“The wise and beneficent Author of nature … intended,” says Reid, “that we should be social creatures, and that we should receive the greatest and most important part of our knowledge by the information of others” (IHM VI, xxiv [196a; B 193]). That is by no means a stray, decorative comment on Reid's part. It points to an important and fascinating component of his thought; namely, his development of an epistemology of testimony.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF REID'S DISCUSSION OF TESTIMONY

Before we set out on an exploration of Reid's account of testimony let's reflect for a moment on the significance of the fact that he gives such an account. In chapter viii of Essay I of his Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, Reid, after distinguishing between the “social” operations of our mind and the “solitary,” asks: “Why have speculative men laboured so anxiously to analyze our solitary operations, and given so little attention to the social?” [245b]. I judge the situation not to have changed significantly since Reid's day.

By “social operations” he understands, says Reid, “such operations as necessarily suppose an intercourse with some other intelligent being” (EIP I, viii [214b]). When a person “asks information, or receives it; when he bears testimony, or receives the testimony of another; when he asks a favour, or accepts one; when he gives a command to his servant, or receives one from a superior; when he plights his faith in a promise or contract: these are acts of social intercourse between intelligent beings, and can have no place in solitude” (ibid.).