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  • Cited by 19
Publisher:
Cambridge University Press
Online publication date:
September 2016
Print publication year:
2016
Online ISBN:
9781316681398

Book description

In a study that contributes to international relations and international political economy theory, Ruth Ben-Artzi raises substantive issues relating to aid, development, international relations and globalization. Regional development banks (RDBs), designed by politicians and economists to maneuver through labyrinths of economic, social, and political development, possess the potential to be central players in the long-term planning involved in healing and advancing poverty-plagued regions. However, RDBs in particular have received little attention. With a systematic analysis comparing four central regional development banks, this book explores why there is a variation in strategy despite similar institutional design. The formal arrangements and raison d'être of RDBs is to assist developing countries in the process of poverty alleviation - a task that is often a risky investment. Focusing on the dichotomy between their banking and development roles, Ben-Artzi demonstrates that RDBs are potentially critical catalysts in the fight against poverty, even with their institutional limitations.

Reviews

‘Regional Development Banks in Comparison is one of the most important studies of regional development banks to date. Based on an impressive array of empirical evidence, Ruth Ben-Artzi demonstrates that, because these institutions tend to emphasize their banking goals, they have failed to meet their mandate of providing poorer countries with development assistance. The result is a book that makes a valuable contribution to our understanding of economic development, international institutions, and globalization.’

Edward D. Mansfield - Hum Rosen Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania

‘Regional Development Banks in Comparison is a wonderful example of mixed-methods social science research. Ruth Ben-Artzi does a masterful job describing the split personalities of the world’s most important regional development banks (RDBs) and asks whether their policy behavior reflects their identities as banks or as development institutions. The answer varies over time and across institutions, and the behavior of RDBs can be explained by synthesizing different theories of international organization. This book is a must-read for anyone who is interested in the history of RDBs, but also for anyone trying to figure out how to reform existing institutions or explain the behavior of new institutions like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.’

Michael J. Tierney - Hylton Professor of Government and International Relations, College of William and Mary, Virginia

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Contents

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