On December 5, the Polish Politburo granted permission for the imposition of martial law and gave Jaruzelski a free hand to select the exact date. For reasons of secrecy if nothing else, the Politburo was unable to decide the date or hour that the operation—which had been assigned the cryptonyms “G,” “W,” or “X”— would begin. According to the plans that had already been approved, the army required at least forty-eight hours after the political decision had been made to launch its operations in full force. Those same plans also stated that, optimally, the operation would begin on a Saturday night, when most workplaces were closed, making an immediate response (such as strikes and Solidarity's mobilization) practically impossible, or at least seriously hindered, until Monday. Meanwhile, since December 5 was a Saturday, the operation could not begin yet, and it would be necessary to keep its date a secret for at least a week. This would be too risky, considering the large number of people who knew about it. The preparations were still being “polished,” which was not surprising, given Jaruzelski's extreme pedantry, which he also expected of all his subordinates and colleagues. It was necessary, among other things, to conduct a propaganda campaign to publicize a specific reason (or pretext) for taking such dramatic action—putting tens of thousands of soldiers and thousands of tanks and armored vehicles on city streets. A pretext—a meeting of Solidarity's leadership on December 3—did present itself, but secret police tapes made at those meetings had to be suitably prepared and publicized in the mass media for several days at least. Because Jaruzelski made the decision to start this propaganda campaign on Sunday, December 6, it could go on uninterrupted for five or six days. Which is precisely what happened.

The regional communist party offices and administration had to be mobilized as well, as did the leadership of the military and Ministry of Internal Affairs. The satellite political parties also needed to be informed of the fact that Operation “W” was drawing near, and the chairman of the Council of State had to be told about the task awaiting him. Jaruzelski was faced with a long series of meetings, consultations, and briefings.