Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- Acknowledgments
- INTRODUCTION
- 1 A THEORY OF POLITICAL TRANSITIONS
- 2 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
- 3 HISTORICAL EVIDENCE
- 4 THEORETICAL EXTENSIONS: GROWTH, TRADE, POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
- 5 DEMOCRACY AND THE PUBLIC SECTOR
- 6 THE STATE, THE THREAT OF EXPROPRIATION AND THE POSSIBILITY OF DEVELOPMENT
- 7 CONCLUSIONS
- References
- Index
- Title in the series
4 - THEORETICAL EXTENSIONS: GROWTH, TRADE, POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 February 2015
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- Acknowledgments
- INTRODUCTION
- 1 A THEORY OF POLITICAL TRANSITIONS
- 2 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
- 3 HISTORICAL EVIDENCE
- 4 THEORETICAL EXTENSIONS: GROWTH, TRADE, POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
- 5 DEMOCRACY AND THE PUBLIC SECTOR
- 6 THE STATE, THE THREAT OF EXPROPRIATION AND THE POSSIBILITY OF DEVELOPMENT
- 7 CONCLUSIONS
- References
- Index
- Title in the series
Summary
Using a rather simple set of assumptions, the first chapter shed light on the conditions that underlie different types of political regimes: the extent of inequality, the degree of capital mobility, the political resources of the classes or sectors involved in the struggle to determine the constitutional framework of the country, and, in part, uncertainty about political conditions. Chapters 2 and 3 then corroborated the validity of the theory through statistical and historical analysis.
In this chapter, I employ again the basic model of Chapter 1 to discuss its theoretical implications for two types of issues. In the first three sections, I examine how changes in the economy affect the chances of democracy. In the first section I find economic growth to be a necessary but not sufficient condition to generate a democratic outcome. The possibility that low taxes may spur faster economic growth may entice the poor to commit to moderate levels of redistribution. This should, in turn, reduce the wealthy's opposition to universal suffrage and hence facilitate the introduction of democracy. Still, the positive impact on democracy of potential growth hinges on the institutional capacity of the poor to abide by their promise to keep taxes low. This result sheds new light on the literature on the postwar consensus, which claims that the success of democracy in postwar Europe lay on striking a broad class compromise.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Democracy and Redistribution , pp. 130 - 170Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2003