The ICC, created by the Rome Statute in 1998, constitutes a truly unique international adjudicative body. It exemplifies the process of global legalization, it points to the strong connection between domestic and international law, and it embodies a true compromise between two domestic legal traditions. During the Rome negotiations, state representatives pushed for rules and procedures that were familiar to them based on their domestic legal backgrounds, which resulted in the creation of a sui generis international court, an interesting hybrid between common law and civil law principles. This design process was not only rational from the perspective of the Court's supporters, it also had unintended consequences in that states considering whether to join the ICC at a later date would be influenced by the original design of the court.

In this chapter, we apply the theory articulated in Chapter 3, which contends that states' domestic legal traditions influence their preferences regarding the legal design of international courts. States involved in creating a new international adjudicative body seek to design a court with familiar legal rules and principles, anticipating that an initial commitment to the court will be durable and have long-term consequences. We argue that the ICC originators pushed for rules and procedures that mimicked those of their domestic legal systems to help reduce uncertainty regarding the Court's future decision-making processes.