Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Abbreviations
- Introduction
- Individuals
- Logic and ontology
- Ethics
- Physics
- Chapter 19 The nature of time and place
- Chapter 20 The eternity of the world
- Chapter 21 The heavens
- Chapter 22 God and providence
- Chapter 23 Fate, choice and what depends on us
- Chapter 24 Soul
- Chapter 25 Generation
- Chapter 26 Sensation
- Chapter 27 Intellect
- Bibliography
- Index of sources
- Index of passages cited
- Index of personal names (ancient)
- General index
Chapter 27 - Intellect
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Abbreviations
- Introduction
- Individuals
- Logic and ontology
- Ethics
- Physics
- Chapter 19 The nature of time and place
- Chapter 20 The eternity of the world
- Chapter 21 The heavens
- Chapter 22 God and providence
- Chapter 23 Fate, choice and what depends on us
- Chapter 24 Soul
- Chapter 25 Generation
- Chapter 26 Sensation
- Chapter 27 Intellect
- Bibliography
- Index of sources
- Index of passages cited
- Index of personal names (ancient)
- General index
Summary
Alexander of Aphrodisias, reported by Philoponus, On Aristotle’s On the Soul 3 15.65–9 Verbeke 1966
Alexander said that Aristotle says that the intellect exists only in potentiality, but in no way in actuality. Since moreover Aristotle accepts, according to Alexander, those who say that the soul is the place of forms, Xenarchus was deceived by these [words] and suspected that Aristotle was saying that prime matter was intellect; [Xenarchus] judged badly [in this].
Alexander of Aphrodisias, Supplement to On the Soul (On Intellect) (Mantissa 2).106.19–26
(1) Intellect is according to Aristotle of three [types]. One is material intellect. I say ‘material’ not because it is something that underlies like matter – for I say ‘matter’ of something which underlies and is able to become a ‘this-something’ through the presence of some form. (2) Rather, since matter’s being matter [consists] in its having the potentiality for all things, [it follows that] that in which there is potentiality and indeed that which is potential, insofar as it is such, is ‘material’. (3) And so the intellect which is not yet thinking but has the potentiality to come to be like this, is ‘material’, and it is this sort of potentiality of the soul that is the material intellect, not being in actuality any of the extant things, but having the potentiality for becoming all of them, if indeed it is possible for there to be thinking of all the extant things. (Sharples 2004, 24–5)
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- Information
- Peripatetic Philosophy, 200 BC to AD 200An Introduction and Collection of Sources in Translation, pp. 266 - 275Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2010