In the course of 1943, London and Algiers gradually became aware of the scope of the STO crisis, and of the proliferation of mountain redoubts formed spontaneously by STO refugees known collectively as le maquis. While the Allied camp was keen to operationalize this maquis, everyone had different motives for doing so, both operational and political. These considerations caused Allied planners to minimize the military limitations of the maquis, that included the inviolability of “maquis redoubts” and the willingness and ability of Anglo-American conventional forces rapidly to reinforce them with arms drops and paratroops. The fate of the maquis at Glières should have served as a wake-up call. But too many players had too much vested in the maquis concept to submit their expectations to a reality check. One result was that the myth of an alleged “betrayal” of the maquis by the Gaullists and the Allies became the focus of a polemical debate in the post-war years pursued principally by the communists, but also a theme in films and novels.

This chapter revisits the arguments of the book concerning France’s experience of the Second World War – the debate over the Fall of France in 1940 that swings between “Decadence” and revisionist “Contingency,” and systemic collapse or “military misfortune.” The period after 1940 saw France struggle to recover its power and influence through two opposing strategies – Vichy through collaboration with Germany, whereas de Gaulle sided with the Allies. While de Gaulle proved the more strategically insightful, his struggle was, unfortunately, inhibited by diminutive numbers, which, to Eisenhower’s ire, contributed to a faltering French military performance in 1944–1945, emphasizing the fact that 1940 had reduced France to the status of a courtesy power in Allied eyes. Furthermore, like many leaders of France’s internal resistance, Franklin Roosevelt remained deeply skeptical of de Gaulle’s democratic intentions. Upon Liberation, de Gaulle maneuvered to restore the French state not only against the Americans, who refused to recognize the Gouvernement provisoire de la République française, but also against the chaos caused by resistance “feudals” with their own political agendas. Nor did l’amalgame of 1944 repair severely damaged French civil–military relations. The “resistance myth” underpinned France’s liberation narrative, one embraced by multiple actors led by de Gaulle, whose purpose was to minimize the pivotal role of the Allies and Africans in France’s liberation, exclude 1940, POWs, and Vichy collaboration from France’s wartime memory, and mask the fact that the “post-war” era found France in a weak position to reassert power over an empire where wartime mobilization had transformed mentalities, as the aftershock of wars of imperial independence was to prove. The mild punishments and blanket amnesties issued for wartime collaboration, the onset of the Cold War, which allowed former Vichy supporters to evoke a “lost cause” anti-communist “shield of France” alibi for their murderous conduct, and refusal to accept France’s role in the Shoah combined to undermine Gaullist promises of “renewal.” In fact, the post-war Fourth Republic resembled in essentials its pre-war predecessor.

Anfa had set French rearmament at eleven army divisions on a US model, as well as a French air force, and a refurbished French navy, all of which would prove difficult to accomplish with purely imperial manpower, so that a growing resistance on the French mainland might fill the manpower gap and bolster French clout in the alliance. This concept received a trial run with the September 1943 liberation of Corsica, a campaign which allowed de Gaulle to oust Giraud from the CFLN, while revealing both the military ineffectiveness of the resistance and the political agenda of the communists. As a consequence, de Gaulle began to put a structure in place to control events upon liberation of the hexagon, while beginning a purge of former Vichy elements in AFN, a task that would prove divisive in the middle of a war. The benefits of the Italian campaign for the French were two. First, the removal of much of l’armée d’Afrique from AFN allowed de Gaulle’s consolidation of power there. Second, the Juin-orchestrated May 1944 breakthrough at Monte Cassino allowed l’armée d’Afrique to recover its combat laurels in a very tough military environment. Unfortunately, the rapes carried out by some members of the CEF following the breakthrough on the Garigliano called into question the command climate and tacit complicity of the CEF hierarchy, while the fallout momentarily poisoned relations between the French and Italian governments.

