Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Figures
- Foreword
- Acknowledgments
- Note to Readers
- Dramatis Personae
- Map of Iraq
- Introduction
- One The United States
- Two The “Zionist Entity”
- Three The Arab World
- Four Qadisiyyah Saddam (The Iran-Iraq War)
- Five The Mother of All Battles
- Six Special Munitions
- Seven The Embargo and the Special Commission
- Eight Hussein Kamil
- Epilogue
- Appendix: Timeline
- References
- Index
- References
Six - Special Munitions
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Figures
- Foreword
- Acknowledgments
- Note to Readers
- Dramatis Personae
- Map of Iraq
- Introduction
- One The United States
- Two The “Zionist Entity”
- Three The Arab World
- Four Qadisiyyah Saddam (The Iran-Iraq War)
- Five The Mother of All Battles
- Six Special Munitions
- Seven The Embargo and the Special Commission
- Eight Hussein Kamil
- Epilogue
- Appendix: Timeline
- References
- Index
- References
Summary
You are Iraqis and you realize that even the special weapon that the brothers have, if they use it, it will lose its value…sometimes what you get out of a weapon is when you keep saying, “I will bomb you,” [and] it is actually better than bombing him. It is possible that when you bomb him the material effect will be 40 percent, but if you stick it up to his face the material and the spiritual effect will be 60 percent, so why hit him? Keep getting 60 percent!
– Saddam Hussein, 7 July 1984The captured Iraqi recordings provide valuable insight into Saddam's views on the utility of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Scholars and policy makers have long debated the reasons Saddam used, and refrained from using, chemical and biological weapons. Whether Iraq (and states in general) sought weapons of mass destruction (WMD) for deterrence, compellence, prestige, or a combination of such factors has likewise been the subject of a great deal of analysis and speculation. Behind these questions resided, for many, concern that the acquisition of nuclear weapons would lead Saddam to believe that he could engage in conventional aggression with less risk of U.S. military intervention or U.S.-Israeli nuclear intimidation. Although Saddam and his advisers touched on some of these issues in public, analysts have received these public claims with healthy skepticism. This chapter presents transcripts of some of Saddam's private statements on the utility of WMD and the conditions for using them.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Saddam TapesThe Inner Workings of a Tyrant's Regime, 1978–2001, pp. 219 - 253Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2011