Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- List of tables
- Notes on contributors
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction
- Part I Disciplinary insights
- 1 The politics of deadlocks
- 2 From Bretton Woods to Havana: multilateral deadlocks in historical perspective
- 3 Talking one's way out of strikes
- 4 Litigating the way out of deadlock: the WTO, the EU and the UN
- Part II Case studies
- Conclusion: case studies as evidence: lessons learned
- Bibliography
- Index
1 - The politics of deadlocks
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- List of tables
- Notes on contributors
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction
- Part I Disciplinary insights
- 1 The politics of deadlocks
- 2 From Bretton Woods to Havana: multilateral deadlocks in historical perspective
- 3 Talking one's way out of strikes
- 4 Litigating the way out of deadlock: the WTO, the EU and the UN
- Part II Case studies
- Conclusion: case studies as evidence: lessons learned
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
Deadlocks abound in politics. At its simplest a deadlock is a position in which it is impossible to proceed or act. It signals a complete standstill, an impasse. Relationships become frozen, and characterised by immobility and inflexibility. Deadlocks arise frequently in political negotiations of all kinds, but it is important to ask why this is so. Is there something about politics and political relationships which are especially liable to deadlocks, or is the phenomenon a more general one? Might it be possible to design a world in which deadlocks did not occur at all, or only infrequently?
Deadlocks are generally seen as undesirable. If there is an impasse in a negotiation and it becomes impossible to proceed or act, it is often assumed that the resulting situation will be less optimal than if there had been an agreement. But as other papers in this collection point out this is not necessarily the case. An impasse can be rational if the best alternative to a negotiated agreement (the BATNA) is seen as superior to what is being offered by the other parties. There remains an assumption that the path of negotiation and the conclusion of negotiated agreements is generally in the best interests of the parties, and that the gains that come from negotiation in the end outweigh whatever has to be given up or compromised in order to get the agreement.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Deadlocks in Multilateral NegotiationsCauses and Solutions, pp. 25 - 46Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2010
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