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8 - Family Ties and Nepotism in the Mexican Federal Judiciary

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 August 2022

Sandra Botero
Affiliation:
Universidad del Rosario, Colombia
Daniel M. Brinks
Affiliation:
University of Texas, Austin
Ezequiel A. Gonzalez-Ocantos
Affiliation:
University of Oxford
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Summary

To what extent are employees in the Mexican judiciary – both judges and lower level officials – connected by family ties? Are these family connections used inappropriately to hire or to favor relatives in ways that would not have been possible absent the family connection? This chapter takes advantage of a unique dataset to answer these questions. It documents a departure from the promise made in the judicial reform of 1994, that by removing the administration of the judiciary from the Supreme Court and transferring it to a judicial council, a professional and meritocratic judicial career would be established for all federal judges, making merit and not connections the main determinants of becoming a judge. The sheer magnitude and pervasiveness of family relationships within the Mexican federal judiciary conspicuously show the limitationsof this reform and highlight the challenges Mexico faces to consolidate judicial careers.

Type
Chapter
Information
The Limits of Judicialization
From Progress to Backlash in Latin America
, pp. 195 - 216
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2022

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