Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- List of Contributors
- Introduction: The Moral and Political Philosophy of Gregory Kavka
- Some Personal Memories
- The Shadow of the Future
- A New Paradox of Deterrence
- Rethinking the Toxin Puzzle
- Toxin, Temptation, and the Stability of Intention
- The Toxin Puzzle
- Religion and Morality in Hobbes
- Contemporary Uses of Hobbes's Political Philosophy
- The Knavish Humean
- Some Considerations in Favor of Contractualism
- Justice, Reasons, and Moral Standing
- Wrongful Life: Paradoxes in the Morality of Causing People to Exist
- Gregory S. Kavka's Writings
The Toxin Puzzle
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 October 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- List of Contributors
- Introduction: The Moral and Political Philosophy of Gregory Kavka
- Some Personal Memories
- The Shadow of the Future
- A New Paradox of Deterrence
- Rethinking the Toxin Puzzle
- Toxin, Temptation, and the Stability of Intention
- The Toxin Puzzle
- Religion and Morality in Hobbes
- Contemporary Uses of Hobbes's Political Philosophy
- The Knavish Humean
- Some Considerations in Favor of Contractualism
- Justice, Reasons, and Moral Standing
- Wrongful Life: Paradoxes in the Morality of Causing People to Exist
- Gregory S. Kavka's Writings
Summary
The Puzzle
Here is “a vial of toxin that, if you drink it, will make you painfully ill for a day, but will not threaten your life or have any lasting effects.” An “eccentric billionaire… will pay you one million dollars tomorrow morning if, at midnight tonight, you intend to drink the toxin tomorrow afternoon.”
The case is designed to distinguish between having reasons to intend to do something and having reasons for doing it. You have reasons to intend to drink the toxin tomorrow, but do you or will you have reasons actually to drink the toxin tomorrow? You can see that if you do not and will not have reasons actually to drink the toxin tomorrow, you will not do it. But, if you can see that you will not actually drink the toxin tomorrow, because you will not have any reason to drink the toxin at that point, it is going to be difficult now to intend to drink the toxin tomorrow. It is certainly going to be harder to get the $1 million in this case than in the easier case in which you would get the money only for actually drinking the toxin, not just for intending to do it.
I want to discuss whether you will have any reason actually to drink the toxin tomorrow in the first case – Kavka's toxin case, the case in which you get the $1 million for the intention alone.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Rational Commitment and Social JusticeEssays for Gregory Kavka, pp. 84 - 89Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1998
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