BibliographyIntroduction: Anti-ArchimedeanismBurley, Justine, ed. Dworkin and His Critics. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004.
Fish, Stanley. Doing What Comes Naturally: Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies. Durham: Duke University Press, 1989.
Guest, Stephen. Ronald Dworkin. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991.
Hunt, Alan, ed. Reading Dworkin Critically. New York and Oxford: Berg, 1992.
Hurley, Susan. Natural Reasons: Personality and Polity. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989.
Perry, Stephen. “Interpretation and Methodology in Legal Theory,” in Law and Interpretation, ed. Marmor, A. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).
Posner, Richard A. “Conceptions of Legal ‘Theory’: A Response to Ronald Dworkin.” Arizona State Law Journal 29 (1997): 377–88.
Raban, Ofer. “Dworkin's ‘Best Light’ Requirement and the Proper Methodology of Legal Theory.” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 23 (2003): 243–64.
Schlink, Bernhard. “Hercules in Germany?” International Journal of Constitutional Law 1 (2003): 610–20.
Westmoreland, Robert. “Dworkin and Legal Pragmatism.” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 11 (1991): 174–192.
Chapter 1. The “Hart–Dworkin” debate: a short for the perplexedAtkinson, Max. “Taking Dworkin Seriously.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (1983): 27–39.
Balkin, J. M “Taking Ideology Seriously: Ronald Dworkin and the CLS Critique.” UMKC Law Review 55 (1987): 392–433.
Brubaker, Stanley C. “Reconsidering Dworkin's Case for Judicial Activism.” Journal of Politics 46 (1984): 503–19.
Brubaker, Stanley C. “Taking Dworkin Seriously.” The Review of Politics 47 (1985): 45–65.
Burton, Steven J. “Ronald Dworkin and Legal Positivism.” Iowa Law Review 73 (1987): 109–29.
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Coleman, Jules, ed. Hart's Postscript. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.
Coleman, Jules. The Practice of Principle. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.
Coleman, Jules, and Shapiro, Scott, eds. The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001 (various chapters).
Corlett, J. Angelo. “Dworkin's Empire Strikes Back!” Statute Law Review 21 (2000): 43–56.
Culver, Keith. “Leaving the Hart-Dworkin Debate.” The University of Toronto Law Journal 51 (2001): 367–98.
Donato, James. “Dworkin and Subjectivity in Legal Interpretation.” Stanford Law Review 40 (1988): 1517–41.
Endicott, Timothy. “Herbert Hart and the Semantic Sting.” Legal Theory 4 (1998): 283–300.
Endicott, Timothy. “Are There Any Rules?” The Journal of Ethics 5 (2001): 199–219.
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Himma, Kenneth Einar. “Waluchow's Defense of Inclusive Positivism.” Legal Theory 5 (1999): 101–16.
Kornhauser, Lewis A. “No Best Answer?” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 146 (1998): 1599–1637.
Kramer, Matthew H. “Also Among the Prophets: Some Rejoinders to Ronald Dworkin's Attacks on Legal Positivism.” Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence: An International Journal of Legal Thought 12 (1996): 53–82.
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Lyons, David. “Principles, Positivism and Legal Theory.” Yale Law Journal 87 (1977): 415–35.
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Mackie, John. “The Third Theory of Law.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 7 (1977): 3–16.
Mureinik, Etienne. “Dworkin and Apartheid,” in Law and Social Practice, ed. Corder, H. (Cape Town: Juta, 1988) 181.
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Pannick, David. “A Note on Dworkin and Precedent.” The Modern Law Review 43 (1980): 36–44.
Raz, Joseph. “Authority, Law and Morality,” in Ethics in the Public Domain (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994).
Raz, Joseph. The Authority of Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979.
Regan, Donald H. “Glosses on Dworkin: Rights, Principles, and Policies.” Michigan Law Review 76 (1978): 1213–64.
Soper, E. Philip. “Legal Theory and the Obligation of a Judge: The Hart/Dworkin Dispute.” Michigan Law Review 75 (1977): 473–519.
Waluchow, Wilfrid J. “Strong Discretion.” The Philosophical Quarterly 33 (1983): 321–39.
Waluchow, Wilfrid J.Inclusive Legal Positivism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.
Woodman, Gordon. “Dworkin's ‘Right Answer’ Thesis and the Frustration of Legislative Intent: A Case-Study on the Leasehold Reform Act.” The Modern Law Review 45 (1982): 121–38.
Woozley, A. D “No Right Answer.” The Philosophical Quarterly 29 (1979): 25–34.
