Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- List of maps
- Acknowledgments
- List of abbreviations
- Introduction
- 1 Stalin, man of the borderlands
- 2 Borderlands in Civil War and Intervention
- 3 The borderland thesis: the west
- 4 The borderland thesis: the east
- 5 Stalin in command
- 6 Borderlands on the eve
- 7 Civil wars in the borderlands
- 8 War aims: the outer perimeter
- 9 War aims: the inner perimeter
- 10 Friendly governments: the outer perimeter
- Conclusion: A transient hegemony
- Index
10 - Friendly governments: the outer perimeter
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 September 2015
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- List of maps
- Acknowledgments
- List of abbreviations
- Introduction
- 1 Stalin, man of the borderlands
- 2 Borderlands in Civil War and Intervention
- 3 The borderland thesis: the west
- 4 The borderland thesis: the east
- 5 Stalin in command
- 6 Borderlands on the eve
- 7 Civil wars in the borderlands
- 8 War aims: the outer perimeter
- 9 War aims: the inner perimeter
- 10 Friendly governments: the outer perimeter
- Conclusion: A transient hegemony
- Index
Summary
In countries outside the zone of Soviet military operations such as Western Europe and Greece, or in Allied countries like Iran and China, where the Red Army was engaged along with Western forces for limited periods of time, the concept of a friendly government diverged in important ways from the model of the inner periphery. These differences should not obscure Stalin's intentions to forge new political and economic relationships that would enhance the influence of the Soviet Union outside this inner periphery.
Friendly governments in Western Europe
In negotiating with his major and minor allies in Western Europe, Stalin learned important lessons on how he might conduct his pursuit of hegemony in the borderlands of Eastern Europe. The first indications emerged from the political decisions taken by the three powers before the Yalta Conference and the Declaration on Liberated Territories. This chronology is important, for by the time the Red Army crossed the 1941 frontiers of the Soviet Union, Stalin had ample evidence to indicate how far the British and Americans were prepared to go in exercising political control over areas occupied by their military forces. And he could test the effectiveness of his policy of instructing local Communists in the liberated areas to subordinate themselves to the overall strategic and military demands of the Western allies but remain politically active as an example or even a precedent of how non-Communists ought to behave in territories liberated by the Red Army.
One of the most important recommendations of the planning commissions which has been ignored in the literature is contained in a memo of October 13, 1943 from Voroshilov to Molotov addressing the need to provide an alternative to the American military administration (AMGOT) imposed on the liberated territories. In North Africa the American military had experienced frustrations in dealing with conflicting civilian authorities. As a result the War Department began to plan for the creation of American military government for liberated territories. In Italy the Allied commander in chief, General Eisenhower, was determined that “so long as active military operations are being carried on, final authority regarding the political relations between the occupying armies and the local administration should remain with the Allied Commander-in-Chief.” The reaction of the Soviet Union helps explain the origins of their alternative model for administering the liberated territories as a key aspect of their political aims.
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- Information
- Stalin and the Struggle for Supremacy in Eurasia , pp. 356 - 403Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2015