Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- Acknowledgements
- 1 Introduction: rethinking corporate governance – lessons from the global financial crisis
- Part I The failure of the market approach to corporate governance
- Part II Ownership, internal control and risk management: the roles of institutional shareholders and boards
- 7 A review of corporate governance in UK banks and other financial industry entities: the role of institutional shareholders
- 8 Ownership structure and shareholder engagement: reflections on the role of institutional shareholders in the financial crisis
- 9 Board challenges 2009
- 10 Do independent boards effectively monitor management? Evidence from Japan during the financial crisis
- 11 Risk management in corporate law and corporate governance
- Part III Post-crisis corporate governance: the search for new directions
- Index
- References
9 - Board challenges 2009
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 August 2011
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- Acknowledgements
- 1 Introduction: rethinking corporate governance – lessons from the global financial crisis
- Part I The failure of the market approach to corporate governance
- Part II Ownership, internal control and risk management: the roles of institutional shareholders and boards
- 7 A review of corporate governance in UK banks and other financial industry entities: the role of institutional shareholders
- 8 Ownership structure and shareholder engagement: reflections on the role of institutional shareholders in the financial crisis
- 9 Board challenges 2009
- 10 Do independent boards effectively monitor management? Evidence from Japan during the financial crisis
- 11 Risk management in corporate law and corporate governance
- Part III Post-crisis corporate governance: the search for new directions
- Index
- References
Summary
Numerous corporate scandals and failures have characterized the early twenty-first century: from the bursting dot-com bubble in 2000 to malfeasance at Enron, Tyco, Worldcom and elsewhere in 2002 to the demise of once-great automotive companies and the failures of banks and financial institutions in 2008 and 2009. Each wave of business problems has been greeted by accusations of failure on the part of corporate boards and calls for government action. Indeed, passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 was a result of the failures of Worldcom, Enron and other mismanaged companies. Pressure from shareholders, the media and politicians has prompted the SEC to stiffen requirements for reporting executive compensation in company 10-Ks and recent proposals for ‘say-on-pay’ legislation seek to provide a non-binding shareholder vote on executive compensation. Moreover the SEC has floated a proposal granting shareholders the right to nominate candidates for corporate boards.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Corporate Governance and the Global Financial CrisisInternational Perspectives, pp. 165 - 187Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2011