Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Table of cases
- Table of treaties
- List of abbreviations
- Introduction
- PART I Self-determination in post-Cold War international legal literature
- 1 The question of norm-type
- 2 Interpretation and identity
- 3 Pandemonium, interpretation and participation
- PART II Self-determination interpreted in practice: the challenge of culture
- PART III Self-determination interpreted in practice: the challenge of gender
- Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
1 - The question of norm-type
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 July 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Table of cases
- Table of treaties
- List of abbreviations
- Introduction
- PART I Self-determination in post-Cold War international legal literature
- 1 The question of norm-type
- 2 Interpretation and identity
- 3 Pandemonium, interpretation and participation
- PART II Self-determination interpreted in practice: the challenge of culture
- PART III Self-determination interpreted in practice: the challenge of gender
- Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
‘Un droit imprécis, voire marqué par la contradiction, est aussi un droit éminemment évolutif,’ observes Michel Virally. (‘A law that is imprecise, or even marked by contradiction, is also a law that is eminently evolutive.’) He connects the form that an international law norm takes to its ability to meet the needs of an international society in transition from a club of European states to a more equal and inclusive community. Virally's observation draws attention to an important but neglected point of contention in the debate among international lawyers over a right to secede – namely, how imprecise the law of self-determination is – and to the implications for diversity. This chapter pursues one particular aspect of this disagreement: the characterization of self-determination as a rule of international law, a principle of international law, or both. To frame the discussion, the chapter uses Antonio Cassese's treatment of self-determination as both principle and rule in Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal and James Crawford's response in his review of the book.
We need not accept Virally's mapping of the rule/principle distinction onto the dichotomies of conservative/progressive, disempowering/empowering, homogeneous/heterogeneous. Indeed, we shall find that approaching self-determination as a principle is not necessarily always better suited to advancing substantive justice, procedural fairness and a thrivingly diverse international community. The proposition, however, provokes a set of questions that begin to reveal the structures at work in competing definitions of self-determination and the stakes in the choice of structure.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Diversity and Self-Determination in International Law , pp. 29 - 49Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2002