Introduction

It is clear that the PVCL and PVCM will hold that coercive proposals can often nullify the transformative power of sexual consent. Sexual deception is different. Although deception typically renders agreements voidable in commercial contexts, caveat amator has long been the traditional legal principle for sexual relations. Several states criminalize deception with respect to a sexually transmitted disease or impersonation of a husband. But such exceptions aside, the law has been quite permissive with respect to sexual deception. In the words of a recent Canadian case: “Deceptions, small and sometimes large, have from time immemorial been the by-product of romance and sexual encounters. They often carry the risk of harm to the deceived party. Thus far in the history of civilization, these deceptions, however sad, have been left to the domain of song, verse and social censure.” I suspect that prevailing moral norms are only somewhat less permissive. We may think it sleazy if a male lies about his marital status, affections, or intentions in order to get a woman into bed, but many do not think that this is a particularly serious matter.

It is not clear why this is so. As a general principle, we might think that A's deception should generally undermine the moral and legal transformative power of consent because it precludes B from being able to decide whether engaging in sex with A is in her interests or compatible with her values.