Chapter 2. The rule of law as the rule of liberal principleAltman, Andrew. “Policy, Principle, and Incrementalism: Dworkin's Jurisprudence of Race.” The Journal of Ethics 5 (2001): 241–62.
Lagerspetz, Eerik. “Ronald Dworkin on Communities and Obligations: A Critical Comment.” Ratio Juris: An International Journal of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law 12 (1999): 108–15.
Mian, Emran. “The Value Of Community, Or How Burke Compromises Dworkin.” Legal Theory 9 (2003): 125–56.
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Peerenboom, Randall P. “A Coup d'Etatin Law's Empire: Dworkin's Hercules Meets Atlas”. Law and Philosophy: An International Journal for Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy 9 (1990): 95–113.
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Winston, Kenneth I. “Principles and Touchstones: The Dilemma of Dworkin's Liberalism.” Polity 19 (1986): 42–55.
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Wolfe, Christopher. “The Egalitarian Liberalism of Ronald Dworkin,” in Liberalism at the Crossroads: An Introduction to Contemporary Liberal Political Theory and Its Critics (2nd ed.), ed. Wolfe, Christopher (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003).
Chapter 3. Liberty and EqualityAnderson, Elizabeth. “What Is the Point of Equality?” Ethics 109, no. 2 (Jan. 1999): 287–337.
Armstrong, Chris. “Equality, Risk and Responsibility: Dworkin on the Insurance Market.” Economy and Society 34 (2005): 451–73.
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Arneson, Richard. “Liberalism, Distributive Subjectivism, and Equal Opportunity for Welfare.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 19 (1990): 158–94.
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Arneson, Richard. “Equal Opportunity for Welfare Defended and Recanted.” Journal of Political Philosophy 7 (1999): 488–97.
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Arneson, Richard. “Luck and Equality II.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supp. vol (2001): 73–90.
Bennett, John G. “Ethics and Markets.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 14 (1985): 195–204.
Champeau, Serge. “Ronald Dworkin, le Libéralisme et l'Égalité.” Revue Philosophique de Louvain 97 (1999): 550–80.
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Christofidis, Miriam Cohen. “Talent, Slavery and Envy in Dworkin's Equality of Resources.” Utilitas: A Journal of Utilitarian Studies 16 (2004): 267–87.
Clayton, Matthew, and Williams, Andrew, eds. The Ideal of Equality. New York: Macmillan and St. Martin's Press, 2000.
Clayton, Matthew. “Liberal Equality and Ethics.” Ethics 113 (2002): 8–22.
Cohen, G. A “On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice.” Ethics 99 (1989): 906–44.
Ely, John Hart. “Professor Dworkin's External/Personal Preference Distinction.” Duke Law Journal (1983): 959–86.
Fleirbaey, Marc. “Equality of Resources Revisited.” Ethics 113 (2002): 82–105.
Halpin, Andrew. “Clamshells or Bedsteads?” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 20 (2000): 353–66.
Heath, Joseph. “Dworkin's Auction.” Politics, Philosophy & Economics 3 (2004): 313–35.
Hinton, Timothy. “Choice and Luck in Recent Egalitarian Thought.” Philosophical Papers 31 (2002): 145–67.
Hurley, Susan. Justice, Luck, and Knowledge. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003.
Jacobson, Daniel. “Freedom of Speech Acts? A Response to Langton.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 24 (1995): 64–79.
Kymlicka, Will. Contemporary Political Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990.
Langton, Rae. “Whose Right? Ronald Dworkin, Women and Pornographers.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 19 (1990): 311–59.
Lippert-Rasmussen, Kaspar. “Egalitarianism, Option Luck, and Responsibility.” Ethics 111 (2001): 548–79.
Macleod, Colin M. “Liberal Neutrality Or Liberal Tolerance?” Law and Philosophy 16 (1997): 529–59.
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Nordahl, Richard. “Ronald Dworkin and the Defense of Homosexual Rights.” Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 8 (1995): 19–48.
Otsuka, Michael. “Luck, Insurance, and Equality.” Ethics 113 (2002): 40–54.
Plaw, Avery. “Why Monist Critiques Feed Value Pluralism: Ronald Dworkin's Critique of Isaiah Berlin.” Social Theory and Practice 30 (2004): 105–26.
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Roemer, John. “A Pragmatic Theory of Responsibility for the Egalitarian Planner.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 10 (1993): 146–66.
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Sandbu, Martin E. “On Dworkin's Brute-Luck-Option-Luck Distinction and the Consistency of Brute-Luck Egalitarianism.” Politics, Philosophy & Economics 3 (2004): 283–312.
