Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-gxg78 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-21T14:21:48.140Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

3 - Collectionist theories of substance

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 September 2009

Joshua Hoffman
Affiliation:
University of North Carolina, Greensboro
Gary S. Rosenkrantz
Affiliation:
University of North Carolina, Greensboro
Get access

Summary

Bundle: A collection of things bound or otherwise fastened together; a bunch; a package, parcel.

“Bundle” Oxford English Dictionary (1971)

The former recited particulars, howsoever improperly… bundled up together.

F. Greville The Life of the Renowned Sir Philip Sidney 235 (1628)

WHAT IS A COLLECTIONIST THEORY OF SUBSTANCE?

The idea of a substance is nothing but a collection of simple ideas that are united by the imagination and have a particular name assigned them by which we are able to recall, either to ourselves or to others, that collection.

D. Hume A Treatise of Human Nature I. iv. 6 (1739–1740)

A distinction needs to be drawn between two sorts of collectionist theories about substance. The eliminative collectionist theory holds that there are no substances. Instead, there are collections of entities of another sort, which collections are not to be identified with substances. This view usually maintains that what are taken to be substances are really collections of nonsubstances. A proponent of this view seems to be the Hume of the Treatise. Hume is the sort of eliminationist who thinks that there is no intelligible concept of substance, but it is possible to be an eliminationist and also hold that the concept of substance is a coherent one.

A second kind of collectionist theory identifies substances with collections of nonsubstances. Such a theory attempts to provide a philosophical analysis of the concept of an individual substance as ordinarily understood in terms of a collection of this kind.

Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1994

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×