INTRODUCTION

Gangs are widely considered to be among the most important security threats in post-cold war Central America, to the extent that they have been characterized as a ‘new urban insurgency’ aiming ‘to depose or control the governments of targeted countries’ (Manwaring, 2005, p. 2). As a result, policy-makers and the general public see them as a danger that has the potential to extend beyond the region, in particular to the United States and Canada. At the same time, however, branding gangs a ‘national security threat’ or a ‘new urban insurgency’ can significantly distort our understanding of the phenomenon (Hagedorn, 2008, p. xxx). The topic of gangs is often sensationalized, whether in media reports, academic studies, or policy documents, and the overwhelming majority of available information on Central American gangs is arguably flawed, with official statistics particularly inconsistent ‘due to institutional weaknesses, deficient data collection, and the discretionary if not political use of crime data’ (Wolf, 2012, p. 68).

Central American gangs are furthermore often considered generically, when it is critical to distinguish between the very different phenomena of pandillas and maras. The former are localized, home-grown gangs, while the latter are a hybrid social form with transnational roots. Pandillas were initially present throughout the Central American region in the post-cold war period but have been largely supplanted by maras in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras; today, they are only significantly present in Nicaragua.