Book contents
- The Revolution that Failed
- The Revolution that Failed
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Epigraph
- Contents
- Figures and Tables
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- 1 The Nuclear Revolution Revisited
- 2 The Delicacy of the Nuclear Balance
- 3 Comparative Constitutional Fitness
- 4 Testing the Argument against Its Competitors
- 5 Nixon and the Origins of Renewed Nuclear Competition, 1969–1971
- 6 Nixon, Ford, and Accelerating Nuclear Competition, 1971–1976
- 7 The Rise of Nuclear Warfighting, 1972–1976
- 8 Carter and the Climax of the Arms Race, 1977–1979
- 9 The Revolution that Failed
- Index
4 - Testing the Argument against Its Competitors
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 26 February 2020
- The Revolution that Failed
- The Revolution that Failed
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Epigraph
- Contents
- Figures and Tables
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- 1 The Nuclear Revolution Revisited
- 2 The Delicacy of the Nuclear Balance
- 3 Comparative Constitutional Fitness
- 4 Testing the Argument against Its Competitors
- 5 Nixon and the Origins of Renewed Nuclear Competition, 1969–1971
- 6 Nixon, Ford, and Accelerating Nuclear Competition, 1971–1976
- 7 The Rise of Nuclear Warfighting, 1972–1976
- 8 Carter and the Climax of the Arms Race, 1977–1979
- 9 The Revolution that Failed
- Index
Summary
Thus far, I have kept the argument relatively free of explicit predictions or the superstructure of testing and evaluation. I have done so to make my logical and empirical claims as clear as possible. But the ultimate worth of my argument can only be determined by weighing it against the evidence from the history of the late Cold War nuclear competition.
Moreover, as a social scientist, I hope that my argument has relevance beyond its historical interest. As a theoretical matter, the argument aims to amend our understanding of the nuclear revolution, at least with respect to peacetime nuclear competition. From a policy perspective, nuclear competition between states who have achieved assured destruction arsenals may recur. Indeed, conditions for such competitions may be arising today. If my argument illuminates American nuclear force posture during the later Cold War, perhaps it might help forecast the risk of future nuclear competitions.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Revolution that FailedNuclear Competition, Arms Control, and the Cold War, pp. 66 - 86Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2020