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2 - A Theory of Drug Market Regulation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 August 2022

Hernán Flom
Affiliation:
Trinity College, Connecticut
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Summary

This chapter deploys the book’s theoretical framework, which connects political competition, police autonomy and informal regulation of illicit markets. While the electoral costs of police corruption and violence can motivate politicians to reduce police autonomy, political fragmentation and turnover condition whether and how they can achieve this objective. Fragmentation may obstruct policy implementation but also inhibit politicians from centralizing police rent extraction, while turnover impedes sustaining policies that reduce police autonomy over time. Police autonomy will shape how the police regulate drug markets. With greater autonomy police broker particularistic negotiations with, or engage in unbridled violence, or particularistic confrontation, against dealers and traffickers. When politicians reduce police autonomy through politicization, they capture rents from criminal activities and produce coordinated protection rackets, defined by high corruption but also lower violence on both sides. Finally, professionalized police forces regulate drug trafficking through coordinated coexistence regimes, brokering informal agreements that limit violence by both police and criminals.

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Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2022

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  • A Theory of Drug Market Regulation
  • Hernán Flom, Trinity College, Connecticut
  • Book: The Informal Regulation of Criminal Markets in Latin America
  • Online publication: 18 August 2022
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009170710.002
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  • A Theory of Drug Market Regulation
  • Hernán Flom, Trinity College, Connecticut
  • Book: The Informal Regulation of Criminal Markets in Latin America
  • Online publication: 18 August 2022
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009170710.002
Available formats
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Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • A Theory of Drug Market Regulation
  • Hernán Flom, Trinity College, Connecticut
  • Book: The Informal Regulation of Criminal Markets in Latin America
  • Online publication: 18 August 2022
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009170710.002
Available formats
×