Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-xm8r8 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-06-28T14:36:37.062Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

5 - Fault in Contract Law

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 November 2010

Omri Ben-Shahar
Affiliation:
University of Chicago
Ariel Porat
Affiliation:
Tel-Aviv University
Get access

Summary

A promisor is strictly liable for breaching a contract, according to the standard account. However, a negligence-based system of contract law can be given an economic interpretation. This chapter shows that such a system is, in some respects, more attractive than the strict liability system. This may explain why negligence ideas continue to play a role in contract decisions, as a brief discussion of cases shows.

Introduction

Anglo-American contract law is said to be a strict liability system, but it could just as well be a fault-based system. Indeed, one can make a plausible case that a fault-based contract law would be superior to the strict liability system. A fault-based system would result in courts enforcing optimal contracts more systematically than they do currently – if courts could implement the system with sufficient accuracy. The disadvantage of such a system is that courts would need to make difficult inquiries and could make more errors. How the advantages and disadvantages balance out is hard to determine.

As many authors have noticed, although Anglo-American contract law is usually called a strict liability system, it does contain pockets of fault. Faultlike notions, such as good faith and best efforts, recur in the cases; and terms are often implied in order to ensure that obligations are reasonable rather than absolute. These doctrines reflect some of the advantages of the fault-based system, and strengthen the theoretical basis for the claim that fault ought to play a role in contract law.

Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2010

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Cohen, George M., The Fault Lines in Contract Damages, 80 Va. L. Rev.1225, 1237–9 (1994)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bebchuk, Lucian Arye & Png, I.P.L., Damage Measures for Inadvertent Breach of Contract, 19 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ.319 (1999)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cooter, Robert, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution, 73 Cal. L. Rev.1 (1985)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Craswell, Richard, Performance, Reliance, and One-sided Information, 18 J. Legal Stud.365 (1989)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Craswell, Richard, Precontractual Investigation as an Optimal Precaution Problem, 17 J. Legal Stud.401 (1988)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kornhauser, Lewis A., Reliance, Reputation and Breach of Contract, 26 J.L. & Econ.691 (1983)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Goetz, Charles J. & Scott, Robert E., Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 Colum. L. Rev.554 (1977)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Craswell, Richard, Contract Remedies, Renegotiation, and the Theory of Efficient Breach, 61 S. Cal. L. Rev.629, 643–4 (1988)Google Scholar
Craswell, Richard, Deterrence and Damages: The Multiplier Principle and Its Alternatives, 97 Mich. L. Rev.2185, 2229 (1999)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shavell, Steven, Strict Liability versus Negligence, 9 J. Legal Stud.1, 20–2 (1980)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Posner, Richard A. & Rosenfield, Andrew M., Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. Legal Stud.83, 92 (1977)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Goldberg, Victor P., Impossibility and Related Excuses, 144 J. Institutional & Theoretical Econ.100 (1988)Google Scholar
Sykes, Alan O., The Doctrine of Commercial Impracticability in a Second-best World, 19 J. Legal Stud.43, 66–7 (1990)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schwartz, Alan, The Myth that Promisees Prefer Supracompensatory Remedies: An Analysis of Contracting for Damage Measures, 100 Yale L.J.369 (1990)CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×