moral dilemmas in crises. It facilitates a confrontation with the inevitable moral discomforts of crisis response.

Most crisis studies assume that crisis response should end disruption and restore order. This approach effectively upholds the status quo and tends to neglect structural inequalities in society. In particular, gender, race, and class inequalities render some groups more vulnerable than others. Response operations may even further discriminate against marginalized groups. Such discrimination can go unnoticed, since crisis organizations are often characterized by internal discrimination against members of these social groups as well. Alternatively, by explicitly recognizing the political nature of crisis response, frontline personnel can also try to reform society and correct structural inequalities through social transformation, although this is very challenging in practice. The goal of crisis response, therefore, constitutes a dilemma. At the very least, frontline response should avoid reinforcing discrimination and commit to social equity. Striving for more diverse and inclusive organizations would mean a step toward more equitable crisis responses. Even though our expectations should be modest, crisis response operations can and should contribute to fairness and justice.

Interorganizational coordination is increasingly viewed as crucial to frontline crisis response. Contemporary crises often require the collective action of multiple organizations. Many researchers recommend integrating frontline responders of diverse organizations to make good use of scarce resources and synchronize their actions. In practice, frontline responders frequently choose fragmentation by dividing responsibilities and limiting interactions instead. This allows them to implement a fast response without being dependent on others. At the same time, it can lead to safety risks and suboptimal outcomes. Frontline responders face a dilemma, because they have an interest in pursuing both integration and fragmentation. It is useful to note that coordination may not always be the right course of action in a crisis. Even if it is, it does not necessarily need to be formal, as much coordination emerges in the operational field. For more structured ways of coordinating, the nature of the crisis and existing interorganizational relations are useful guides in how to organize the coordination. Generally, it must be conditional upon the situation at hand.

Crisis response operations are increasingly important due to the rising number and impact of crises. Frontline personnel of crisis organizations conduct this live-saving and risky work under conditions of uncertainty, threat, and time pressure. Some notable examples are emergency responders, military personnel, and humanitarian aid workers. Although their crisis response activities may vary considerably, they operate under similar circumstances and face the same operational dilemmas. This introduction presents eleven crisis response dilemmas that crisis responders face again and again. Still, little is known about how to deal with these dilemmas and dispersed research findings offer competing solutions. By integrating existing research on frontline crisis response, this book problematizes simple solutions to crisis response dilemmas and provides a basis for reflective thinking about possible improvements. As such, it gives an insight into the main theories and research topics on crisis response, and provides a comprehensive analysis of how frontline crisis responders organize and implement their activities amidst the chaos of crises.

Chapter 11 returns to the beginning by revising the arguments on negativity made by Adorno and Agamben, as well as George Spencer Brown’s language of distinctions and of the nothing to help formulate this sense of renewed strategic need for both in-forming and un-informing. It is not much that we offer by way of a way out, but that is the point; it must remain in an uneasy and slightly impoverished space if it is to survive, it is strategy from the shadow.

Chapter 2 turns to the role of language in the context of strategy, specifically investigating how rhetoric and persuasion can open and close spaces for the airing of opinions freely amongst speakers. It is in creating and expressing opinion (and not truth) in the polis – the space of appearances – that the question of who one is receives its full disclosure. We then turn to the appearance of strategy in ancient Greece, first in the figure of Pericles, then Alcibiades, and in particular the latter’s skilful performances in the polis, and a gifted if contested career blighted, we suggest, by a failure to apprehend the distinction between the polis (rhetoric) and oikos (sophistry and instrumentality). The failure of Alcibiades also hints at some of the difficulties of language as the means of self-disclosure and so also for Arendt’s idealized association of action with talk, for it is in Alcibiades’ struggle as a strategos that opinion becomes twisted into event: Things get done, even if the action is consumed by failure and ruin. The case of Alcibiades takes us from talk to the body, and back to the polis in which the everyday is suspended so that action, freed from instrumentality, can occur and recur, each time alive and enlivening.

Introduction: ‘Strategy and as the basic question of organization?’ provides an overview of ideas, themes and concepts that find fuller exploration in subsequent chapters. We set the scene by considering the grounding importance of strategy as an organizational practice: enacting the struggle to see outside the measured orbits by which sight is habitually and theoretically confined to a representation.

Chapter 7 begins the task of unpacking contemporary information technologies. Taking leave from Soshana Zuboff’s critique of surveillance capitalism, we suggest a further step beyond anthropocentric ideas of control. We discuss how organizational forms such as platforms and systems like Enterprise Resource Planning products, have come to ‘run’ organizations, but in ways that also extend, replace and veil human cognition, in often imperceptibly powerful ways. And yet, these widely connected networks, the computational apparatuses, intelligent algorithms and digital media are fundamentally indifferent to what they ‘replace’. They no longer bring anything near, moreover there is no-one to whom such pictures and things can be brought. Agency, not just human agency, but all agency, is dissipated into brief small blips.

Chapter 8 broaches our understanding of communication systems and their intimacy with strategic practice. Beginning with the general (strategist) Napoleon’s forms of communication–technological warfare and the subsequent reliance on innovation in communication devices, especially those of coding and decoding communications in military conflicts, we consider the workings and implications of electronic, digital computing systems for strategy. Via Alan Turing’s Imitation Game, we introduce the debate on the nature of intelligence, consciousness and conscience (self-awareness), setting the scene for an elaboration on the development from cybernetics to contemporary machine-learning algorithms in the subsequent chapter.

Chapter 4 presents the epoch of technē, which is marked by the play of the fickleness of nature, luck (tuchē) and the fragility of early human stratagems. Technē is both a means of controlling the world, as well as one of violence. Indicated by humble and pre-scientific inventions such as the almanack, they allow little gains to be wrest from an otherwise unforgiving surround by knowing when to sow or harvest in accordance with the almanack’s alignment of experiential, mythical and cosmological clues. The epoch of technē is characterized by an intimacy between humans and their surroundings, the term planning itself finding its roots in the way in which seedlings are pushed into the ground by a farmer’s foot. But there is also violence; both imposed on the human body, whose shape is bent and twisted, ground down and severed by the acts of labour and the growing numbers of devices that extend human reach; as well upon nature, which becomes a place in need of taming and cultivating; cutting, slicing, ploughing, killing and using.