Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- Part One Naturalism: Epistemology and Metaphysics
- 1 Why Naturalism?
- 2 Four Epistemological Challenges to Ethical Naturalism: Naturalized Epistemology and the First-Person Perspective
- 3 Moral Naturalism and Self-Evident Moral Truths
- 4 Moral Necessities in a Contingent World
- Part Two Referring to Moral Properties
- Part Three Naturalism and Normativity
- Index
- References
1 - Why Naturalism?
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 19 July 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- Part One Naturalism: Epistemology and Metaphysics
- 1 Why Naturalism?
- 2 Four Epistemological Challenges to Ethical Naturalism: Naturalized Epistemology and the First-Person Perspective
- 3 Moral Naturalism and Self-Evident Moral Truths
- 4 Moral Necessities in a Contingent World
- Part Two Referring to Moral Properties
- Part Three Naturalism and Normativity
- Index
- References
Summary
My goal in this chapter is to explain what ethical naturalism is, to locate the pivotal issue between naturalists and nonnaturalists, and to motivate taking naturalism seriously. It is no part of my goal to establish the truth of naturalism. There are various familiar objections to it, including, most importantly, the objection that naturalism cannot explain the normativity of moral judgment. In this chapter, my goal is simply to motivate naturalism sufficiently that the attempt to deal with the objections will seem worthwhile.
An ethical naturalist holds that there are moral properties and relations – for example, there are moral rightness, goodness, justice, and virtuousness – and she holds that these properties and relations are ‘natural.’ Accordingly, when a naturalist hears us say that something is right or wrong, just or unjust, she takes the truth of what we say to depend on whether the relevant thing has the relevant property, and she takes this to depend in turn exclusively on the way things are in the natural world. The chief problem, of course, is to explain what it might mean to claim that moral properties are natural properties. I think that once this is properly explained, naturalism will seem enormously attractive. If we believe that there are moral properties at all, we will find ourselves moved in the direction of naturalism.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Morality in a Natural WorldSelected Essays in Metaethics, pp. 33 - 54Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2007
References
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