Before the 1830s, when “scientist” began to refer to someone with specific professional qualifications, the pursuit of science had two countervailing qualities: on the one hand, it was expected only of those (few) with sufficient leisure; on the other, the results of science were accorded universal validity, even if most people remained ignorant or passive with regard to their production. This paradox persists today. Indeed, science appears to be sociologically unique as a form of knowledge – certainly in contrast with religion or even politics – in that most of its believers have little specific knowledge of what it is they believe. Thus, there is widespread cross-cultural agreement that Einstein was the premier intellect of the twentieth century, but who in this consensus (see consensus versus dissent) can correctly express Einstein's estimable insights? If anything, greater knowledge of science appears to be correlated with greater scepticism of science's goodness. Not surprisingly, to this day the most effective critics of science have come from within the scientific community, since there remains no widely institutionalized means of soliciting public input into the conduct of science. In this respect, science remains for – but not by – the people.

From Plato's Republic to Auguste Comte's positivist polity, the tension between elitism and universality (see universalism versus relativity) in the public understanding of science has inspired philosophers to imagine that a non-coercive social order could be built by establishing clear patterns of deference to the appropriate scientific authorities.