The Dragoon landings succeeded at relatively little cost largely because Hitler ordered German forces in the south of France to retreat. Controversy over the seizure of Toulon and Marseille revealed command tensions at the summit of l’Armée B that would simmer for the remainder of the war. Despite considerable efforts to arm resistance in France, its military contribution to liberation disappointed expectations. Nevertheless, various personalities and political factions in France, beginning with de Gaulle, attempted to exploit resistance as a source of political legitimacy and/or to further personal ambition. While the BBC kept captive populations informed, and propaganda helped to discredit collaboration, inspire hope for liberation, and encourage certain forms of resistance, it succeeded neither in transforming resistance into a mass movement nor in triggering a national insurrection. In the end, the Germans were defeated by military force, not propaganda. Nevertheless, the image of popular resistance helped to rehabilitate France’s image tarnished by 1940 followed by Vichy collaboration, as well as to legitimize de Gaulle, all of which smoothed the transition of power from Vichy to the GPRF while dodging civil war. France’s popular mobilization also testified to republican renewal, which helped to rehabilitate France’s status as a minor ally. Beyond its negligible operational impact, historians struggle to calculate the influence of resistance activity, in part because intangible psychological and morale factors are impossible to quantify. France would have been liberated in any case without the resistance, but perhaps not on the same terms. Despite the momentary disorder, even anarchy, of the Liberation, ultimately the resistance helped to smooth the transition from Vichy to the GPRF. But its memorial image was conflicted by political infighting and violent acts that brought down retribution on the French population. Furthermore, the post-war mythification of national “resistance” not only distorted its nature and contribution to victory. It also exiled from France’s wartime memory other victims of war and occupation to include POWs, STO, Jews, and even les forces françaises libres.

One of de Gaulle’s great successes in the Second World War was to allow France to punch above its weight in the Alliance. However, the French army struggled to match in military proficiency de Gaulle’s lofty aspirations for French power and influence. The Vosges campaign proved yet another punishing trial for the French army. Its professional cadres seriously attrited in Tunisia, in Italy, and in the march from the Mediterranean coast, distant from its North African base, utterly dependent on the Americans for supplies, the command echelon riven by rivalries of a political, doctrinal, and personal nature, the poorly equipped First French Army was forced to endure a bitter campaign in the harshest of winter conditions, while simultaneously “amalgamating” clusters of poorly trained and disciplined FFI and volunteers. While the reconquest of Alsace and that of the “Atlantic pockets” were symbolically important to de Gaulle and the French, they were low priorities for the SHAEF commander, whose mission for Sixth Army Group was to “hold the flank” while advances were to be made further north. Eisenhower’s personal rivalry with Jacob Devers, combined with a lack of confidence in the volatile de Lattre and a rebuilding French army, possibly caused him to “miss opportunities” for an early crossing of the Rhine in late November 1944, and the disruption of the German Ardennes offensive, which caught him by surprise on 16 December. While Eisenhower blamed Devers and de Lattre’s timorousness and lack of mastery of armored warfare for the persistence of the Colmar Pocket, and pressured Sixth Army Group to eliminate it, he constantly diverted resources which might have allowed them to do so to Patton. Tensions between de Gaulle’s political agenda and Eisenhower’s operational focus, apparent since Algiers in 1942, exploded with the Strasbourg crisis of January 1945, which was successfully resolved only after Churchill’s intervention. However, the Allied failure to clarify the French role in the post-war occupation of Germany created conditions for further clashes between Eisenhower and the French during the culminating invasion of Germany.

The Allied bet that they could reach Tunis ahead of Axis forces fell victim to hesitancy, delay, and confusion at the top of the French command, that communicated downward to subordinates. In a situation that combined uncertainty with pusillanimity in the French leadership, Axis forces flowed into Tunisia. The Allies viewed the resulting campaign as both costly and unnecessary. That said, the decision by the Axis leaders to defend Europe from Tunisia arguably made “Tunisgrad” more consequential than Stalingrad. It also marked an ambiguous entry of the hitherto Vichy French forces into an Allied coalition, that, in the view of French commander in chief Alphonse Juin, “erased the memory of Dunkirk.” Nevertheless, quickly exasperated by infighting between Gaullists and “Giraudists,” the Allies continued to suspect both the loyalty and the military potential of poorly armed French forces.

