Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-wg55d Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-05-04T00:32:00.988Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

5 - The Framing and Adoption of the Necessary and Proper Clause

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 May 2011

Gary Lawson
Affiliation:
Boston University School of Law
Geoffrey P. Miller
Affiliation:
New York University School of Law
Robert G. Natelson
Affiliation:
University of Montana School of Law
Guy I. Seidman
Affiliation:
University of Herzilya, Israel
Get access

Summary

DRAFTING THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE AT THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION

Original Intent vs. Original Understanding vs. Original Meaning

Under the founders' rules of interpretation, deducing the force of the Constitution requires that one read the text as it was understood by the ratifiers (“original understanding”). When a coherent original understanding is not recoverable – due to lack of evidence or contradictory evidence – the interpreter must seek the meaning of the document that a reasonably well-informed hypothetical ratifier would have ascribed to it (“original meaning” or “original public meaning”). The intent of the delegates at the drafting convention (“original intent”) has no direct legal force, but often provides evidence of the understanding or meaning at the time of ratification.

In the case of the Necessary and Proper Clause, the convention record is particularly useful for deducing the understanding and meaning at the ratification because the delegates who, directly or indirectly, were most responsible for shaping the Clause all served as leading ratification figures as well. Those delegates were Charles Pinckney of South Carolina and John Dickinson of Delaware and the five members of the drafting committee: John Rutledge of South Carolina, Edmund Randolph of Virginia, James Wilson of Pennsylvania, Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut, and Nathaniel Gorham of Massachusetts. All except Gorham later assumed major roles in representing the Constitution to the ratifying public, and all except Dickinson were delegates in their state ratifying conventions.

Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2010

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Natelson, Robert G., The General Welfare Clause and the Public Trust: An Essay in Original Understanding, 52 U. Kan. L. Rev. 1 (2003)Google Scholar

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×