Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Foreword
- Preface and Acknowledgments
- List of Contributors
- 1 Constitutional Issues in Modern Democracies
- PART I CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
- 2 On Writing a Constitution
- 3 Constitutional Order and Economic Evolution: Competitive and Protectionist Interests in Democratic Society
- 4 The Efficacy of Arbitrary Rules
- 5 Constitutional Political Economy and Civil Society
- 6 The Constitutional Conflict between Protecting Expectations and Moral Evolution
- 7 Ideological Competition and Institutions: Why “Cultural” Explanations of Development Patterns Are Not Nonsense
- PART II ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND INSTITUTIONS
- PART III CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES FOR A FEDERAL STATE
- Index
7 - Ideological Competition and Institutions: Why “Cultural” Explanations of Development Patterns Are Not Nonsense
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Foreword
- Preface and Acknowledgments
- List of Contributors
- 1 Constitutional Issues in Modern Democracies
- PART I CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
- 2 On Writing a Constitution
- 3 Constitutional Order and Economic Evolution: Competitive and Protectionist Interests in Democratic Society
- 4 The Efficacy of Arbitrary Rules
- 5 Constitutional Political Economy and Civil Society
- 6 The Constitutional Conflict between Protecting Expectations and Moral Evolution
- 7 Ideological Competition and Institutions: Why “Cultural” Explanations of Development Patterns Are Not Nonsense
- PART II ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND INSTITUTIONS
- PART III CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES FOR A FEDERAL STATE
- Index
Summary
Introduction
Why do some societies prosper and grow? Why do other societies stagnate, though they have equal or superior endowments of natural and human resources? It is not surprising that social scientists do not fully agree on precisely which economic variables are most important. What is interesting is the growing consensus that, even if we could identify all the economic variables, they would still be insufficient to explain growth and development. If this is true, what are the omitted factors?
An analytical theory of “culture” is a crucial part of the answer. “Analysis” of culture may seem like an oxymoron, of course. Cultural explanations have been marginalized in the theoretical literature, and for good reason. Those who study economic development, or comparative politics, are skeptical of giving a residual a name and then calling it a variable. Persson and Tabellini had it right: Explanations for growth cannot be random effects, admitting of no further analysis.
Economic policy is not a random variable that varies freely across countries. Rather, policy is the result of deliberate and purposeful choices by individuals and groups, who have specific incentives and constraints. If we maintain that it is policy differences that explain growth differences, what we ultimately have to explain is why these deliberate and purposeful choices differ systematically across countries. To us, the most promising avenue toward such an explanation is to be found in the study of political incentives and political institutions.
(Persson and Tabellini, 1992: 5)- Type
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- Rules and ReasonPerspectives on Constitutional Political Economy, pp. 107 - 122Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2001
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