The Tunis victory parade, followed by the “fusion” of the Free French and l’armée d’Afrique, symbolized a transition between the old and new French army, rearmed as the result of the Anfa conference, so that French troops might take part in the liberation of their country. For France to assume its “place among the democratic nations of the world,” the French exile movements of de Gaulle and Giraud needed to cooperate, while a third resistance army was mobilizing within the hexagon. How to coordinate, “fuse,” and “amalgamate” these three forces would preoccupy French and Allied leaders for the remainder of the war. Resurrecting French military power in an impoverished and fractious French North Africa would prove problematic. De Gaulle’s 30 May 1943 appearance in Algiers launched his struggle with Giraud for control of the CFLN. The two factions competed to recruit the trickle of évadés de France to Casablanca via Spain, as well as women to fill non-combatant roles, a rivalry, tinged with rancor, that would linger until the war’s end, and become even more complex when the internal resistance was added to the mix. These minor “crises” highlighted just how diminutive French forces actually were in the larger context of the war. They also signaled that French and Allied goals would diverge, as the French leader prioritized the preservation of empire; the restoration of order and the State upon liberation; and securing France’s post-war interests in Germany.

Thursday 11 June 1840

John Cecil Hall, archdeacon.

Francis Broderick Hartwell, vicar-general.

Alfred Philips, principal of King William's College, absent.

Robert Dixon, vice-principal of King William's College, absent.

John Nelson, absent.

Thomas Howard, at a funeral.

Henry Maddrell, archdeacon's registrar.

Thomas Stephen.

Edward Craine, late.

John Edward Harrison.

Alexander Gelling, absent.

Joseph Qualtrough, late.

Joseph Brown, episcopal registrar.

Bowyer Harrison

William Corrin

William Duggan

William Gill

Samuel Gelling

Bobert Brown, at a funeral.

John Lamothe Stowell

George Stickler Parsons

Archibald Holmes

John Thomas Clarke

William Carpenter, off the island.

John Cannell

Thomas Caine

John Gell

Henry Joseph Stevenson

Daniel Nelson, supernumerary and official, off the island.

Thomas Drury, curate of Andreas, off the island.

Edward Qualtrough, curate of Dalby

John Qualtrough, curate of Sulby

Thomas Rump Drake, curate of St Barnabas

William Kermode, curate of Lezayre

Maurice Fitzgerald Day, curate of St George's

William Christian, absent.

According to the Manx Sun of Friday 19 June 1840 (p. 4) the bishop delivered a charge at the convocation.

The constitution of the convocation265

[1] In the name of our great Lord and Master, the Lord Jesus Christ, and to the glory and increase of his kingdom amongst men.

We, the bishop, archdeacon, vicars-general and clergy of this isle, who do subscribe these articles, that we may not stand charged with the scandals which wicked men bring upon religion while they are admitted to and reputed members of Christ['s] church, and that we may by all laudable means promote the conversion of sinners, and oblige men to submit to the discipline of the Gospel, and lastly, that we may provide for the instruction of the growing age in Christian learning and good manners, we have formed these following constitutions, which we oblige ourselves (by God's help) to observe, and to endeavour that all others within our several cures shall comply with the same:

1. First, that when a rector, vicar or curate shall have any number of persons under twenty of his parish desirous and fit to be confirmed, he shall give the lord bishop notice thereof, and a list of their names, and shall suffer none to offer themselves to be confirmed but such he has before instructed to answer in the necessary parts of Christian knowledge, and who, besides their church catechism, have learned such short prayers for morning and evening as shall be immediately provided for that purpose.

2. That no person be admitted to the holy sacrament till he has first been confirmed by the bishop (or in case of his lordship's absence or indisposition) to bring a certificate from the archdeacon or vicars-general that he is duly qualified for confirmation.

[2] 3. That no person admitted to stand as godfather or godmother, nor to enter into the holy state of matrimony, till they have received the holy sacrament of the Lord's Supper, unless being an orphan, there be a necessity for his speedy marriage; and this to be approved of and dispensed with by the ordinary for a limited time to fit himself for the sacrament; and where any of them are of another parish, they are to bring a certificate from their proper pastor.

