Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Introduction: Irony, Naïveté, and Moore
- 1 Simplicity, Indefinability, Nonnaturalness
- 2 Good's Nonnaturalness
- 3 The Paradox of Ethics and Its Resolution
- 4 The Status of Ethics: Dimming the Future and Brightening the Past
- 5 The Origin of the Awareness of Good and the Theory of Common Sense
- 6 Moore's Argument Against Egoism
- 7 The Diagnosis of Egoism and the Consequences of Its Rejection
- 8 Moore's Practical and Political Philosophy
- 9 Moore's Cosmic Conservatism
- 10 Cosmic Conservatism II
- Bibliography
- Index
7 - The Diagnosis of Egoism and the Consequences of Its Rejection
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 July 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Introduction: Irony, Naïveté, and Moore
- 1 Simplicity, Indefinability, Nonnaturalness
- 2 Good's Nonnaturalness
- 3 The Paradox of Ethics and Its Resolution
- 4 The Status of Ethics: Dimming the Future and Brightening the Past
- 5 The Origin of the Awareness of Good and the Theory of Common Sense
- 6 Moore's Argument Against Egoism
- 7 The Diagnosis of Egoism and the Consequences of Its Rejection
- 8 Moore's Practical and Political Philosophy
- 9 Moore's Cosmic Conservatism
- 10 Cosmic Conservatism II
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
Why Egoism Seems Plausible
The stronger view is something very difficult to accept. To get into a position to accept it, one will have to engage in a great deal of psychological and anthropological reflection to wean oneself from the thought that there is sense in such notions as ‘my own good’ and ‘important to me’: Why do such notions lodge so deeply within us if finally they make no sense? Moore's attempt to engage in these reflections and answer this question in the rest of his discussion of Sidgwick is disappointing.
Sidgwick's concern has been to come to grips with the felt conflict between duty and self-interest, between what he calls Rational Benevolence and Rational Prudence. He holds that because it is rational to act in accord with either of these opposing positions, there is a “contradiction” in ethics. He suggests a way to resolve this contradiction by reconciling the two positions. If there is a Deity who insures that actions done in accord with the dictates of Rational Benevolence are the same as those done in accord with Rational Prudence, there would never be any difference in what the two principles require. Thus the contradiction would evaporate. Moore argues that this suggestion is misguided on a number of different counts. First, Sidgwick's view that there is a contradiction in ethics is born of his failure to realize that egoism is contradictory.
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- Chapter
- Information
- G. E. Moore's Ethical TheoryResistance and Reconciliation, pp. 131 - 145Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2001