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1 - In and of This World: The Dual Status of Thought

from Part I - The Dialectic of Ideology

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 November 2016

Michael Morris
Affiliation:
University of South Florida
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Summary

From his first writings, Marx was never content with stating his own views and criticizing those of others. In addition, he wanted to explain how others came to hold their erroneous views. The theories of others were not treated mainly as alternative views of the same social reality that he also studied – as legitimate if possibly incorrect explanations of society. Rather he considered them to be part of the reality to be explained.

Jon Elster

In the normal view, the fact that an idea is deemed true or beautiful is sufficient to explain why it is accepted, and the fact that it is deemed false or ugly is sufficient to explain its rejection … What requires special explanation are the cases in which, in spite of the truth or beauty of an idea, it is not accepted, or in spite of its ugliness or falsehood it is accepted. The meme's eye view purports to be a general alternative perspective from which these deviations can be explained … The theory becomes interesting only when we look at the exceptions, the circumstances under which there is a pulling apart of the two perspectives. Only if meme theory permits us better to understand the deviations from the normal scheme will it have any warrant for being accepted. (Note that in its own terms, whether or not the meme meme replicates is strictly independent of its epistemological virtue; it might spread in spite of its perniciousness, or go extinct in spite of its virtue.)

Daniel Dennett

The Noncognitive Dimensions of Thought

The emergence and proliferation of the theories of ideology forms a significant part of a much larger story, one that involves the historical increase in our attention to what we might call “the noncognitive dimension of thought.” Indeed, beliefs, theories, and other cognitive entities are highly peculiar: they appear to have two important but divergent dimensions. We might say that they are at once in and of this world. We get some sense of this distinction in the introductory passage from Elster, where he suggests two possible ways for treating theories that diverge from our own. First, we might treat them “as alternative views of the same social reality.”

Type
Chapter
Information
Knowledge and Ideology
The Epistemology of Social and Political Critique
, pp. 36 - 64
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2016

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