Scheffler, Samuel. “What is Egalitarianism?” Philosophy and Public Affairs 31, no. 1 (Winter 2003): 5–39.
Scheffler, Samuel. “Equality as the Virtue of Sovereigns: A Reply to Ronald Dworkin.” Philosophy & Public Affairs 31 (2003): 199–206.
Sherwin, Emily. “How Liberal Is Liberal Equality? A Comment on Ronald Dworkin's Tanner Lecture.” Legal Theory 1 (1995): 227–50.
Vallentyne, Peter. “Brute Luck, Option Luck, and Equality of Initial Opportunities.” Ethics 112 (2002): 529–57.
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Wilkinson, T. M “Against Dworkin's Endorsement Constraint.” Utilitas: A Journal of Utilitarian Studies 15 (2003) 175–93.
Williams, Andrew. “Dworkin on Capability.” Ethics 113 (2002): 23–39.
Williams, Andrew. “Equality for the Ambitious.” Philosophical Quarterly 52 (2002): 377–89.
Chapter 4. Rights, Responsibilities, and Reflections on the Sanctityof LifeBaird, Robert M. “Dworkin, Abortion, Religious Liberty, and the Spirit of Enlightenment.” Journal of Church and State 37 (1995): 753–71.
Barclay, Linda. “Rights, Intrinsic Values and the Politics of Abortion.” Utilitas: A Journal of Utilitarian Studies 11 (1999): 215–29.
Belshaw, C. “Abortion, Value and the Sanctity of Life.” Bioethics 11 (1997): 130–50.
David, Gregory B. “Dworkin, Precedent, Confidence, and Roe v. Wade.” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 152 (2004): 1221–53.
Kamm, F. M “Abortion and the Value of Life. Ronald Dworkin: Life's Dominion” Columbia Law Review 95 (1995): 160–222.
Kamm, F. M “Ronald Dworkin on Abortion and Assisted Suicide.” The Journal of Ethics 5 (2001): 221–40.
Mitchell, David. “The Importance of Being Important: Euthanasia and Critical Interests in Dworkin's Life's Dominion.” Utilitas: A Journal of Utilitarian Studies 7 (1995): 301–14.
Naticchia, Chris. “Ronald Dworkin's Life's Dominion.” Journal of Law and Politics 10 (1997): 339–67.
O'Day, Ken. “Intrinsic Value and Investment.” Utilitas: A Journal of Utilitarian Studies 11 (1999): 194–214.
Rakowski, Eric. “Ronald Dworkin, Reverence for Life, and the Limits of State Power.” Utilitas: A Journal of Utilitarian Studies 13 (2001): 33–64.
Scanlon, T. M “Partisan for Life.” New York Review of Books (July 15, 1993), 40 (13): 45–50.
Stroud, Sarah. “Dworkin and Casey on Abortion.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 25 (1996): 140–70.
Tomasi, John. “Liberalism, Sanctity, and the Prohibition of Abortion.” The Journal of Philosophy 94 (1997): 491–513.
Chapter 5. Hercules, Abraham Lincoln, the United States Constitution, and the Problem of SlaveryAronovitch, Hilliard. “A Liberal Reading of the American Constitution.” Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence: An International Journal of Legal Thought 10 (1997): 521–35.
Chaskalson, Arthur. “From Wickedness to Equality: The Moral Transformation of South African Law.” International Journal of Constitutional Law 1 (2003): 590–609.
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Levinson, Sanford. “Taking Law Seriously: Reflections on ‘Thinking Like a Lawyer.’” Stanford Law Review 30, no. 5 (May 1978): 1071, 1090–1.
Levinson, Sanford. Constitutional Faith. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988.
McCaffery, Edward J. “Ronald Dworkin, Inside-Out.” California Law Review85 (1997): 1043–86.
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Pildes, Richard H. “Dworkin's Two Conceptions of Rights.” The Journal of Legal Studies 29 (2000): 309–15.
Posner, Richard A. “Dworkin, Polemics, and the Clinton Impeachment Controversy.” Northwestern University Law Review 94 (2000): 1023–47.
Sebok, Anthony. “Judging the Fugitive Slave Acts.” Yale Law Journal 100 (1991): 1835–1854.
Sebok, Anthony J.Legal Positivism in American Jurisprudence. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Zagrebelsky, Gustavo. “Ronald Dworkin's Principle Based Constitutionalism: An Italian Point of View.” International Journal of Constitutional Law 1 (2003): 621–50.
