Reid believed that the Way of Ideas held his philosophical predecessors so firmly in its grip that without an accompanying polemic against that alternative his own view would be rejected out of hand. I judge that at many points the connection between affirmation and polemic goes even deeper than that. It's not just that we won't take Reid's arguments for his position seriously unless we are also given arguments against the opposition. Often it's difficult even to grasp what Reid is affirming without being aware of the position he is rejecting and of his reasons for doing so. Thus in my exposition I will, in good measure, follow Reid's own practice of allowing the presentation of his own view to emerge out of his polemic against the Way of Ideas.

THE WAY OF IDEAS

In its main outlines the Way of Ideas is as familiar as anything in modern philosophy. I will not exegete the various statements Reid offers of what he wants his expression, “the Way of Ideas,” to cover – that is, of the theses that he wants included. Those statements are not entirely consistent with each other, and I see no point in dwelling on the inconsistencies here. What I will rather do is outline the system of thought which Reid attributes to his forebears and whose totality he sometimes, at least, has in mind by “the Way of Ideas.”