Book contents
- The Perils of International Capital
- The Perils of International Capital
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Acknowledgments
- 1 The Politics of International Capital
- 2 International Capital and Authoritarian Survival
- 3 Foreign Rents and Rule
- 4 Aiding Repression
- 5 Remittances and Autocratic Power
- 6 Foreign Direct Investment in Militarism
- 7 Conclusion
- References
- Index
5 - Remittances and Autocratic Power
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 December 2019
- The Perils of International Capital
- The Perils of International Capital
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Acknowledgments
- 1 The Politics of International Capital
- 2 International Capital and Authoritarian Survival
- 3 Foreign Rents and Rule
- 4 Aiding Repression
- 5 Remittances and Autocratic Power
- 6 Foreign Direct Investment in Militarism
- 7 Conclusion
- References
- Index
Summary
Throughout history a strong executive with limited constraints on his or her political authority has been a prerequisite for dictatorship. Of course, the ability of autocrats to enjoy these low constraints on their rule requires sufficient revenues to repress and buy loyalty via patronage.
This chapter presents cross-national evidence that remittances can finance authoritarian politics, by lowering the constraints dictators face and extending their time in power. Endogeneity, however, plagues efforts to test whether a causal relationship exists between remittance income and authoritarian politics. To overcome this empirical challenge, I leverage a quasi-natural experiment of oil price–driven remittance flows emanating from the Persian Gulf to non–oil-producing Muslim countries in North Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Perils of International Capital , pp. 103 - 125Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2019