Book contents
- A Great Deal of Ruin
- A Great Deal of Ruin
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Tables
- Preface
- I Introduction
- Part I Financial Crises
- Part II Five Case Studies
- Part III Lessons
- 8 Markets Do Not Self-Regulate
- 9 Shadow Banks are Banks
- 10 Banks Need More Capital, Less Debt
- 11 Monetary Policy Does Not Always Work
- 12 Fiscal Multipliers Are Larger Than Expected
- 13 Monetary Integration Requires Fiscal Integration
- 14 Open Capital Markets Can Be Dangerous
- 15 Not All Debt Is Created Equal
- Conclusion
- Abbreviations and Acronyms
- Bibliography
- Index
Conclusion
from Part III - Lessons
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 August 2019
- A Great Deal of Ruin
- A Great Deal of Ruin
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Tables
- Preface
- I Introduction
- Part I Financial Crises
- Part II Five Case Studies
- Part III Lessons
- 8 Markets Do Not Self-Regulate
- 9 Shadow Banks are Banks
- 10 Banks Need More Capital, Less Debt
- 11 Monetary Policy Does Not Always Work
- 12 Fiscal Multipliers Are Larger Than Expected
- 13 Monetary Integration Requires Fiscal Integration
- 14 Open Capital Markets Can Be Dangerous
- 15 Not All Debt Is Created Equal
- Conclusion
- Abbreviations and Acronyms
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
It is too soon to know if the financial controls implemented in the wake of the recent Subprime Crisis are as robust as the reforms put into place after the Great Depression. It seems unlikely, however, that the next seventy-five years will be free from a systemwide crisis like the seventy-five years from the Great Depression to the Subprime Crisis. The complexity of finance, together with its international linkages, rapid development of new technologies such as blockchain and risk models, and institutional innovations such as the various forms of shadow banking, seem to argue against another long period of relative quiet.
There are plenty of possibilities for another crisis. China has accumulated massive amounts of internal debt in its shadow banks and state owned enterprises. The Eurozone will continue to create divergences between weak and strong economies, along with pressures to implement austerity in countries already suffering from slow or negative growth.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- A Great Deal of RuinFinancial Crises since 1929, pp. 296 - 303Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2019