The chapter aims to answer the question in its title from a practical aspect, the perspective of a Hungarian criminal lawyer. First, it dsicusses the theoretical background and reasonableness of the criminalisation of anticompetitive conducts, including some thoughts about the type of sanctions that might make the threat of criminal liability a real deterrent. It goes on to summarise the main features of various criminal regimes with their own unique approaches to criminalisation. For this, it not only focuses on the regimes’ theoretical concepts, but also on their actual implementation and results, covering the difficulties and discrepancies deriving from their everyday practice. Based on this analysis, some general conclusions are drawn – both on the national and European Union level – regarding anticompetitive conducts’ criminalisation, and suggestions made as to how to improve the criminal regimes already introduced. Based on these findings, the study tries to answer its basic question, whether at the present stage of the (Hungarian) criminalisation of anti-competitive conducts, the ‘cartel crime’ could be deemed a somewhat theoretical danger, a so-called paper tiger, and whether even the present stage of criminalisation could be deemed satisfactory, and the present threat of criminal liability and sanctions already to have a real deterrent effect.