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Relativism versus constructivism

Steve Fuller
Affiliation:
University of Warwick
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Summary

Relativism and constructivism should be understood as equally opposed to the view philosophers call scientific realism but from complementary perspectives. Scientific realism involves two distinct claims, each of which can be denied separately:

  • A scientific account is universally valid. Therefore, if scientific theory, T, is true, it is true everywhere and always. The denial of this claim is relativism. It implies that reality may vary across space at any given time.

  • A scientific account is valid independently of what people think and do. Therefore if T is true, it is true even if nobody believes it. The denial of this claim is constructivism. It implies that, for a given place, reality may change over time.

The particularist orientation of relativism opposes realism's claim to universality, whereas constructivism's reliance on the contingent actions of knowers undermines realism's claim to necessary truth.

It follows that philosophical criticism targeted at constructivism may miss its mark by taking issue with relativism. For example, the constructivist slogan “the rational itself is constitutively social” is meant to deny any clear distinction between what is rationally and socially acceptable. This view is compatible with either a relativist or a universalist epistemology. (e.g. Fuller's version of social epistemology is a constructivist universalism.) All that it implies is that rationality is to be explained sociologically. In principle, the relevant sense of “social” may be common to all societies.

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The Knowledge Book
Key Concepts in Philosophy, Science and Culture
, pp. 138 - 142
Publisher: Acumen Publishing
Print publication year: 2007

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