Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Contributors
- Introduction
- DATA AND THEORY IN NEUROSCIENCE
- NEURAL REPRESENTATION
- 4 Moving Beyond Metaphors: Understanding the Mind for What It Is
- 5 Brain Time and Phenomenological Time
- 6 The Puzzle of Temporal Experience
- VISUOMOTOR TRANSFORMATION
- COLOR VISION
- CONSCIOUSNESS
- Index
- Plate section
- References
5 - Brain Time and Phenomenological Time
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 February 2010
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Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Contributors
- Introduction
- DATA AND THEORY IN NEUROSCIENCE
- NEURAL REPRESENTATION
- 4 Moving Beyond Metaphors: Understanding the Mind for What It Is
- 5 Brain Time and Phenomenological Time
- 6 The Puzzle of Temporal Experience
- VISUOMOTOR TRANSFORMATION
- COLOR VISION
- CONSCIOUSNESS
- Index
- Plate section
- References
Summary
As 'tis from the disposition of visible and tangible objects we receive the idea of space, so from the succession of ideas and impressions we form the idea of time.
– David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature… space and time … are … pure intuitions that lie a priori at the basis of the empirical… . [T]hey are mere forms of our sensibility, which must precede all empirical intuition, or perception of actual objects.
– Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics… there are cases in which on the basis of a temporally extended content of consciousness a unitary apprehension takes place which is spread out over a temporal interval (the so-called specious present)…. That several successive tones yield a melody is possible only in this way, that the succession of psychical processes are united “forthwith” in a common structure.
– Edmund Husserl, The Phenomenology of Inner Time-ConsciousnessIntroduction
The topic of this chapter is temporal representation. More specifically, I intend to provide an outline of a theory of what it is that our brains do (at the subpersonal level) such that we experience (at the personal level) certain aspects of time in the way that we do. A few words about both sides of this relation are in order.
First, the brain. I will actually be making little substantive contact with neurophysiology.
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- Information
- Cognition and the BrainThe Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement, pp. 160 - 207Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2005
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