Natural desire

I.I. Reason and inclination There is a long tradition in Western ethical thought, going back at least as far as Socrates, that says the right sort of life is one guided by reason rather than by emotions, passions, or natural appetites. There are harsher and milder versions of this view, and it has also been controverted both by hard-headed empiricists and by tender-minded enthusiasts. Kant's version of the rationalist view is both milder and subtler than its common reputation, but it is still relatively harsh. This chapter explores Kant's reasons for thinking that reason must oppose and regulate the satisfaction of natural appetite and the prompting of natural feeling. These reasons are not derived a priori from Kant's conceptions of metaphysics or morality but are empirical and anthropological in character.

In the Groundwork Kant says prominently: “The human being feels within himself a powerful counterweight to all the commands of duty, … the counterweight of his needs and inclinations” (G 4:405). Such remarks have been a rallying point for attacks on Kant's position, beginning with those on Kant's “rigorism” and “formalism” by milder rationalists (such as Schiller and Hegel). Kant's moral psychology presents a relatively easy target in the abstract form it assumes in his foundational ethical works, where it can be associated with his “two worlds” metaphysics of the self, and blamed either on his pietist background or the Stoic ethical tradition Kant seems to represent.