These are all to be found in a single manuscript in the Manx National Heritage Library, M 2042A, fos. lr-14r. This MS formerly belonged to John Selden, and is almost certainly the text used by Sir William Dugdale in his Monasticon Anglicanum (6 vols., London 1665), I, 711-17; 2nd edn. (8 vols., London, 1817- 30), V, 253-6. The texts are also found in Bodleian Library, Oxford, MS Add. C 64, fos. 55r-57r, 58r-66v, 113r-116r, which seems to have been the basis for David Wilkins’ edition in the Concilia Magnae Britanniae et Hiberniae (4 vols., London, 1737). A third MS containing them is in Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge, MS 793 (P 28), pp. 53-79. However, it appears that both the Oxford and the Cambridge manuscripts depend (independently of each other) on the first, and are therefore valuable mainly for occasional conjectural emendations. On the history of the canons, see C. R. Cheney, ‘Manx synodical statutes, A. D. 1230(?)-1351. Part I: Introduction and Latin texts', Cambridge Medieval Celtic Studies, VII (Summer 1984), pp. 63-89 and Tart II: Translation of Latin texts', ibid, VIII (Winter 1984), pp. 51-63.

Thursday 31 May 1855

Absent:

John Edward Harrison, unwell.

Alexander Gelling, unwell.

Thomas Caine, preaching to Friendly Society.

Edward Forbes, off the island from ill health.

John Purdon Stoute, unwell.

New curates:

William Maxwell Smith, Michael.

Henry Grattan White, Ballaugh.

Henry Thomas Adamson, St Barnabas.

Thursday 15 May 1856

Absent:

John Edward Harrison, unwell.

Alexander Gelling, unwell.

John Lamothe Stowell, duty at church.

Edward Forbes, abroad in ill health.

John Cannell, unwell.

Charles James Stewart, off the island.

Benjamin Philpot Clarke, doing duty.

The bishop delivered his charge and celebrated holy communion.578

Thursday 4 June 1857

Absent:

Thomas E. Brown, vice-principal of King William's College.

John Edward Harrison, unwell.

Alexander Gelling, unwell.

Edward Forbes, not on the island.

John Thomas Clarke, absent.

John Cannell, absent.

William Richard Ick, not on the island.

New curates:

William Richard Ick, St George's.

Edward Gomersall Charlesworth, Michael.

William Lloyd Jones, St Thomas.

Francis Richard Swallow, Foxdale.

Thomas Fletcher, St Barnabas.

George Dawes, St Luke's.

William Charles Sparrow, St Mary's.

Wednesday 2 June 1858

Distribution of the royal bounty up to 3 April 1858:

We the undersigned clergy and schoolmasters of the diocese of Sodor and Man entitled to a distributive share of the royal bounty, do hereby acknowledge to have received from the Reverend Joseph Brown, episcopal registrar, the sums affixed to our respective names, being our dividends for four quarters of the royal bounty, ending 5 April 1858.

The convocation of 1607195

At a convocation and court holden before the reverend father in God John Philips, lord bishop of Man, the third day of December 1607, in Church Peelers in Holland,196 it is decreed as followeth:

Thereupon a process given and granted by the foresaid reverend father after the manner of this isle, according to the decree for his appearance. Concordat in decreto. Iohannes Cosnahan, registrarius.

Yonge apparently did not appear and Thompson was confirmed in the living, with Yonge ordered to pay damages to him, on 21 September 1608.

The convocation of 1610199

At a convocation holden the 23 of January 1609 before the reverend father in God John, lord bishop of Man, in Church Peelers in Hollandtown.

It is decreed that Sir Nicholas Thompson and Sir Christopher Yonge, clerks, shall make their personal appearance in St Mary's church in Ballalaighe [Ballaugh] before the ordinary, the sixth day of February being Tuesday [6 February 1610] between the hours of nine and eleven of the clock in the forenoon the foresaid day, and there and then to know his further pleasure and not to fail, sub poena suspensionis.

Thereupon a process given and granted by the foresaid reverend father for their appearance according to the decree. Concordat in decreto.