Development of the concept of morality: Tübigen and Bern (1793–1796)

Perhaps the most well-known feature of Hegel's ethical thought is his distinction between “morality” (Moralität) and “ethical life” (Sittlichkeit). But is the distinction well understood? One common interpretation is the following: “Morality” for Hegel means Kant's moral philosophy; it represents what is reflective, critical, and individualistic in the moral life. Hegel identifies “ethical life” with ancient Greek society; it stands for an attitude of unthinking, pious devotion to the traditional laws and customs of one's people. Hegel is a partisan of ethical life and an opponent of morality. He favors social conformism and moral traditionalism, and is an opponent of individualism and critical moral thinking.

There is some truth in each of the elements of this picture, but in every case that truth is seriously oversimplified. The picture as a whole (summed up in the last two sentences of the previous paragraph) is a hopeless distortion. The picture comes closest to describing Hegel's views during his Jena period (1801–1806). But Hegel's views about morality and ethical life underwent quite radical changes in the course of his philosophical development, and during the Jena period itself Hegel's conception of morality presents us with a moving target. The best way to begin a discussion of this conception is with a brief account of its evolution. Hegel's earliest manuscripts, composed while he was a student in Tübingen (1793) and a private tutor in Bern (1794–1796), are ostensibly concerned with religion and its history.