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23 - Foundationalism and Ground Truth in American Legal Philosophy: Classical Rhetoric, Realism, and Pragmatism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 July 2009

By
Eileen A. Scallen
Edited by
Francis J. Mootz III
Francis J. Mootz III
Affiliation:
University of the Pacific, California
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Summary

One of the visual clichés in modern newscasts is a clip of a hapless reporter standing in the midst of a hurricane, blizzard, flood, or other natural disaster. I am sure I am not alone in wondering, “What is that idiot doing out there?” It turns out this is a melodramatic representation of a standard concept in meteorology, known as “ground truth.” Ground truth is provided by professional or volunteer spotters who are in a position to observe and report weather conditions as they are being experienced on – well – the ground. Although modern meteorology uses a wide range of sophisticated remote sensing technology, “[o]nly a spotter can see a tornado” (McAuliffe 2007). Ground truth is also used in cartography and military operations, where even high-definition remote sensing devices, including satellite imagery and aerial photographs, can provide misleading or inaccurate information unless compared with and connected to observed conditions on the earth. In the military and international law contexts, ground truth is used in opposition to other kinds of truth, such as “legal truth” (Warren 1996: 50) or “paper truth” (Cárdenas 2004: 1343). In each of these cases, the use of generalized or abstract knowledge is balanced with contextual, firsthand observation and reporting: ground truth.

Advocates of ground truth suggest that it is often more accurate than the abstraction it validates. Yet ground truth makes no claim of perfection. Ground truth can be dead wrong; a spotter can miss the funnel cloud or mischaracterize the condition (e.g., categorizing sleet as hail).

Type
Chapter
Information
On Philosophy in American Law , pp. 195 - 204
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2009

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