Book contents
- Electricity Capacity Markets
- Electricity Capacity Markets
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Capacity Markets Primer
- 3 Restructured Electricity Markets and Regional Transmission Organizations
- 4 Reliability and the Missing Money Problem
- 5 Capacity Policies
- 6 First-Generation Capacity Markets
- 7 Second-Generation Capacity Markets
- 8 Capacity Market Demand
- 9 Capacity Market Supply
- 10 Capacity Market Design
- 11 Market Power
- 12 Minimum Offer Price Rules
- 13 The Texas Alternative
- 14 Conclusion
- Index
- References
11 - Market Power
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 February 2022
Book contents
- Electricity Capacity Markets
- Electricity Capacity Markets
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Capacity Markets Primer
- 3 Restructured Electricity Markets and Regional Transmission Organizations
- 4 Reliability and the Missing Money Problem
- 5 Capacity Policies
- 6 First-Generation Capacity Markets
- 7 Second-Generation Capacity Markets
- 8 Capacity Market Demand
- 9 Capacity Market Supply
- 10 Capacity Market Design
- 11 Market Power
- 12 Minimum Offer Price Rules
- 13 The Texas Alternative
- 14 Conclusion
- Index
- References
Summary
The exercise of market power is a continuing problem in electricity markets. This is especially true for capacity markets. To deal with this challenge, each of the Northeast regional transmission organizations (RTOs) uses a variant of the pivotal supplier test to determine if market power exists. Which variant is used has important implications for the risks of error in the analysis of market power. Where market power is found, it needs to be mitigated. How such mitigation takes place in capacity markets has posed difficulties for the RTOs.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Electricity Capacity Markets , pp. 190 - 204Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2022
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