1 - Why Direct Realism?
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 April 2021
Summary
If you’re new to the philosophy of perception, you may wonder why Direct Realism is worth defending against Indirect Realism or Idealism. Tough question! A comprehensive answer would encompass this book and many others. For starters, though, consider some advantages that Direct Realism boasts over its rivals. First, it is the recognised common sense position. Odds are that you already believe it, and it fits best with your other beliefs – like that you’ve felt a friend's handshake or seen the ocean without feeling or seeing any mental objects in between. If Direct Realism turns out false, then you may have to revise many, many other beliefs. Perhaps you’d be inclined to think that reality is out to get you! Second, Indirect Realism has trouble accounting for the in-virtue-of relation that connects perceivers to the physical world. How can seeing an idea count as seeing the physical world? Finally, Indirect Realism and Idealism usually show up as promised solutions to the infamous Problems of Illusion and Hallucination, but how viable are they as solutions? The Problems of Illusion and Hallucination cast doubt on human abilities to acquire perceptual knowledge. Indirect Realism and Idealism are supposed to secure that knowledge by making perceptions always veridical, at least in a qualified sense. But introducing evanescent ideas as objects of perception, in addition to or instead of common sense physical objects, seems a poor approach to ensuring veridical perception. It only makes things worse. This chapter spells out one advantage of Direct Realism over Idealism, one over Indirect Realism, and a selfundermining feature common to Direct Realism's rivals in order to justify this book's default acceptance of Direct Realism.
Direct Realism as Common Sense
Human thinkers acquire beliefs in various ways: perception, reason, memory, testimony and perhaps others. Philosophers call these ways epistemic faculties. If all is well, you find your faculties in harmony. You remember leaving your keys on the counter, but to be certain you ask your friend whether they are in fact on the counter. She testifies that they are, and when you go to retrieve them, you perceive them there for yourself. All your faculties converge on the truth that your keys are on the counter. That's a typical case.
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- Thomas Reid and the Problem of Secondary Qualities , pp. 9 - 21Publisher: Edinburgh University PressPrint publication year: 2017