At first glance, Iran and Turkey appear to be an unambiguous study in contrast in both the arenas of politics and economics. In the political sphere, in common parlance, Iran is referred to as a “theocracy” while Turkey is identified as a “secular republic”. However, the reality is far more complex than is assumed. Belying the view that Turkey is unequivocally secular in terms of the strict separation of religion and state is that the official Turkish definition of secularism subordinates religion to the state instead of separating the two spheres, thus deviating from the normally accepted meaning of the term, at least in the Anglo-American tradition. Moreover, one finds that the country's public arena is not free from contestation between religiously inclined forces and those espousing a militant and aggressive form of secularism. This contestation, in large measure a reaction to the state's aggressive secularism, has become sharper since the 1970s, as the religiously observant segments of society have regained their political voice suppressed for decades by the Kemalist elite.

Paradoxically, in its attempt to control the public expression of Islam, the Kemalist state has ended up giving Sunni Islam of the Hanafi school of jurisprudence the de facto position of state religion by according it preferential, if subordinate, treatment. The Directorate of Religious Affairs appoints and pays all Sunni imams, the state-funded imam-hatip schools train all Sunni religious functionaries, and the upkeep of Sunni mosques and other religious establishments is the responsibility of the state.